


AMERICAN NEO- COLONIALISM

Its Emergence in the Philippines and Asia

by William J. Pomeroy

NEW WORLD PAPERBACKS
NW



OTHER BOOKS BY THE AUTHOR

Guerrilla and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare

*The Forest: A Personal Record of the Huk Guerrilla Struggle
in the Philippines*

Beyond Barriers (poems)

Half a Century of Socialism: Soviet Life in the Sixties

Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism

AMERICAN
NEO-COLONIALISM

*Its Emergence in the
Philippines and Asia*

by William J. Pomeroy



INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS

New York

To Celia

The researching and writing of this book were made possible by a grant from the Louis M. Rabinowitz Foundation, to which the author expresses his gratitude.

*Copyright © 1970 by INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS CO., INC.
All Rights Reserved
First Edition*

Library of Congress Catalogue Number: 71-108385
Printed in the United States of America



CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	7
I. IMPETUS TO EMPIRE	13
<i>The Disputed Issue of 1898</i>	
1. The Imperial Expansionists, 13	
2. Reform and Anti-Colonialism, 20	
3. War With Spain: The Issue is Joined, 26	
II. THE PHILIPPINE DILEMMA	35
<i>Colony or Coaling Station?</i>	
1. "Liberating" A Base, 35	
2. The Logic of Acquiring a Colony, 46	
3. Ratifying a Peace Treaty, Beginning a War, 56	
III. AMERICANS AND FILIPINOS	64
<i>Attraction or Subjugation?</i>	
1. Preparations to Strangle a Republic, 64	
2. The Schurman Commission and Alternatives to a Military Solution, 70	
IV. CONQUEST OF A COLONY	84
V. THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST MOVEMENT, 1898-1900	99
1. The Opposition to Colonial Conquest, 99	
2. The Inconclusive Election of 1900, 111	
VI. COLONIAL POLICY	118
<i>Conflict or Curtailment?</i>	
1. Imperialism and the Lawmakers, 118	
2. The Organic Act and the Boundaries of Exploitation, 124	

3. From "Colonial Department" to "Bureau of Insular Affairs," 129	
4. MacArthur vs Taft: The Imperialist Mind, Military and Civil, 132	
VII. FRUSTRATION IN ASIA	150
<i>Open Door to Holding Action</i>	
1. The Elusive China Market: Rivals and High Stakes, 150	
2. The Military Problem, 165	
VIII. PROBLEMS OF PHILIPPINE TRADE AND INVESTMENT	172
1. Cotton Goods, Cordage and the Carrying Trade, 172	
2. Railroads, Bonds and Banks, 181	
IX. AMENDING COLONIALISM	190
1. Expansion of the U.S. Home Market, 190	
2. Capitalist Reform and Anti-Colonialism, 195	
3. "Treat the Philippines Like Cuba," 200	
4. The Colonial Issue Is Settled, 205	
X. BALANCE SHEET	219
1. Questions of Cost and Profit, 219	
2. Neo-Colonialism: A Continuing Debate, 223	
REFERENCE NOTES	229
BIBLIOGRAPHY	240
INDEX	249

INTRODUCTION

This volume offers a study of the factors and processes that have contributed to the creation and operation of the imperialist system of the United States. It is not an attempt at a full-scale analysis of American imperialism and of how it developed and functions as a stage of American capitalism, but is limited mainly to an examination of the controversy affecting aspects of imperialist policy at the turn of the century, particularly in regard to ventures into Asia. The essential policies characteristic of American imperialism were formed to a large extent by critical questions concerning the nature of its Asian operations at that time, and an exposition of these may add to an understanding of the problems that affect it in the same region in the contemporary period.

The classical formulation of imperialist development was made by Lenin, and is well-known to all serious students of modern history and of political economy. Lenin's five features, illustrating the imperialist process as marked by monopoly growth, finance capital, export of capital, international cartel arrangements, and outright division of the world into colonies, provided an exact definition recognizable in the development of all imperialist countries.

An understanding of Lenin's general formulation, however, is only the beginning of an understanding of how each major capitalist country advanced, or declined, in its imperialist role, just as a grasp of Marx's theory of surplus value is only the starting point for an explanation of the class forces at work in each country. There remains the need to explain the rise of the United States to world imperialist supremacy with only a minimum participation in outright seizure of colonies. There is a need to take Lenin's observation that imperialism also maintains indirect colonies with an outer frame of independence and expand it into a detailed formulation of the contemporary phenomenon of neo-colonialism, no longer relying upon actual ownership of colonies.

The variations in the formula of imperialism become apparent when one examines the colonial systems of each individual

power. India, Indo-China, Indonesia and the Philippines could all be mentioned as examples of Lenin's fifth feature of imperialism, but each was different from the others in structure of colonial rule. This not only reflected the peculiar historical circumstances of each imperialist power concerned, but it had a decided effect upon the nature and the course of the national liberation movements and of struggles leading to independence in each colony.

Because of its distinctive peculiarities, American imperialism for decades was less exposed as a system than that of its European counterparts. American bourgeois historians were able to put forward a contention that the events beginning in 1898 that led to the acquisition of colonies by the United States were an "aberration," a mere "flirtation" with imperialism that was short-lived. Colonial occupation of the Philippines was thus portrayed, not without success, as a great experiment in "education for self-rule" for the Filipinos, with the United States supposedly anxious to get rid of its "white man's burden," finally doing so through an Independence Act passed by the U.S. Congress in 1934, long before the forced liquidation of empires by the other imperialist powers.

The United States was able for a long time to escape the full onus attached to imperialist dominance because its growth as a world power contained certain factors different from those affecting Great Britain, France, Germany, tsarist Russia, Japan, the Netherlands, or Portugal. Its continental wealth of resources made it relatively less dependent, until a later stage, on foreign sources of food and of raw materials for industry; today's more obvious, aggressive American imperialism occurs at a time when there is a depletion of domestic oil reserves and key mineral ores. Its internal market and investment field, capable of great expansion, tempered its drive into foreign markets; the use of a high tariff policy to protect that home market traditionally played a more salient role than the acquisition of colonies, colonial markets, and resources. (British imperialism, at its peak in 1914, had one-fourth of its total wealth in investments abroad and its foreign trade approximated one-fourth of its gross national product; in contrast, the United States, from the time of its rise as a world power, has put no more than one-tenth of its wealth in overseas investments, with foreign trade not exceeding about

12 per cent of gross national product.) Even the geographical location of the United States enabled it to escape so-called entangling alliances in Europe and Asia and the devastation visited on those continents in imperialist wars.

Interwoven with these factors have been serious internal contradictions, shaping the American attitude toward possession of colonies and making themselves felt repeatedly at various times in the imperialist stage of the United States. Most important was the clash of interests between the various sectors of American finance, industry and agriculture when it came to an expanded imperialist policy abroad.

Domestic producers of agricultural crops in particular (especially beet sugar, tobacco and dairy products) opposed the acquisition or retention of colonies from which similar crops could enter the United States on a competitive preferential basis. Domestic business interests, too, including some prominent industrial circles, were unwilling to share the tax and inflationary burden arising from military and administrative costs in acquiring, maintaining and defending a colonial empire for the benefit of a relative minority of overseas traders and investors.

One of the great debates and internal struggles in American history took place early in the present century between these contradictory forces. Although focused on colonial policy toward the Philippines, it had its effect on the whole course of American imperialist policy. At the time, the struggle resulted in a large measure of success for the "anti-imperialists," who held their ground and helped prevent the implementation of a traditional colonialism.

In truth, the problems of American imperialist policy at critical times have been brought to a head as much by conflicts at home as by contradictions and crises in the colonial areas themselves. The multi-faceted question of protectionism for domestic industries and of the reluctance on the part of all producers and citizens to accept the burdens of paying for the imperialist operations of a few, albeit powerful, interests has been woven through American history in the 20th century.

One of the most significant aspects of policy was largely unstated in the debate, and was significant precisely because it remained unstated and outside the arena of conflict. This was the main tendency of American imperialist interests to expand and

to concentrate in areas adjacent to the United States, in Canada and in Latin America. The "big stick" policy of armed intervention in the Caribbean, Central America and Mexico did not arouse protest on a scale that the conquest of the Philippines did. More important, there was no objection to indirect domination of the countries in these areas, although the effects of this on their peoples were virtually the same as the effect on the colonized Filipino people.

Opponents of the outright possession of the Philippines were, in fact, very much in favor of the imperialist policy pursued in Latin America, and put forward the idea that the United States should "treat the Philippines like Cuba." Cuban policy was a forerunner of what has come to be known as "neo-colonialism," the creation of which actually lay at the heart of the controversy early in the century. In simplified terms, the anti-imperialism of that time is the neo-colonialism of today.

The question of Puerto Rico is a perfect example of an exception that proves the rule. Taken as a colony from Spain at the same time that the Philippines were seized, its possession never became a serious matter of contention in ruling circles as the Philippines colony did. Once its relation to the American market was defined to the satisfaction of U.S. domestic interests (by the same "insular cases" decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that defined the Philippine relation), it subsided as an issue. The smallness of its area and population and of productive capacity in competitive crops may have been a factor in this, but the main consideration was its strategic location at the entrance of the Caribbean, where it played a key part in protecting the Panama Canal and the lines of penetration into Latin America. As a part of the home-based U.S. military system, the island base involved little in the way of extra expense and its possession incurred no rivalry with other imperialist powers. Puerto Rico as a colony was a protective piece in the important neo-colonial machinery in Latin America, and therefore was acceptable.

Questions of strategy, military and economic, have been closely linked with internal contradictions in the shaping of American imperialist policy. Seizure of the Philippines at the turn of the century was to provide the base for participation in the carving up of China into imperialist spheres of domination, but once the colony was acquired it soon became apparent that

more than possession of a base was needed. Not only would large sums of capital be required to finance a competitive thrust into China, but a major military presence would be necessary in East Asia to contend with the power of imperialist rivals on the ground. The enormous effort and cost of such a policy, in a region of tertiary importance in the global division of American overseas trade and investment, made this strategically unfeasible and conducive to further divisions at home. When the Philippine Independence Act was passed in 1934, finally achieving a Cuba-like relationship with the colony, the strategic consideration, augmented by the threat of aggressive Japanese power, was coupled with the pressures of domestic interests intensified by the effects of the Great Depression.

This example of over-extension and of retreat, or adjustment, when power and profitability have proven to have limitations, has had its remarkable duplication in the contemporary period. Following the elimination, for the time being, of Japan, its former main rival in Asia, American imperialism, claiming the Pacific as "an American lake," now felt that it had the military and the financial means to capture the goals of 1898.

Fresh rivals of American imperialism had, however, come on the scene: the national liberation, anti-imperialist movements of Asia, merged with and supported by the socialist countries. These denied long-sought markets in Asia to American control far more effectively than rival imperialist powers had done earlier in the century. American imperialism, however, disregarding the historical significance of this development, felt that it had the means to overcome the new, liberated nations and that the risk and the cost were worth it. This led the United States into the disastrous colonial-style wars of aggression in Korea and Vietnam.

Two main American sectors fostered these adventures: those who hoped for dominance in Asia, including reconquest of the vast China market and investment field, and those in the military-industrial complex who profited from the wars themselves. However, a commitment of American wealth and resources to an area of tertiary importance in U.S. overseas holdings and trade came to overweigh and to be a drag upon both the home sector and major areas of operation abroad. The old contradictions between the various sectors and priorities of American capitalism reasserted themselves in new forms.

There are, of course, great differences between the period at the turn of the century and the present. In the earlier period American imperialism and its capabilities were ascendent; today they are in decline and the revolutionary forces with which they contend in all areas are ascendant. Today, also, the anti-imperialist, anti-Vietnam War movement in the United States has been far broader and deeper than the Anti-Imperialist League of 1899, representing not only a cleavage in ruling circles but a massive popular domestic upsurge against costly colonial-style aggressions abroad. The patterns of American imperialist contradictions, however, are similar.

The present study has concerned itself mainly with the Philippines because in the policies arising from American relations with that country can be seen most clearly the evolution of concepts and trends that have come to be known today as neo-colonialism. It is felt that there is no better way of demonstrating the American neo-colonial thesis than to show its emergence from the problems of maintaining a colonial possession.

IMPETUS TO EMPIRE:

The Disputed Issue of 1898

1. The Imperial Expansionists

When an American naval squadron under Commodore George A. Dewey arrived in battle formation in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898 and began the action that led to the conquest of the Philippines, it was not the result of a sudden decision born of any new impulse in American policy. The emergence of the United States as a full-fledged imperialist power was the consequence of a process that had been in the making throughout the second half of the 19th century. The Civil War in the 1860s, which had marked the superceding of one type of expansion based on slavery by another based on a developed capitalism, initiated that process. Its acceleration had been particularly noticeable in the two decades that preceded the fever of '98.

This lay behind the claims of a "manifest destiny" for American expansion abroad, which culminated in the seizure of the Philippines. Commercial interests had been in the vanguard of such a national policy. The announced aims of American naval officers for obtaining bases in the Pacific to protect trade routes were part of the encouragement given to those interests by the U.S. government, an encouragement that increased as manufacturing industry grew.

The pattern of forcing trade treaties, "protectorates," and "concessions" on Asian countries by means of gunboats was the standard feature of the imperialist penetration of Asian markets. American trade policies in the 19th century were a part of this general pattern. In both a supporting and a vanguard role of this type, the U.S. Navy had always been closely linked with the nation's commercial enterprises.

A fleet of American warships under Commodore Matthew Perry opened the ports of Japan, with belligerent threats, in 1855.

Perry carried orders to force a commercial treaty upon Japan, a policy insisted upon by American merchant interests. In 1871 a squadron of warships was dispatched to Korea following the resistance by Koreans to the entering of their rivers by American and other foreign merchant vessels. A bombardment of Korean defense was carried out, and a joint expedition into the country with France was proposed by Secretary Seward and only abandoned when France declined. When a trade treaty between Korea and the United States was finally signed in 1882, it followed from the fact that Japanese warships had forced the Koreans to submit to commercial agreements.

Among both naval and merchant sectors there were strong proposals for steps beyond this, for the adoption of colonial policies similar to those of Britain and France. Perry, his success in Japan fostering "the ambitious longings of increased power," urged territorial acquisitions by the United States in Asia, recommending the seizure of the Bonin Islands, the Liuchius and Formosa. "He looked forward to the time when there would be on the Pacific and in Asia a large number of American 'settlements'."

An attempt was made at the same time (1855-1857) to seize Formosa in the interest of a U.S. commercial firm, Robinet and Gideon Nye, which had tried to gain a monopoly of the camphor trade. The firm, through its armed merchant seamen, took control of the port of Takao, raised the American flag, and ruled the area for a year. When the Formosans protested, the American force had to "threaten them with forcible measures if they did not act faithfully."⁽¹⁾ The U.S. Commissioner to China, Dr. Peter Parker, a missionary in close league with the firm, wrote to the State Department urging the setting up of a U.S. protectorate in Formosa, but the Buchanan administration did not feel that there was sufficient pressure for it to favor the idea.

With the advent of steam-driven ships, increased urgings came from the Navy for the annexation of islands in the Pacific for "coaling stations" and for bases from which to operate. In 1872 a naval officer, Commander Meade, initiated the steps that led to the eventual protectorate over Samoa (an island on which the Navy had had its eye since 1839, when a naval scientific expedition had gone there at the behest of American whaling interests). Meade collaborated with a Californian real-estate promoter who

had made a "treaty" of protection with a single Samoan chief. By 1888 the Navy was ready to risk a shooting war with Germany over the retention of Samoa and its harbors at Apia and Pago-Pago.

By 1890 the Navy's arguments for an expansionist policy in the Pacific reached the full level of a theory of strategy with the publication of Captain Alfred T. Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power Upon History*. His *Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future* followed in 1897. In that same year Mahan was appointed to the Naval Advisory Board. His theories were the military aspect of a drive that had by then acquired its fully developed economic and political features. A Republican Congressman, William F. Draper, declared on November 15, 1893 that "a properly organized fleet sufficiently strong to keep open the communication between those bases [Samoa, Hawaii, the Straits of Magellan] will hold the Pacific as an American Ocean, dominated by American commercial enterprise for all time."

These aspirations were sufficiently publicized to come to the attention of Filipino nationalists pressing their demands for reforms on Spain. José Rizal, writing of the Philippines' future in the exile propaganda organ, *La Solidaridad*, February 1, 1890 ("The Philippines a Century Hence"), speculated on the threats to an eventually independent Philippines and included among them possible aggression from the United States: "Perhaps the great American Republic . . . may some day dream of foreign possessions. This is not impossible, for the example is contagious, covetousness and ambition are among the strongest vices, and [President] Harrison manifested something of this sort in the Samoan position. . . ."

If territories in the Pacific were not acquired by the United States in this period, as advocated by aggressive naval commanders, it was due mainly to the fact that the dominant circles of American commerce, investment and finance were occupied elsewhere, particularly in the development of the vast American continent and its internal market. As late as 1889, when the Samoan crisis blew up, *The New York Times* (January 26, 1889) said that "we have concluded that our 'instinct of expansion' can be met for an indefinite time to come within our own national domain."²

Those firms that were involved in the Asian trade desired the

protection offered by a display of military power, but they did not exert a sufficient influence on the making of policy; from 1860 to 1890 they represented only five per cent of total U.S. foreign trade. Although governmental promotion of commercial opportunities was not neglected, especially in the case of China, with which most of American trade in Asia was then conducted, it was implemented for the most part by a diplomacy that capitalized as much as possible on the wars and the ruthless imperialist aggression of Britain, France and tsarist Russia.

Thus, the first trade treaty between the United States and China, the treaty of Whanghia in 1844, followed the Opium War of 1841-1842 in which Britain wrested concessions from China. Although the United States declared that it did not want territorial concessions in China like those grabbed by other powers, it insisted on equal rights and on "most favored nation" privileges gained by aggression. American merchants participated in such exploitive ventures as the wretched slave traffic of the "coolie trade" for a quarter of a century after England regulated it on its own ships by law in 1855. The Whanghia Treaty, in fact, went even further than that extracted by Britain and provided for extraterritorial rights for Americans, a provision only later obtained by other foreign interests in China.

U.S. commercial elements again benefited from the war for treaty revision (1856-1858) conducted by Britain and France to extend colonial trade concessions throughout China. Although the Americans declined to participate in the war itself, they "nevertheless saw to it that an envoy was on hand to reap any profit that might accrue,"³ and promptly demanded the same benefits wrung from the Chinese. American ships, on occasion, did attack and destroy Chinese installations by gunfire, as in the Canton River in 1856, to force compliance to merchant wishes.

Perhaps more indicative of U.S. policy was President Lincoln's dispatch of Anson Burlingame as the first American resident minister in 1861. Burlingame advocated "equal opportunities," no territorial concessions, and diplomacy instead of gunboats. This "moral position" was resented by other powers which viewed the United States as benefiting from their aggressive policies without much cost to itself. It is to be noted, as well, that Burlingame also offered guarantees of assistance to Chinese

rulers in putting down rebellions (the T'ai P'ing anti-foreigner rebellion having but recently occurred). This form of diplomacy by the United States took place during the American Civil War, when the nation was completely absorbed in an internal conflict and could not afford a forceful policy to match that of Britain and France. Therefore, through most of the century, internal pre-occupation with a sectional conflict and with the expansion of home territory and a home market, and not moral compunctions, was the main determinant of U.S. policy in Asia. Despite the increased penetration of the China market by western powers in these decades, U.S. import-export trade with Asia (mainly China), which was valued at \$22.5 million in 1860, did not rise above that level for 30 years, until the 1890s.

However, from the very outset of the United States as a nation, a cluster of fortunes had been built on the China trade. Sailing out of New England ports, the first American merchant ships had arrived in China in 1784, and by 1803-1807 there were 36 ships annually carrying furs in exchange for tea. The trade founded the wealth of the Cabot, Forbes, Lodge, Sturgis, Russell, Perkins, Cushing and Coolidge families, the descendants of several of these later playing an active role in U.S. policy in the Philippines.

The ups and downs of these commercial ventures in Asia were tied in with shifting patterns of trade. The early merchant houses, operating from the eastern coast of the United States and dealing largely in furs, lost their profitable line with the depletion of forests and of seal-bearing regions. By mid-century exports of manufactured goods from developing industries were predominant, with ports on the western coast of the United States increasingly becoming the centers of trade with Asia. Marketing of manufactured goods, in competition with those of other powers, involved a much more aggressive form of commerce.

The experience of American commercial firms in the Philippines during the 19th century illustrated the difficulties of these interests in a period when they did not have serious support from their government or from financial circles. Among the first foreign merchant houses established in Manila after Spain relaxed its colonial mercantilist policies in the 1830s were two American firms: Russell, Sturgis and Co., and Peele, Hubbell and Co. For many years Russell, Sturgis was the biggest commercial house by

far in the islands, but it had to rely for credit on the British Hong-kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. All told, in 1959 American traders accounted for over one-third of the total value of Philippine exports; tonnage of American vessels entering and leaving Manila in that year was 125,922, the British 75,439 and the Spanish 33,157.⁽⁴⁾

By 1875, however, competition from British firms had forced Russell, Sturgis into bankruptcy, with Peele, Hubbell being forced out in 1887. This was due wholly to organized British trading policies: the British government backed its trading firms, they had territorial bases in Hong Kong and Singapore from which to operate, and branches of the principal British banks in Asia (the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China) were established in Manila. Before abandoning the field, American firms sought to carve out a colony in North Borneo to use as a base, but they were unable to bring enough pressure to bear on a U.S. government occupied then with Reconstruction problems and a program of continental expansion. Eventually a British firm with a royal charter took over the North Borneo site.

Considerable trade between the Philippines and the United States continued, but it was handled through British companies and British shipping, Philippine hemp and sugar reaching the United States by way of London.

In the final two decades of the 19th century the overseas commerce of the United States became intensely devoted to the disposal of the greatly magnified output of manufactured goods. Up to this time the bulk of American exports had been primary raw materials, while more manufactured goods were imported than exported. However, manufactured exports valued at \$130.3 million in 1888 had nearly doubled in 1896, within eight years, to \$253.7 million and stood at \$308 million in 1898, the year in which exports of manufactured goods exceeded their importation for the first time.

So fast had industrial development occurred that many American capitalists were alarmed at what they thought was the saturation of the home market for both manufactured goods and capital. The capitalized value of U.S. manufacturing industry had risen from \$1.9 billion in 1880 to over \$4 billion in 1890; by 1895 industrial incorporation was proceeding at the rate of \$3.6 billion

per year. Savings were piling up in the banks seemingly without profitable fields of domestic investment; savings deposits of \$500 million in 1870 had increased to \$2.2 billion in 1899.⁽⁵⁾

A leading economist of the period asserted that "under the present social order it is becoming impossible to find at home . . . employment for all the capital saved which is at once safe and remunerative" and pointed out "how great this excess is at the present time, how profoundly it is disturbing economic conditions . . . and how necessary to the salvation . . . is an outlet for their surplus savings if the present economic order is not to be shaken by a social revolution."⁽⁶⁾ To fearful capitalists the violent Homestead and Pullman strikes that had accompanied the severe depression of 1893 and the upsurge of the Populist movement in the 1890s meant that the revolution was on the threshold.

This, too, was the period when the huge American monopolies were formed. Between 1890 and 1901 they grew to giant proportions. The American Sugar Refining Co. by 1895 controlled 95 per cent of the industry. Standard Oil, set up as a trust in 1882, absorbed 90 per cent of oil refining and distribution. The American Tobacco Co. had similar dominance in its field. In 1901 the U.S. Steel Corp., embracing three-fourths of the industry, became the biggest single corporation in the world, with capitalization of \$1.1 billion. The power exerted by these mammoth enterprises, which were financed in the main by the banking houses of Morgan and Rockefeller, was an irresistible force in the shaping of U.S. policy.

Cost and price cutting made possible by the operations of these giant concerns enabled American products to begin underselling European competitors in world markets. In 1896 American steel rails that were priced at \$160 per ton in 1875 began to sell in European markets at \$16 per ton, below the price of British and French rails. Among other advantages, this meant that American interests could now underbid competitors in railroad construction in colonial and semi-colonial regions, an important feature of imperialist operations.

J.A. Hobson, the early delineator of imperialism whose analysis in 1902 was to be much further extended by Lenin, pointed out that the manufacturing power of the United States had grown so fast that it was outstripping the demands of the home market.

He wrote:

No one acquainted with trade will deny a fact which all American economists assert, that this is a condition which the United States reached at the end of the century, so far as the more developed industries are concerned. Her manufactures were saturated with capital and could absorb no more. One after the other they sought refuge from the waste of competition in "combines" which secure a measure of profitable peace by restricting the quantity of operative capital. Industrial and financial princes in oil, steel and sugar, railroads, banking, etc., were faced with the dilemma of either spending more than they knew how to spend, or forcing markets outside the home area. Two economic courses were open to them, both leading towards an abandonment of the political isolation of the past and the adoption of imperialist methods in the future. Instead of shutting down inferior mills and rigidly restricting output to correspond with profitable sales in the home market, they might employ their full productive power, applying their savings to increase their business capital, and, while still regulating output and prices for the home market, "hustle" for foreign markets, dumping down their surplus goods at prices which would not be possible save for the profitable nature of the home market. So likewise they might employ their savings in seeking investments outside their country, first repaying the capital borrowed from Great Britain and other countries for the early development of their railroads, mines and manufactures, and afterwards becoming themselves a creditor class to foreign countries.⁽⁷⁾

This was, indeed, the pattern followed by American manufacturing and financial interests. The amount of foreign capital in the United States, which stood at nearly \$6 billion in 1900⁽⁸⁾, was already being absorbed by that date, and U.S. capital had begun to flow abroad at a rising rate, reaching \$684.5 million in 1897.⁽⁹⁾

2. Reform and Anti-Colonialism

In the impulse toward expansion in the 1890s those who felt it mandatory to embark on imperialist policies represented only one sector of the American economy. Among the interests at that time hoping to benefit from an imperialist program were the manufacturers of war materials and the financiers of wars (as well as army and navy circles), manufacturers of textiles, hardware and certain machines, producers of railroad materials, shipping and engine boilers, and such groups as the diplomatic service, engineers and missionaries.

In regard to the latter group, the *New Cambridge Modern History* has pointed out that the force of Christian missionaries by 1900 in Africa, Asia and the Pacific equalled the overseas military forces of any of the great powers, and that "Their activities undoubtedly stimulated imperialist sentiment both by stimulating public interest in overseas expansion and in more direct ways."⁽¹⁰⁾

Still limited as they were, these interests, however, represented far more powerful forces than the relatively small merchant enterprises and their naval supporters that had tried for decades to obtain strong government backing for their commercial ventures in Asia. It had become a situation in which "the business interests of the nation as a whole are subordinated to those of certain sectional interests that usurp control of the national resources and use them for their private gain."⁽¹¹⁾

The ascendancy of these interests to the direction of national policy did not occur smoothly in the United States, where sectional interests dedicated to domestic investment remained powerful. A debate over crisis and expansion had, in fact, been going on for over a decade prior to 1898. Among those who opposed the imperialist impulse was Edward Atkinson, author of a book published in 1890, *The Industrial Progress of the Nation: Consumption Limited, Production Unlimited*. He argued for stimulation of the home market, if necessary by state intercession.

Atkinson pointed to the absurdity of seeking large-scale outlets for surplus production in undeveloped regions, showing that the increase of trade with European countries alone where purchasing power was high was vastly greater than U.S. trade with all of Asia. He contended that "brains, industry and capital" should be applied within the United States "to develop greater individual wealth and more general welfare than all the commerce of Asia will yield in a generation."⁽¹²⁾

He and his group feared that the building of a colonial empire, of which Britain was to them the glaring example, would necessitate the maintenance of a large standing army, a large navy, and a burdensome colonial service, all of which would be extremely costly and would require the imposition of heavy taxes, as well as being a corrupting force in the nation. Political control of areas abroad, he felt, was not needed, and he pointed out that the United States was trading successfully with British colonies.

Carl Schurz, the eminent anti-slavery German immigrant who had been a major-general in the Union army in the Civil War and was influential in the Republican Party, rejected "the barbarous notion that we must own the countries we are to trade with." Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, insisted that "it is not necessary for us to violate the principles upon which our Government derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, that it is not necessary that we shall become a nation of conquerors, a nation founded upon physical force, that it is not necessary that we shall subjugate by force of arms any other people in order to obtain that expansion of trade," while as for such countries as the Philippines, "neither its gates nor those of any other country of the globe can long be closed against our constantly growing industrial supremacy."⁽¹³⁾ This same outlook was expressed by Samuel W. McCall (later elected congressman and then governor of Massachusetts with anti-imperialist support); he stressed that trade would thrive on quality and cheapness of goods, not on political control.

In this gradual polarization of viewpoints, those who came to be called "anti-imperialists" used the term in a way rather different from that employed by Marxists in general and by national liberation movements in later periods. The issue was one between the frank exponents of an expansionism that included territorial acquisitions and the moderate elements that, while recognizing the need for expanding American interests abroad, desired that it be done without colonial encumbrances.

It was in keeping with their outlook that many of these latter elements were involved in the multi-faceted movement for reforms, beginning in the latter part of the 19th century and continued until the election of Woodrow Wilson in 1912. This "age of reform," arising out of a period of raw, unbridled capitalist accumulation, was directed at the problem of achieving a merger of political and industrial-financial power in such a form as would avoid driving farmers, small businessmen and urban workers, by ruthless exploitation, into combinations challenging monopoly control or ruling class power itself. A ferment of social unrest had been produced by open corruption of city, state and national politics by "the trusts," undermining of the country's civil service by the political spoils system and by bribery, the squeezing of middle-western and western farmers and of small businessmen by

the uncontrolled price-fixing of monopolies and by the manipulation of currency and credit by a few financial houses in the eastern states, and the growing gap between workers' incomes and "robber baron" wealth. There were signs of an alarming tendency toward organization among the exploited classes, in trade unions, in the Populist movement of agrarian revolt, and in the growth of a Socialist party.

In the strikes of the 1870s and again in the Pullman strike of 1894 the alarm spread to the bodies of organized religion. The chief Protestant journals in the 1870s described striking laborers as "wild beasts" and "reckless desperados" and recommended that cannon and Gatling guns be used to bring them to submission if clubs could not.⁽¹⁴⁾ These were the same groups that took up the expansionist cry of bringing Christian civilization to the "benighted heathen" in Asia and Africa.

At the heart of the reform agitation was an attempt to create a more efficient capitalism that could tap more thoroughly and with the least chaos the productive forces of the country, and that could bring about a broader and deeper home market. The dominant role of industrial and financial monopolies in the system was not actually questioned; it was their regulation by government agencies, subject also to the pressure from other sectors of enterprise, that was demanded. Reforms of political and economic methods, modifying the rapacious activity of monopolies and their bribe control of politicians, would make no real difference in the basic operation of the system or in the main trends it was following; but the adjustment would reduce the possibility of open class conflict in American life.

To the liberal reformers, annexations abroad and a colonial empire, by the very nature of the exploitation involved as well as the cost, would mean a recrudescence of corruption and of its related social evils in their worst form. The looting of colonies was visualized as a large-scale version of the looting of municipal treasuries, less easy to regulate because far away and likely to reinforce such tendencies at home.

In this post-Reconstruction period elements of the anti-slavery movement and of the Radical Republican era were still active in the political life of the nation, and their humanitarian outlook opposing the enslavement of peoples contributed to the anti-expansionist sentiment.

Another attitude toward colonies came from the labor movement, in reaction to the encouragement by industrialists of immigration of cheap labor which brought unskilled European workers from across the Atlantic and Asian workers from across the Pacific (imported Chinese "coolie" labor was a major force in the building of railroads in the western United States). Demands for restriction of immigration came from labor unions, compelled to fight bloody battles with ruthless monopolies for higher wages. Acquisition of overseas territory was seen as leading to further importation of cheap labor which would drive down wages. Gompers, for example, came from the Cigar Makers' Union which opposed the acquisition of areas that grew tobacco and had a cigar-making industry with low paid workers who might undermine American jobs and wages.

The agrarian Populist movement also took up the refrain. In the Populist party platform of 1892 the following point was included: "Resolved, That we condemn the fallacy of protecting American labor under the present system, which opens our ports to the pauper and criminal classes of the world and crowds out our wage-earners."⁽¹⁵⁾

Although certain key industrial and manufacturing groups were the strongest advocates of imperialist policies—steel products and textiles led the way—there were also leading industrialists who opposed such a form of expansion abroad. Among them was Andrew Carnegie, the steel magnate, who believed that the growth of American productive capacity was not to be feared but was the key to the expansion of markets both at home and abroad. In his words, "The United States does not know the destiny that is lying immediately at her feet, provided she turns from these phantom schemes of annexation of barbarous peoples in distant lands and just looks down to her feet and sees what the gods have placed within her grasp—the industrial dominion of the world."⁽¹⁶⁾

Carnegie viewed a colonial policy as a costly venture in which he would end up paying for the profits of others. He concluded, furthermore, that the Philippines could only be gained, in the face of similar ambitions by other powers, with the support of Britain, which would demand big tariff concessions from the United States in return, a suicidal course, to him, after a protectionist high tariff policy had enabled American industry to confront world competitors advantageously for the first time.

The strongest economic grouping opposing the acquisition of colonies was composed, however, of agrarian sectional interests devoted to domestic investment: producers of sugar beets and sugar cane, tobacco and rice. These feared the competition of similar crops produced in overseas possessions by cheap labor and able to enter the United States freely. In the last two decades of the 19th century the introduction of high American tariffs had fostered these protectionist feelings on the part of domestic agrarian producers even as they favored the accumulation of capital that spurred imperialist sentiment in industrial and financial circles. Senators and congressmen from many states were committed through direct ties to protecting these sectional agrarian interests.

A serious skirmish had already occurred between sectional and expansionist groups over the acquisition of Hawaii. A group of American plantation owners and merchants had gained a strong foothold in these Pacific islands and desired preferential entry of their products, especially sugar, into the American market. For several decades agitation for the outright annexation of the Hawaiian Islands developed into a major lobbying issue in the U.S. Congress.

When protective legislation favoring domestic sugar interests was passed by Congress in 1890 (the McKinley Bill of that year handed a bounty of 2¢ per pound to them), the settlers in Hawaii received a bitter setback. This was augmented by resistance to annexation from the Hawaiian people themselves, especially when Queen Liliuokalani, who opposed U.S. commercial domination, came to the throne in 1891. The American business community in Hawaii reacted by organizing a coup against the independent-minded queen. A "revolt" occurred on January 17, 1893, supported by 150 marines from an American naval vessel, the *USS Boston*, which had a hand in the plot. A provisional government headed by a plantation owner, S.B. Dole, immediately sought to negotiate for annexation by the United States, sending a commission to Washington. Domestic sugar interests girded for a fight.

President Harrison, whose term was due to expire on March 3, 1893, favored annexation but he was unable to obtain Senate action on a treaty before relinquishing the government to his successor, Grover Cleveland, an anti-annexationist. "I regarded,"

said Cleveland, "... the proposed annexation of these islands as not only opposed to our noble policy, but as a perversion of our national mission. The mission of our nation is to build up and make a greater country out of what we have, instead of annexing islands."⁽¹⁷⁾ He sent an investigative body to Hawaii; its head, J.H. Blount (from the agrarian state of Georgia), reported that the great majority of Hawaiians supported Queen Liliuekalani, and revealed the complicity of the U.S. Marines and of the U.S. minister in the "revolt." The Cleveland administration dropped annexation.

The question was revived, however, when McKinley was elected in 1896. A new annexation treaty was drawn up, and was signed on June 16, 1897, but Senate opposition was still so strong that the treaty's chances of being approved were, under normal circumstances, very slim. In the Senate, opposition cut across both parties and was especially pronounced on the part of senators from sugar-beet growing areas in the middle west and cane growers in Louisiana. The Spreckles sugar interests in California were also an opposition lobbying group. Labor unions, which expressed the fear that contract labor would be imported from an annexed Hawaii, protested against the treaty.

As a consequence, Hawaii was not actually annexed until after the outbreak of the war with Spain. Even then its advocates did not risk submitting it in the form of treaty approval, but made it the subject of a joint resolution by Senate and House, on July 7, 1898, attached as a rider to a war appropriation bill. The U.S. Navy had leased Pearl Harbor in Honolulu as a naval base in 1887, and the permanent acquisition of the islands was presented as a step to bolster U.S. coastal defenses and naval strategy in a time of war.

3. War With Spain: The Issue is Joined

Expansionist aims of budding American imperialist circles were finally realized in a war with Spain that was drummed up following the election of McKinley on the Republican ticket in 1896. The issue of Spain's repression of a Cuban independence struggle that had been developing for 30 years was utilized to justify U.S. intervention and seizure of Spanish island colonies in the Caribbean and in the Pacific.

The American sugar monopoly played a large part in demands for intervention in Cuba, where there were big American investments in sugar plantations and in milling. These interests complained of damage and a threat of damage to installations, cane fields and trade from both the rebelling Cubans and from the suppression policies of Spain. Railroad and mining interests were also involved. Before 1898, U.S. investment in these fields totalled \$30-50 million. Trade, too, with Cuba was increasing steeply during the 1890s (\$64 million in 1889 to \$103 million in 1893).⁽¹⁸⁾

As a means of masking imperialist aims, the Cuban independence question was ideal. The independence issue aroused much wider support than the limited sectional groups concerned with their special interests. Besides, the jingoism that the issue produced provided a convenient device in the hands of politicians from both the Republican and Democratic parties to divert the mass support for Populism from internal grievances. Churches, which had suffered a decline in membership due to the mass bitterness in a society in which the trusts openly corrupted political and economic life, found crusading moral features in the plight of the Cubans; all Protestant sects except the Unitarians and the Quakers joined in the call for war against Spain.⁽¹⁹⁾ Furthermore, many labor unions after 1895 adopted resolutions supporting the liberation struggle of the Cubans.⁽²⁰⁾

While there were moral overtones to an American involvement in Cuba which obscured expansionist intentions, the imperialist drive across the Pacific was much more clearly an open commercial cause. It was accelerated by an intensification of moves to carve up China among the imperialist powers, which threatened to destroy whatever American interests had gained or hoped to gain in that part of the world, a market area that was felt to be "the heritage of our merchants."⁽²¹⁾ In 1895 Japan made war on China and seized Formosa and Liaotung as its fruits of victory. Germany grabbed Tsingtao, with a naval base at Kiaochow, in November 1897, and in January 1898 China was compelled to hand over to Germany sole railroad and coal mining rights in adjoining Shantung. Russia seized Port Arthur in November 1897. France simultaneously took Kwangchow Bay and the surrounding area and built a naval base. Britain, holding the largest stake in China, moved to consolidate its predominant position in

the populous Yangtze Valley, expanded its Hongkong possession to include Kowloon on the mainland, and demanded the bay of Weihaiwei in Shantung.

One explanation for the acceleration of territorial aggressions in China is that they coincided with and were probably influenced by the restrictions on the entry of capital and goods into the United States. The overflow of surpluses now went into the underdeveloped regions at a greater rate, including into Africa which had been carved up for exploitation as early as 1885, at the imperialist Berlin Conference.

In turn, the developing imperialist circles in the United States became increasingly anxious as they saw hoped-for markets passing into the full possession of rivals. One of their ardent apostles, Henry Cabot Lodge, a descendant of New England "China trade" merchants, raised the alarm in 1895: "The great nations are rapidly absorbing for their future expansion and for their present defense all the waste places of the earth. It is a movement which makes for civilization and the advancement of the race. As one of the great nations of the world, the United States must not fall out of the line of march."⁽²²⁾

Lodge and a growing group of publicists for the imperialist cause, including John Hay, Henry Adams and Brooks Adams, were given access to and prominence in some of the nation's leading periodicals, such as the *Review of Reviews*, edited by Albert Shaw, the *Atlantic Monthly*, edited by Walter Hines Page, the *New York Tribune*, edited by Whitelaw Reid, and the *North American Review*, edited by George Harvey.

"The rivalry of the European powers in the commercial exploitation of China in 1897-98," wrote a contemporary historian, "served to emphasize more than ever before the fact that commerce has become the greatest of all political interests, and that the prime object of diplomacy is now the extension of trade relations and the maintenance of foreign markets."⁽²³⁾

Toward the end of 1897, while the European powers were serving their demands upon China, commercial and investment groups in the United States were galvanized into demanding government action to protect existing or desired American interests in Asia. The *New York Journal of Commerce*, which previously had been avowedly anti-imperialist, reversed itself suddenly on December 28, 1897 and asserted that free access to China was the solution for the problem of surplus manufactures.

In the early months of 1898 a swarm of demands and of organized committee actions to promote a vigorous China trade policy came from both east and west coasts of the United States. Committees on the question were set up in the Chambers of Commerce or the Boards of Trade in New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Baltimore, Boston and Seattle. A Committee on American Interests in China was organized in New York on February 3, 1898, and this was followed in March by the creation of an American China and Japan Association (changed after the Battle of Manila Bay to the American Asiatic Association). The New York Chamber of Commerce received a letter from 70 mercantile and manufacturing firms urging that President McKinley be persuaded to protect U.S. export trade to the Far East.⁽²⁴⁾ Among these interests were those dealing in cotton goods, oil, flour, iron and steel, and railroad building (an American China Development Co. had been established in 1895 to compete with Russian and Japanese railroad building in North China).

"Nothing is more significant of the changed attitude toward this country's foreign trade, manifested by the American manufacturer today as compared with a few years ago," said the financial journal, *Broadstreet's*, on January 29, 1898, "than the almost single devotion which he pays to the subject of possible export trade extension."

This clamor from commercial groups in the United States was paralleled by the activity of U.S. consular posts in Asia which, representing these groups on the spot, were also, in official reports and in articles in periodicals, advocating a more aggressive trade policy. Charles Denby, who occupied the consulate in Peking and whose representation was mainly for cotton goods and railroad interests, wrote of China as "a vast market for commerce not satisfactorily exploited," and thought "a gunboat policy" was the more satisfactory one to pursue. As early as 1889 he was declaring, "There is no room for doubt that the foreigners hold their place in China by force and by force alone. . . . The fear of interfering with international rights or offending China should not for a moment be allowed to stand in the way of ordering immediate and armed protection to . . . all foreigners in China."⁽²⁵⁾

In Manila, U.S. Consul Oscar Williams was stressing in his reports (February 23, 1898) that "there are here 22 consulates

representing the several countries but the value of the export trade under my official supervision equals that of my 21 colleagues combined." He was excited by rumors of war between Spain and the United States and claimed (March 31, 1898) that "the natives, half-breeds, Chinese merchants, and such Spaniards as were in business were all ready to welcome our fleet, fight with it to hoist over these islands the U.S. flag, and swear allegiance to it; and once done, all interests here would thrive, be settled and happy."⁽²⁶⁾

John Barrett, U.S. minister in Siam, also had his eyes on the Philippines, to which he made a special trip in the latter part of 1897 to investigate commercial possibilities. In an article written for the *North American Review* early in 1898 prior to the outbreak of the war with Spain (it was published in the September 1898 issue), he advocated the seizure of the Philippines to serve as a naval and commercial link in the Pacific. The Philippines, he contended, would provide "an unsurpassed point in the Far East from which to extend our commerce and trade and gain our share in the immense distribution of material prizes that must follow the opening of China, operating from Manila as a base, as does England from Hongkong."⁽²⁷⁾

Within the administration of President McKinley, a determined nucleus of imperialist-minded men had gained key vantage points from which to bring these trends to the focus of declared policy. One of them, Henry Cabot Lodge, who had been elevated to the Senate from Massachusetts in 1892, was peculiarly suited to be spokesman for overseas expansionists. He was born of two families that had founded their wealth on the China trade. Furthermore, he was connected, through James Wilson, a railroad promoter and friend of Charles Denby, to the railroad interests behind Denby and the China Development Co. that was seeking to build a rail network in North China.⁽²⁸⁾ Lodge, who had been extremely vocal throughout the 1890s in favor of naval stations in the Pacific to vie with Britain's chain of bulwarks protecting its commerce, was also a friend of Alfred Mahan, the sea-power strategist.

Mahan had another ardent sponsor in the person of Theodore Roosevelt, a close friend of Lodge's and Under-secretary of the Navy in McKinley's cabinet. Roosevelt and Lodge formed a

team that came close to being conspiratorial, organizing within the government the steps toward the seizure of colonial possessions to advance imperialist aims. As early as September 20, 1897, Roosevelt, dining with the President and afterwards arranging to go with him for a private carriage drive, pressed upon McKinley a fully-devised plan of action to take in the Pacific in the event of a war with Spain.⁽²⁹⁾ Roosevelt wrote to Lodge in September 1897: "Our Asiatic Squadron should blockade, and if possible, take Manila."⁽³⁰⁾ It was Roosevelt who maneuvered the appointment of Commodore Dewey, a naval officer with a record for aggressiveness who was in the Mahan circle, to the command of the Asiatic Squadron in October 1897. Dewey, sailing for the Far East on December 7, 1897, carried with him, at Roosevelt's instructions, all the information available in Washington on the Philippines, to be studied en route.

On February 15, 1898 the battleship *Maine* exploded in Havana harbor and precipitated the ultimate crisis with Spain. Ten days later, on February 25, Roosevelt, acting in the temporary absence of Secretary of the Navy Long, sent out a direct order to Dewey, now in east Asian waters, to attack the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay upon the outbreak of hostilities.⁽³¹⁾ This was two months before war was actually declared. Although this order had not been authorized by either McKinley or Long, neither of them made any effort to rescind it.

Up to March 1898, despite the deliberate setting of the stage for a war of aggression, there was still uncertainty in dominant financial circles as to the wisdom or the need of seizing a colonial empire. On March 5 the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle* contended that colonies were useless outposts which would have to be protected at a greater cost than their worth, an argument that was one of the main themes of the anti-imperialists then and later. In less than three weeks, however, what appeared to be an inevitable drift of events led to the making of a decision in the upper financial bodies of the nation to take the Caribbean and Asian colonies of Spain by force of arms. On March 24 statements began to appear by John Jacob Astor, William Rockefeller, Thomas Fortune Ryan, Stuyvesant Fish and others supporting a war for the ouster of Spain.⁽³²⁾

The War Message sent to Congress by President McKinley on April 11, 1898 gave the official reasons for the decision to go to war with Spain. It was declared that armed intervention was made necessary in Cuba to stop Spain's war of suppression against the Cuban revolution "which during its progress has subjected the United States to great effort and expense in enforcing its neutrality laws, caused enormous losses to American trade and commerce, caused irritation, annoyance and disturbance among our citizens, and, by the exercise of cruel, barbarous and uncivilized practices of warfare, shocked the sensibilities and offended the human sympathies of our people." Repeatedly it is stressed that "the right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade and business of our people."

Before this message was sent to Congress, Spain had already agreed, on April 9, to all American demands, including virtual independence for the Cubans. If only the question of Cuba was involved, this may have checked the imperialist war drive. Capitulation of Spain on Cuba, however, did not satisfy the broader ambitions in the Pacific. The message was sent, and on April 25 a Joint Resolution of both houses of Congress declared war on Spain.

The Joint Resolution, and the circumstances of its passage, reflected the continuing national debate over the course of the country's policy. In the Senate, the vote was quite narrow for an act of such great seriousness, 45 to 32. Of more importance, an amendment of great significance was added by Senator Henry Teller of the sugar-beet producing state of Colorado, stating that "The United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said islands, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people." The Teller Amendment was a move by domestic sugar interests to block the free entry of Cuban sugar that would follow from a policy of colonial annexation.

One day before the declaration of war was made final, Dewey, on April 24, was sent a message from the Navy Department ordering him to proceed immediately to the Philippines to destroy the Spanish fleet stationed in Manila Bay. Before news of his subsequent victory, on May 1, could be relayed to the United States and made known there (he had cut the cable between Manila and Hongkong), a directive was issued by McKinley on

May 4, following prior arrangements with the War Department, for the sending of 5,000 troops to the Philippines for obvious occupation purposes.⁽³³⁾ Included in this expeditionary force was a geologist, Dr. George F. Becker, of the U.S. Geological Survey, whose instructions, by arrangement between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Interior, were to procure information on the geological and mineral resources of the Philippines.⁽³⁴⁾

News of Dewey's victory, when it finally arrived on May 5, erased any hesitation over the acquisition of territories affecting leading journals of opinion in the United States. The *Wall Street Journal* said on May 5: "Some broad-minded men believe that the United States should retain enough interest in the Philippines to be sure of a coaling station and a naval base in Asiatic waters, under belief that the breaking up of China will make it necessary for this country to be in a position to protect, not only the existing trade with the Far East, but the enormously greater trade likely to be developed in the next 25 years." It was a position endorsed by *The New York Times*, the *New York Tribune*, and the bulk of the American press.

Petitions from Chambers of Commerce and from Manufacturers Association in Seattle and in San Francisco reached McKinley, urging the seizure of the Caroline and the Ladrone Islands (Guam) as well as the Philippines. Advocates of the annexation of Hawaii took advantage of the war fever finally to push through their objective that had been snagged for so long. It was done through a maneuver by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who evaded the treaty requirement in an uncertain Senate by attaching its annexation to a War Authorization Bill on July 7, 1898 as a measure for the employment of Hawaii as a naval base to prosecute the war against Spain.

Lodge, on hearing the news of Dewey's victory, exclaimed with delight: "We hold the other side of the Pacific, and the value to this country is almost beyond recognition."⁽³⁵⁾

A close associate of Lodge, Senator Albert J. Beveridge of Illinois, was aroused to even greater panegyrics. He arose at the Middlesex Club in Boston on April 27 to deliver the classic statement of the more fervid imperialist aims of the period:

American factories are making more than the American people can use; American soil is producing more than they can consume. Fate has written our policy for us; the trade of the world must and shall be ours.

And we will get it as our mother [England] has told us how. We will establish trading posts throughout the world as distributing points for American products. We will soon cover the ocean with our merchant marine. We will build a navy to the measure of our greatness. Great colonies governing themselves, flying our flag, and trading with us, will grow about our posts of trade. Our institutions will follow our flag on the wings of commerce. And American law, American order, American civilization, and the American flag will plant themselves on shores hitherto bloody and benighted, but by those agencies of God henceforth to be made beautiful and bright. . . . The Philippines are logically our first target.⁽³⁶⁾

THE PHILIPPINE DILEMMA

Colony or Coaling Station?

1. "Liberating" A Base

In its earlier stages, the conquest of the Philippines by the United States was shaped by two general decisions reached prior to the declaration of war against Spain.

The first of these decisions was to seize possession of sufficient territory in the Philippines to serve as a naval base and as a commercial entrepot site in Asia, the equivalent of the British naval and commercial bases in Singapore and in Hongkong.

This, it is apparent, was the recommendation of the Naval War Board which had been set up shortly before war broke out (with Alfred T. Mahan as a member) to advise the McKinley government. Dewey's directives from his navy superiors were not to seize the whole of the Philippines but to defeat the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay and to invest the city of Manila. No move was made by American forces to take any other part of the archipelago until after the Paris Peace Conference had settled war indemnities. This was consistent with established U.S. policy of obtaining bases in Pacific island chains. The base in Samoa was a part of this pattern as was the base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. After the victory on May 1, 1898 at Manila Bay, the Naval War Board, on May 9, also recommended the seizure of Guam in the Ladrões to serve "as a strategic point between Honolulu and Manila."⁽¹⁾

One of the points of contention in the McKinley administration, after Dewey's success, was over how much of the Philippines to retain. The first draft of McKinley's peace terms mentioned only Manila, with the rest of the islands to be left with Spain. Secretary of State Day also favored the retention of Manila with the addition of the whole of Luzon island, but as for the rest, "unfortunately, there is nothing we can do but give those islands

back to Spain.”⁽²⁾ This, significantly, was the position taken by Dewey.⁽³⁾ Henry Adams, an advocate of expansion influential in administration circles, wrote to John Hay urging the holding of a mere coaling station.⁽⁴⁾ Lodge, one of the architects of the Dewey descent on Manila, wrote to Day over two months after the Battle of Manila Bay, when imperialist fervor was high:

I see very plainly the enormous difficulties of dealing with the Philippines, and am by no means anxious to assume the burden of possession outside of Luzon. The only practical solution that occurs to me is that we should take the whole group as an indemnity for the war, and then cede all the islands except Luzon to England in exchange for the Bahamas and Jamaica and the Danish West Indies. . . . This would relieve us of the burden of administering that great group in the East . . . and would leave us in the Philippines associated with a friendly power with whom we should be in entire accord.⁽⁵⁾

Circumstances and pressures generated by a war of conquest were to enlarge the original decision, but it produced a debate on American imperialist strategy that ran through the history of American domination of the Philippines.

The second general decision evoked no disagreement in the McKinley cabinet. In essence, it was agreed that an independent Filipino government should not be recognized and that the Filipino people residing in any territory to be seized should come under the rule of the United States.

This feature of American aggrandizement has been covered with a haze of deliberate vagueness to obscure the manner in which the Filipino people were brought under American colonial subjugation. Sufficient evidence exists, however, to indicate that it was a decision parallel to that of making a military assault on Spanish forces in the Philippines. The fact that no declaration was made in regard to the future status of the Filipino people, as was done by the Teller Amendment in the case of the Cubans who were similarly engaged in a revolution against Spain, was obviously due less to uncertainty of attitude than to intention to deceive.

The nature and the particulars of the Philippine struggle for freedom were well known in Eastern Asia, from where American consular posts had been sending regular reports on its course. It was known that the struggle had reached an advanced stage, that

Spanish colonial rule had been severely shaken by the major revolution which had broken out in 1896, and that the Filipino people and their leaders were fully prepared to govern themselves.

A development of Philippine export production and trade from the mid-19th century onward had brought a degree of prosperity to Filipino landowning groups. The middle strata of these, not enjoying the privileged position of the large landowners, agitated for political and economic opportunities in the islands and for representation in Spain's legislative body, the Cortes. This was a campaign for reforms within the framework of Spanish colonial rule and was not at this stage a demand for independence. The Spanish attitude, however, was made far more rigid than it might have been by the strong influence in the Philippines of the extremely reactionary Catholic religious orders that were the largest landowners and the local rulers. Thus, Spain's course was to resist reforms or to leave unimplemented those that were proposed.

In the face of suppression, and with the more wealthy Filipino groups unwilling to support their demands, the Filipino middle class elements began to abandon their fight by the early 1890s. At this point a mass revolutionary movement, called the Katipunan,* led by semi-proletarian elements and with a membership mainly of peasants and of urban laborers, came into being as an underground force. It had a revolutionary program of independence from Spain as the only alternative. Organized in 1892, it had attained a remarkably large membership by 1896, variously estimated at from 123,000 to 400,000⁽⁶⁾ in Manila and the surrounding provinces.

At the head of the Katipunan was Andres Bonifacio, an artisan and revolutionary nationalist. When the Spaniards discovered the existence of the movement in 1896, and undertook suppressive measures, Bonifacio led his followers in an uprising. It quickly spread to general revolutionary proportions. Up to this moment both the wealthy Filipinos and the bulk of the middle class reformists had refused to support the Katipunan. When its potential was realized in actual struggle, however, and when the direction

*Its complete name was Kataastaasan Kagalanggalang na Katipunan ng mga Anak na Bayan (Highest and Most Respectable Society of the Sons of the People).

its mass revolutionary character might take was appreciated, the middle class groups not only jumped to support it but moved to take control. Bonifacio and those close to him were ousted from leadership of the movement, with Bonifacio himself assassinated, and Emilio Aguinaldo, a medium landowner and town official from the province of Cavite, was elevated to leadership.

The revolution continued for over a year. By November 1, 1897 the basis for a Philippine Republic was laid with the adoption by Aguinaldo and his Revolutionary Committee of a Provisional Constitution. Wealthy Filipino circles which had opposed the struggle were persuaded by the Spaniards at this time to intervene and to influence Aguinaldo to negotiate a settlement in exchange for promises of reform. On December 14, 1897 the irresolute Aguinaldo and those close to him agreed to terminate the armed struggle and to go into exile. Aguinaldo was paid a sum of 400,000 pesos (out of a promised amount of 1,700,000 pesos for the movement as a whole, the rest of which was not paid).

This settlement, known as the Pact of Biak-na-Bato after the mountain site in Bulacan province where it was negotiated, actually settled nothing. The Spanish colonial regime failed to carry out its promised reforms and continued persecuting revolutionaries. Militant Katipunan leaders opposed the pact with the Spaniards and continued to conduct an armed struggle for independence that became intense again before Dewey arrived in Manila. Aguinaldo and his group of exiles had merely removed themselves to Hongkong where, as Aguinaldo claimed, they proposed to use the money obtained from Spain to buy arms for renewing the revolution.

U.S. government agencies were in possession of all the necessary information to grasp the state of affairs in the Philippines long before the declaration of war against Spain. As early as November 3, 1897, prior even to the Pact of Biak-na-Bato, a representative of the Filipino revolutionists, Felipe Agoncillo, had approached the U.S. Consul in Hongkong, Rounseville Wildman, and had proposed an alliance. Wildman had immediately sent the following message to Secretary of State Day:

Mr. Agoncillo offers *on behalf of his government* alliance offensive and defensive with the United States when the United States declares war on Spain, which, in Mr. Agoncillo's judgment, will be very soon. In the meantime he wishes the United States to send to some port in the

Philippines 20,000 stand of arms and 200,000 rounds of ammunition for the use of *his government*, to be paid for *on the recognition of his government by the United States*. He pledges as security two provinces and the custom house at Manila. (Italics added)

This message, which made it plain that the Filipino revolutionaries were prepared to set up a government, arrived in Washington at the time when Dewey's fleet was being outfitted, when his mission was being discussed in government circles, and when Dewey himself was being briefed about the Philippines. It evidently received extended consideration because a lapse of nearly six weeks occurred before a reply was sent to Wildman, and it was not dispatched until December 15, a week after Dewey's departure. Wildman was instructed not to encourage advances by Agoncillo or his associates.

In the meantime, Consul Oscar Williams in Manila was sending regular messages on the continuing state of revolt after Biak-na-Bato, on the strength of the revolutionists, and on their desires. "Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. . . . A republic is being organized here as in Cuba. . . . Rebellion never more threatening to Spain."⁽⁷⁾ After Dewey's arrival at Hongkong, Williams was instructed to send daily information to him about the Philippine situation, and these messages of his included the assertion that "at your first gun there will be 30,000 Filipinos arise."⁽⁸⁾

The magnitude of the Filipino revolution and its aim of independence were therefore well-known to American authorities. Furthermore, it had become common knowledge in eastern Asia that Emilio Aguinaldo, after his transfer with his companions in the Filipino revolutionary movement to Hongkong on December 29, 1897, was biding his time for a resumption of the revolutionary struggle. It could only have been with full awareness of this that Dewey, soon after his own arrival in Hongkong, initiated talks with Aguinaldo, sending one of his officers, Captain Wood, commander of the gunboat *Petrel*, for that purpose sometime in March 1898.

Wood, in his negotiations with Aguinaldo at Dewey's bidding, urged the Filipino leader to return to the Philippines, to reorganize his army with the aid of American advice and arms, and to cooperate with the pending American attack on the Spanish forces. Wood was instructed to become evasive, however, if

Aguinaldo pressed him for a commitment on U.S. intentions after the defeat of Spain. He told the Filipinos merely that "the United States is a great and rich nation and neither needs nor desires colonies." At no time would Dewey or his aides agree to put anything in writing.

Aguinaldo, who was being harassed in Hongkong by a legal suit pressed by an opportunist Filipino who wanted a share of the money given by Spain, was compelled to leave that city and to break off his talks with Dewey at an unfortunate time, shortly before Dewey received his final orders on April 24 to attack the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. The Filipino leader departed for Singapore. There he was approached by eager U.S. consular officials who wanted to pursue negotiations with him but who had not had the benefit of the intimate briefings Dewey had received from the Roosevelt-Lodge clique in Washington. In talking with consular representatives who were too far removed from policy-making at home to understand the nuances to be employed and who were anxious to facilitate an American move in Asia they had long desired to see (and who had hopes of personal advancement from their initiative), Aguinaldo obtained some "wrong" impressions.

One of these personages was Consul Spencer Pratt, who, apprised of Aguinaldo's movements, contacted him as soon as he arrived in Singapore, on the eve of the formal U.S. declaration of war on Spain. Pratt, pressing for Aguinaldo's aid, assured him that "the United States would at least recognize the independence of the Philippines under the protection of the United States navy."⁽⁹⁾ Secretary Day, hearing of his underling's initiative, warned him that it was all right to get Aguinaldo's assistance "if in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practicable to justify." When Day finally learned of the extent of Pratt's overtures that "discloses an understanding on their part that . . . the ultimate object of our action is . . . independence of the Philippines," he upbraided the luckless consul,⁽¹⁰⁾ a reprimand that came because Pratt had violated the policy formulated in Washington.

The exiled Filipino leaders in Hongkong met on May 5 and shrewdly analyzed the maneuvers by Dewey and the consuls. They concluded that the Americans could not be trusted and that in all likelihood they had designs to grab the Philippines as a

colony. Nevertheless they decided to go along with the Americans in order to obtain arms from them, because the people "provided with arms will be able to oppose themselves to them, struggle for their independence, in which consists the true happiness of the Filipinos."⁽¹¹⁾ At the same time a warning was sent to revolutionary leaders in the Philippines stating that "we infer that they are trying to make colonies of us, although they said they would give us independence. The Committee decided it advisable to simulate belief at the same time equipping ourselves with arms."⁽¹²⁾

In the Philippines itself there was another Filipino who had a clear understanding of the implications of the U.S. war on Spain, of the disadvantages confronting the Filipinos, and of the necessary attitudes to be adopted. This was Apolinario Mabini, a brilliant lawyer who was to emerge as one of the most resolute and most irreproachable of the middle class revolutionists. As soon as the declaration of war became known, Mabini wrote and circulated a document among the revolutionary leaders in the Philippines. Estimating that the United States would defeat Spain and would demand the Philippines as spoils, he urged that a revolutionary government be set up immediately and that its forces occupy all possible strategic places. He urged that aid be given neither to the Spaniards nor to the Americans (on the grounds that it would be erroneous to help a nation intending to dominate the country), and that an organized government of Filipinos should be in a position to confront the victor in the war because "when these giants of ambition and of power become convinced that here we have a strong and organized people that know how to defend their honor and what is just, they will be led to restrain themselves and compromise with us in order to secure the best possible concessions."⁽¹³⁾

That Filipinos were determined to fight for the independence of their country was well understood by the western powers engaged in Asia as indicated in a report submitted to Kaiser Wilhelm by Bernhard von Bulow, German Secretary of State in the Foreign Office. Germany was aggressively anxious to win further footholds in the region, and had its eye on the Philippines and the crumbling rule of Spain. Von Bulow's report was made on May 14, while Aguinaldo was still in Hongkong preparing to return to the Philippines to resume revolutionary leadership, and said:

It may be quite true that the Spanish regime in its present form cannot be maintained in the Philippines. The question is whether the archipelago will be taken over by a single power or under foreign protection . . . the natives of the Philippines show scant disposition to exchange the Spanish yoke with another direct and effective foreign domination. To subject the Tagalogs against their will to such foreign rule would probably be no easy task. Should the Americans or the English try it, they may have some unpleasant surprises, such as the French experienced in Mexico or the Italians in Eritrea. The inclination of the natives of the Philippines is to establish an independent state.⁽¹⁴⁾

Aguinaldo was finally transported to the Philippines on May 19 in one of Dewey's vessels and landed in Cavite province to organize a Filipino army against the Spaniards. It was Aguinaldo's contention that Dewey himself, in their first actual meeting on the deck of the Commodore's flagship in Manila Bay, went to the extent of telling him, "the United States had come to the Philippines to free the Filipinos from the yoke of Spain. He said furthermore that America was exceedingly well off as regards territory, revenue and resources and needed no colonies. He assured me finally that there was no reason for me to entertain any doubts whatever about the recognition of the independence of the Philippines by the United States."⁽¹⁵⁾

Although there is reason to doubt that Dewey himself went precisely this far, in all probability he echoed the words of Captain Wood about the United States not needing colonies. Dewey had good reason to prolong, and even to embroider at this point, a two-faced policy in regard to the Filipino leader. The city of Manila, defended by 15,000 Spaniards and Filipino troops loyal to Spain, could not be taken by him until the arrival of American ground forces, a month and a half distant, and he needed Filipino allies to invest the city. "I knew what he was doing—driving the Spaniards in—was saving our own troops," said Dewey later.⁽¹⁶⁾

The vague assurances and the deception continued after the arrival of American ground troops on June 30. General T.H. Anderson, commanding the first contingent of the expeditionary forces and the only ranking officer other than Dewey to deal directly with Aguinaldo, affirmed later that at the outset every American told Filipinos that "we intend to whip the Spaniards and set you free."⁽¹⁷⁾

In testimony given four years later before a U.S. Senate investigating committee, Dewey exhibited all the earmarks of a man trying to cover up what had transpired during the busy months of acquiring a foothold in a country in which the people wanted freedom. He not only denied making any promises of any kind to "these little men" but claimed he did not even know what their viewpoints or wishes were. When asked what the Filipinos had discussed with him, he said: "God knows; I don't know. They were taking up my time about frivolous things." Shrugging off a pile of Filipino proclamations, official correspondence and newspaper reports that had passed through his hands at the time, all bearing on the open and vehement Filipino announcement of independence, Dewey claimed he had no recollection of any of them. Among them was a ceremonial proclamation of Philippine independence made on June 12 in Cavite, to which Dewey himself had been invited.⁽¹⁸⁾

Army generals who came with the expeditionary forces to take Manila brought with them from Washington more precise instructions, elaborating further the briefing Dewey had received. This second stage of military policy had been put in motion by the McKinley administration as early as May 3, before any official word had reached Washington about the Battle of Manila Bay. General Nelson Miles, overall commander of the Army, on that day had designated the troops to be sent to the Philippines "to fortify and hold certain strategic places in the archipelago."⁽¹⁹⁾

Complete understanding existed among military commanders and cabinet members as to the policy to be followed in dealing with the Filipinos. General Wesley Merritt, assigned to command the expeditionary force, understood perfectly what his role was. "It seems more than probable that we will have the so-called insurgents to fight as well as the Spaniards," he wrote to McKinley on May 15, urging that more troops be allocated to him for "conquering a territory . . . inhabited by 14 millions of people, the majority of whom will regard us with the intense hatred born of race and religion."⁽²⁰⁾ This letter was written before McKinley had released his orders to the expedition and before Aguinaldo had arrived in the Philippines to begin organizing his army. A few days later, on receipt of a cable from Dewey that Aguinaldo had arrived at Cavite, Secretary of the Navy Long

wired a reminder for him not to have "political alliances with the insurgents . . . that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future."⁽²¹⁾

President McKinley's orders issued on May 19 to Merritt's army make plain the context in which Long's directive was made: they dealt less with the question of overcoming the Spanish armed forces than with the occupation of the Philippines itself. The country was to be given "security and order . . . while in the possession of the United States" and the greatest stress was given to the assertion that "the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political conditions of the inhabitants." In brief, the expeditionary force was to have the character of an army of occupation, not of liberation.

General Merritt, in reporting on his implementation of his instructions after reaching the Philippines, stated: "I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communications with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs."⁽²²⁾

The "pretensions" of "the insurgent leader" had by then been published for all to see. On May 24 Aguinaldo had issued a decree establishing a Dictatorial Government. This was followed on June 12 with the formal proclamation of a Declaration of Independence, stating that "in the name and by the authority of the inhabitants of all these Philippine Islands, that they are and have a right to be free and independent; that they are released from all obedience to the crown of Spain; that every political tie between the two is and must be completely severed and annulled; and that like all free and independent states, they have complete authority to make war, conclude peace, establish treaties of commerce, enter into alliances, regulate commerce, and execute all other acts and things that independent states have the right to do."⁽²³⁾ (Mabini questioned the tactical wisdom of this step in view of the situation, believing that it "was premature and imprudent, for the Americans concealed their intentions, while we published ours."⁽²⁴⁾

A rapid series of steps followed the Declaration. On June 23 the Dictatorship was changed to a Revolutionary Government,

with Aguinaldo as its President. Four general government departments were created: foreign affairs, navy and commerce; war and public works; police, internal order, justice, hygiene and education; finance, agriculture and industry. A decree was issued for municipal and provincial organization, and for a taxation system. On August 1 an assemblage of 190 municipal presidents from 16 provinces ratified the independence declaration.

Thus, before the arrival of the first contingent of American occupying troops on June 30, a functioning Philippine government was in existence, both nationally and on a local level, which commanded the loyalty of the people and, but for the city of Manila, which its troops had surrounded, had started to administer the whole island of Luzon, coveted by U.S. imperialist circles. (When the American troops did arrive, their commanders had to request the Filipino army to evacuate some of its siege trenches near the shoreline of Manila Bay, at Paranaque south of the city, in order to take part in the investiture of Manila.)

Early in August, Aguinaldo and the members of his government composed a message to the foreign diplomatic representatives in the Philippines, pointing out that the Revolutionary Government was predominant in 15 provinces of Luzon (Cavite, Batangas, Mindoro, Tayabas, Laguna, Morong, Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Pangasinan, La Union, Infanta and Zambales) where "the most perfect order and tranquility reign," and announcing that "the Philippine nation has arrived at that state in which it can and ought to govern itself." Its President "implores the protection of all the Powers of the civilized world, and beseeches them to formally recognize the belligerency of the Revolutionary Government and the independence of the Philippines."⁽²⁵⁾

The message was ignored by the United States and by "all the Powers of the civilized world."

Instead, on August 13, the Spanish army in Manila capitulated to the U.S. army under General Merritt. It was a carefully pre-arranged surrender in which the American troops staged a mock assault on the city's fortifications, ostensibly to enable a saving of "Spanish honor" but actually to permit the American army to "capture" the city in order to assume full control over it and thus keep it out of Filipino hands. At the time of the capitulation Filipino revolutionary troops held seven miles of a siege line of

seven and three-quarters miles around the city⁽²⁶⁾ and were in actuality the besieging force. By excluding the Filipinos from the surrender arrangement the Philippines had been transferred from one colonial power to another in contemptuous disregard of the wishes of the Filipino people.

Under the terms of the capitulation, "This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its educational establishments and its private property of all descriptions, are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army."

Article III of the peace protocol signed on August 12 by the United States and Spain read: "The United States is entitled to occupy and will hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines."

In this manner the United States gained its first objective in the seizure of a Philippine base. Regardless of whether it was felt necessary to take the whole of the Philippines, the McKinley administration had determined in advance to deceive and to thwart the Filipino revolutionary forces, which were organized with "pretensions" in precisely the area on which the United States had "designs." Once in possession of a strategic foothold, the buildup of American power could occur without difficulty.

2. The Logic of Acquiring a Colony

For the United States the period between the occupation of Manila and the signing of a peace treaty with Spain was critical. In that time the decision was finally made to take the whole of the Philippines, and the procedures recognized as legal by the imperialist states were completed for the assumption of American colonial possession of the archipelago.

As McKinley said in his letter of instructions to the members of the American delegation he sent to Paris to negotiate a peace treaty with Spain, "The march of events rules and over-rules human action."⁽²⁷⁾ For those who advocated the acquisition of a naval and commercial base in Asia, the "march of events" dictated the taking of all the islands rather than a single base area or the single island of Luzon.

From the standpoint of the naval strategists, a base on Luzon, in the Manila Bay area, would become untenable if the other

islands were allowed to pass to a rival power. Germany, France and Russia all stood by, interested in what would follow from the collapse of the Spanish colonial empire. Militarily, it was difficult to avoid looking at the archipelago except as an integrated complex.

As far as commercial interests were concerned, although the China market was the main goal, the Philippines was becoming increasingly attractive for its own possibilities. Frank A. Vanderlip, the assistant secretary of the treasury in McKinley's cabinet, rushed an article into print in the August *Century* magazine, "Facts About the Philippines," extolling the commercial horizons in the islands. On August 2, before the surrender of Manila, the State Department appointed a commission, headed by Edward W. Harden, to report on "the financial and industrial conditions of the Philippine Islands,"⁽²⁸⁾ while a cable to Dewey the day after the peace protocol requested a report on commercial as well as naval base estimates.⁽²⁹⁾ The report of George F. Becker, the geologist sent out with the first expeditionary force, arrived in October and was immediately forwarded with its information on mineral deposits to the U.S. Peace Commission in Paris, along with the Harden report, which stressed that the "Philippine Islands [are] one and inseparable."⁽³⁰⁾

Further pressure for the retention of the islands came from the American churches, which exhibited a missionary zeal equal to that of the most rabid apostle of commercial opportunity. The *Baptist Standard* was so carried away by the capture of Manila that it called for an "imperialism of righteousness."⁽³¹⁾ Immediately after the Battle of Manila Bay, in fact, the Protestant missionary societies took steps to open work in the Philippines, the Presbyterian Missionary Society so certain of the outcome that it set up its plans by June 6.⁽³²⁾ By September 6 an agency of the North American Bible Society was operating in Manila.⁽³³⁾ The missionary Bishop James Mill Thoburn of the Methodist-Episcopal Church in South Asia "read about the wonderful Jericho-like victory of Commodore Dewey in Manila Bay. His spirit was strangely moved. He saw the fulfillment of the hopes and prayers of years. God had spoken. The Philippines were open to the gospel."⁽³⁴⁾ This was in spite of the fact that the Philippines had been a Catholic colony for over three centuries. To the Protestant churches in the United States a wonderful opportunity had pre-

sented itself for "a proselytizing assault upon these citadels of Catholicism."⁽³⁵⁾ On the other hand, the American branches of the Catholic religious orders saw the possibility of replacing their brothers in the Spanish orders. In McKinley's own household his wife, a considerable influence on the President, was obsessed with "converting the Igorottes."⁽³⁶⁾ McKinley himself, always the politician with his ear to the ground, heeded this sentiment by professing, in a famous utterance, that he had received heavenly guidance telling him that "there was nothing for us to do but to take them all and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and Christianize them."⁽³⁷⁾

Hesitations in American circles over annexing the entire Philippines were further overcome by a factor of equal importance, the urging of Britain. The British Empire by this time had entered a period of uneasiness and uncertainty about its ability to protect its widespread holdings and trade advantages, particularly with the rise of an aggressive German rival that was building a strong navy. If the Philippines were to fall into other than American hands, the British feared there would be a threat to their positions in Hongkong and Singapore, which would require a strong naval defending force, but a friendly American naval presence in Asia would enable Britain to shift much of its fleet to home waters to stand guard against the German navy pouring off the slip-ways at Kiel. Also, a greater American commercial stake in Asia would militate against the territorial grabs of Russia, Japan and France in China (where Britain had a £32 million annual trade to protect, 70 per cent of China's total foreign trade).

The broad pattern that the far-sighted British had in mind was to concede to American ambitions in the Caribbean in exchange for United States' backing for its policy in China. British assurance, in October 1897, that it had only commercial interest in Cuba and that it would favor American steps against Spain in the Caribbean was an initial step toward winning the United States as an ally. On January 10, 1898 British Prime Minister Balfour put forward an "open door" concept for China, and an approach was made to the United States through Washington embassy channels for support of this position on March 8, 1898. The McKinley administration, however, was unwilling to take such a step at the time.

Assistance was lent by Britain to American moves in the Philippines. Dewey's coaling needs for his Asiatic Squadron were facilitated by the British in Hongkong before he descended on Manila Bay. Following the destruction of the Spanish fleet, British warships played a part in reinforcing the position of Dewey's squadron. A German squadron commanded by Admiral Diederichs entered Manila Bay in strength greater than that of Dewey, behaved provocatively and briefly occupied some harbor installations, but the British warships were interposed between the German and American vessels in a manner plainly of alliance with the Americans, and the episode dissipated.

From London, U.S. Ambassador John Hay wrote to Secretary of State Day in July that the "British Government prefer to have us retain Philippine Islands."⁽³⁸⁾ This refuted suggestions emanating from some circles in Washington and printed in the British press that "What most interests foreign authorities here is the suggestion that Britain should take the Philippines in exchange for the Bermudas or the British possessions near this country."⁽³⁹⁾ Hay was instrumental in the setting up of an Anglo-American League in London on July 13, which was duplicated two weeks later by the creation of an Anglo-American Committee in New York.

In September 1898 Hay was appointed Secretary of State in the McKinley cabinet. His close links with Britain were, beyond doubt, the major consideration in his appointment, and it is significant that the businessmen connected with the American Asiatic Association and the American-China Development Co., feeling that some form of association with Britain would help in their penetration of China, backed Hay to head the State Department. It was Hay who supervised the American Commission in the Paris peace conference, where Britain played an important role in supporting U.S. possession of the Philippines.

Further pressure for the United States to take the Philippines intact came from the Catholic Church and Vatican sources. The Church was much concerned about the fate of its extensive interests in the islands if the collapse of Spanish rule was not succeeded by the rule of another western power. One of the main causes, and consequently one of the chief targets, of the Filipino revolutionists, especially the peasantry, were the friars of the

religious orders and their abusive feudal landlordism. Atrocity stories about the maltreatment of the friars by Filipinos in territory under the control of the revolutionary forces were circulated in the United States and elsewhere. In the United States, Cardinal James Gibbons and Archbishop John Ireland, both close to the Republican Party and to McKinley, advocated retention, looking to the assumption by the American wing of the Church of the responsibilities in the Spanish dioceses in the Philippines.⁽⁴⁰⁾

At the center of these varied influences, McKinley himself, heading probably the most thoroughgoing businessmen's government in American experience to that time ("nothing more than a very supple and highly paid agent of . . . capitalism," as Henry Adams termed him)⁽⁴¹⁾, apparently from an early date was in favor of holding the whole archipelago. "While we are conducting war and until its conclusion we must keep all we can get; when the war is over we must keep what we want," read a note found among his papers.⁽⁴²⁾ However, he was very concerned about public opinion toward a too-rabid imperialist policy, which he realized might affect his re-election chances in 1900.

A skillful politician, he proceeded to stack the cards in favor of annexation. The Peace Commission sent to Paris was weighted with a majority of ardent imperialists. Three of its five members were advocates not only of taking the Philippines but everything else that could be seized in the Pacific: they were Republican Senators Cushman K. Davis of Minnesota and William D. Fry of Maine, and Whitelaw Reid, editor of the *New York Tribune*, one of the most vocal expansionists in the country. The Commission's chairman, Secretary of State William R. Day, was in favor at least of taking Luzon. Only Senator George Gray, a Democrat, was opposed to acquiring overseas territories.⁽⁴³⁾ The shrewdness of McKinley was shown in his choice for the Commission of three senators who would be committed to support of their own handiwork when a treaty was framed for Senate approval; as it turned out, even Gray, the anti-imperialist, was persuaded to vote for the treaty by some judicious distribution of patronage by McKinley.

Instructions given to the Commission by the President, while mentioning only Luzon, were a pious phrasing of U.S. objectives that allowed for the widest latitude of expansionism:

Without any organized thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations which we cannot disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human action. Answering unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we cannot be unmindful that, without any desire or design on our part, the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization. Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship cannot be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade; but we seek no advantages in the Orient which are not common to all. Asking only the open door for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to others. The commercial opportunity which is naturally and inevitably associated with this new opening depends less on large territorial possession than upon an adequate commercial basis and upon broad and equal privilege.

The reference to the "open door" was an evident bow to Britain in exchange for her support, as well as a move to neutralize opposition from other powers to an intended acquisition of a colony in a part of the world where imperialist rivalry was now sharp.

Waiting until after the Peace Conference was under way in Paris, McKinley made a carefully selected and publicized trip to midwest and far western states, to sound out popular sentiment. These were the areas of pro-expansionist feeling; the anti-imperialist current was strongest in the south and east. Applause for his remarks on tour about holding the Philippines was interpreted as popular support for annexation, and on his return to Washington, McKinley wired Day that "the well-considered opinion of the majority" of Americans was for taking the whole archipelago. This was followed by fresh instructions to the Commission: "The information which has come to the president since your departure* convinces him that the acceptance of the cession of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands subject to Spanish rule, or to be the subject of future contention, cannot be justified on political, commercial or humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible, and the former must therefore be acquired."⁽⁴⁴⁾

*The Becker and Harden geological and commercial survey reports.

At the same time the Peace Conference took place, the Filipino Revolutionary Government had assembled a convention in Malolos, Bulacan, to shape the constitution under which the nation would govern itself. This was a fact ignored by all the participants in the Paris Conference. Felipe Agoncillo, in charge abroad of the foreign affairs of the Philippine government, arrived in Paris and sought to present his credentials ("the Filipinos will not permit themselves or their homes to be bought or sold like merchandise," he said), but the American Commission denied him a hearing. The Commission, almost wholly ignorant of the Philippines, sought testimony on the islands instead from American occupation military commanders and from foreign businessmen in Manila.

"The United States can assure a steady government in these islands and in their hands the country will increase in wealth and will, in a short time, be able to return to the United States the money laid out," testified Andre, a businessman and Belgian consul in Manila. A memo from Dewey spoke of "Manila . . . a port that in our hands would soon become one of the first ports of the world."

Major Frank Bournes, a medical officer attached to General Merritt's staff, was the chief contact man for the Americans to win over the wealthy Filipino families by virtue of previous extensive visits to the Philippines during which he had established a relationship with these anti-revolutionary elements (he had applied to accompany the American expeditionary forces as an "interpreter"). He told the Peace Commission that "the people are for the most part easily controlled by proper methods. . . . I . . . believe that if a few of the ambitious chieftans now in control of the insurgent army could be disposed of, the masses of the people could be handled without difficulty."⁽⁴⁵⁾

Peace negotiations in Paris were drawn-out, lasting for over two months, and were complicated by the maneuverings of the major powers with a stake in the transfer of colonial real estate from one power to another. In Russia, France and Germany, government and press were hostile to the U.S. demands on Spain, resentful of the appearance of a new rival in Asia. (The French, aside from their own interests in Indo-China and south China, were large financial backers for the Russian inroads in northern China and Manchuria.) The Russian *St. Petersburg Gazette*

warned that: "By the transfer of the whole of the Philippines to such enterprising and tenacious people as the Americans, the Pacific Ocean would soon become a North American lake on which the flags of other nations would be merely tolerated."⁽⁴⁶⁾ Russia was principally alarmed by the probing of American railroad interests in its Manchurian preserve. To offset such resistance, the United States had the support of Britain and the Vatican.

A chief bone of contention, deadlocking the Conference for some time, was the question of the assumption of debts incurred by Spain in attempting to suppress the Cuban revolution. A Spanish bond issue for this purpose had been subscribed by European powers (France, Germany and Austria-Hungary in the main) in 1897, with Cuban resources as the security.⁽⁴⁷⁾ The United States offered to pay for indebtedness for internal Cuban improvements, but refused to assume, or to let its Cuban dependency-to-be to assume, the Spanish suppression debt.

Into this deadlock stepped the Vatican observer at the Conference, Archbishop Placido Louis Chappelle, of the New Orleans, Louisiana diocese. He persuaded the American Commission to agree to give \$20,000,000 to Spain ostensibly to pay for the Philippines but actually to cover the Spanish Cuban debt and thus to mollify the European powers' resistance to the peace treaty. Archbishop Chappelle's motivations, however, were much deeper than this. As spokesman for the Vatican, he was mainly concerned with molding a treaty in which the United States obtained the Philippines by the appearance of purchase rather than of conquest, an arrangement that safeguarded the extensive Catholic Church properties in the islands (including the friar estates), the titles to which would otherwise be left in doubt. The final wording of the treaty consequently declared that the cession of the Philippines and other islands to the United States "can not in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds . . . ecclesiastical . . . or any other associations . . ." In Article III of the treaty, the payment of the \$20,000,000 is stated without clear specification of its purpose.

The Treaty allowed Spain, from which the Philippines had sought to gain full separation after centuries of colonial oppression, to retain equal commercial privileges with the United States

in its former colony for a period of ten years, until 1909 (Article XV). Spaniards were also granted residence, property and business rights (Article XIX), as were other foreigners. The American Peace Commission was instructed to declare that, "The policy of the United States in the Philippines will be that of an open door to the world's commerce," a position that was hoped would gain a like response from other imperialist powers in Asia.

Signed on December 10, 1898, the Treaty of Peace, proclaiming that "Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands," made no reference to the Filipino people beyond stating that "The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion" (a further concession to Archbishop Chappelle) and that "The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by Congress." The Filipinos, in other words, had become colonial subjects of the United States.

As the representative of the Philippine Government in Paris, Felipe Agoncillo sent a memorandum to the Commission protesting that the peace treaty "cannot be accepted as binding by my government inasmuch as the commission did not hear the Filipino people or admit them into its deliberations, when they have the undisputable right to intervene in all that might affect their future life."⁽⁴⁸⁾ As with all Agoncillo's efforts to present his government's views, it was ignored by the Commission.

The Filipino revolutionary leaders had been convinced that nothing but adverse results for them would come from the Paris Conference. Apolinario Mabini, now the chief adviser of Aguinaldo, denounced the cession of his country as a violation of "international natural law" that provided for the freedom of peoples.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Antonio Luna, the Filipino military commander, wrote in his government's newspaper *La Independencia*: "People are not to be bought and sold like horses and houses. If the aim has been to abolish the traffic in Negroes because it meant the sale of persons, why is there still mentioned in international law the sale of countries with inhabitants free to be unwilling to form part of another country?"⁽⁵⁰⁾

Agoncillo, hurrying to Washington, attempted once again to present his government's case to President McKinley and to the

Senate, to which the peace treaty had been sent for ratification. His memorials asserted that "by the rule of international law, maintained without exception by the American Government, the Philippine Republic has been for many months entitled to national recognition, possessing, as it has since June 1898, a government both de facto and de jure, capable of enforcing its laws at home, or carrying out its undertakings with foreign governments," and expressed disbelief that there could be "an intent to ignore, as to the ten millions of human beings I represent, the right the free government of America preserves to the lowliest of her inhabitants."⁽⁵¹⁾ He was ignored.

In the Philippines a constitution had been drawn up and steps were being taken for the formal proclamation of a Philippine Republic. To contend with this national resistance to American rule, McKinley, eleven days after the signing of the peace treaty and before it could be presented to the U.S. Senate for ratification, hastened to issue a proclamation.

Addressed to the Secretary of War for implementation, it stated that Dewey's naval victory and the Spanish surrender of Manila had "practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein." With the signing of a Spanish-American peace treaty "future control, disposition and government of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States," as a result of which "the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary, and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible dispatch to the whole of the ceded territory."

This was to be announced to the Filipino people, who were urged "either by active aid or by honest submission" to cooperate. Those not inclined to do so "will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but without severity so far as may be possible." An "absolute domain of military authority" would prevail "until the legislature of the United States shall otherwise provide" and the military authorities would collect taxes, customs duties and confiscate private property if needed for military use. Filipinos could only hold civil and municipal office if they "accept the supremacy of the United States by taking the oath of allegiance."

It was declared, finally, that "the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation," but to fulfill "this high mission . . . for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority to repress disturbance, and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States."⁽⁵²⁾

3. Ratifying a Peace Treaty, Beginning a War

For McKinley, the weighting of the Paris Peace Commission in favor of the expansionists and the attempt to screen with high moral purposes commercial aims in annexing the Philippines were rooted in serious difficulty. There was good reason for him and for those around him to be concerned over the fulfillment of the policy they had shaped. The transformation of a war for the "liberation" of Cuba into the military conquest of a colony in Asia had aroused deep and wide opposition in the United States.

The beginnings of an anti-imperialist movement in the United States had appeared within a month of the Battle of Manila Bay, but it was not to become a major force until after the war fever had cooled and the features of a colonial policy had become plain. Sectional domestic economic interests that were opposed to imperialist ambitions made themselves felt, however, throughout the peace negotiations with Spain and entered the Senate debate over ratification of the peace treaty with powerful lobbying effect.

Andrew Carnegie, the steel magnate, was one of the first to make his opposition felt. His pressure against Philippine annexation was so intense while peace talks were in progress that Secretary of State John Hay wrote to Whitelaw Reid, in Paris with the Peace Commission:

Andrew Carnegie really seems to be off his head. He writes me frantic letters signing them 'Your Bitterest Opponent.' He threatens the President, not only with the vengeance of the voters, but with practical punishment at the hands of the mob. He says henceforth the entire labor vote of America will be cast against us, and that he will see that it is done. He says the Administration will fall in irretrievable ruin the moment it shoots down one insurgent Filipino. He does not seem to reflect that the Government is in a somewhat robust condition even after shooting down several American citizens in his interest at Homestead.⁽⁵³⁾

Carnegie was eventually to be made to see where his interests lay, but a much more serious and more enduring opposition to colonial acquisition came from domestic agrarian producers that feared the competition of more cheaply produced foreign crops. These had backed the Teller amendment in the case of Cuba, and they now saw Philippine sugar, tobacco and other products as a serious threat.

These sectors of the country preferred to exert their pressure through the normal channels of Congress and the cabinet rather than through independent political movements. Much of the opposition to the ratification of the peace treaty with Spain came from these groups. Representatives of tobacco growers in states from Connecticut to North Carolina to Kentucky, and sugar-beet and cane interests stretching from Georgia to Louisiana, through the middle west to Wisconsin and in a belt midway across the country to California, formed an anti-imperialist bloc. These were also the regions of Populist protest from farmers whose incomes had plummeted as they were squeezed by the monopolies and who called for free silver to mint their way to prosperity; the competition of foreign crops on top of this would be too great a burden to bear.

Agrarian dissenters against an imperialist policy had a ready-made champion in William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic standard bearer in 1896 who had espoused the free silver cause. Although he had volunteered in the army at the outbreak of the war with Spain (in accord with the seemingly contradictory streak of jingoism that emerged from the frustrations of the Populist movement), he altered his attitude toward imperialist adventures after Spain's defeat, hurriedly shedding his uniform to be in Washington when the ratification question was presented to Congress.

Bryan was not opposed to obtaining naval bases as such and other means of protecting American overseas commerce and investment, but he was against the acquiring of colonies. His way of presenting the issue was typical of the great majority of those who protested a nakedly imperialist policy. It based itself on the effect of holding colonies on the interests of the American people, and not the effect on the peoples to be subjugated:

When trade is secured by force, the cost of securing it and retaining it must be taken out of the profits, and the profits are never large enough

to cover the expense. Such a system would never be defended but for the fact that the expense is borne by all the people, while the profits are enjoyed by a few. Imperialism would be profitable to the ship owners, who would be able to carry live soldiers to the Philippines and bring dead soldiers back; it would be profitable to the officials whose salaries would be fixt here and paid over there, and profitable to those who would seize upon the franchises; but to the farmer, to the laboring man and to the vast majority of those engaged in other occupations it would bring expenditure without return and risk without reward.⁽⁵⁴⁾

The entry into the picture of Bryan, the titular leader of the Democratic party, gave further prestige to the opposition cause but it was not an unmixed blessing. Anti-imperialist sentiment was still in the formative stages, its adherents were not unified and had no common program, and into this Bryan introduced his own ambitions, seeing in the broad issue a platform by which to reach the presidency, denied to him in 1896, in the next national election.

The issue was joined in December 1898 when the peace treaty was presented to the U.S. Senate for ratification. Opposition to acquisition of the Philippines as a colony was strong in this body, so McKinley and his Senate leaders sought to dissipate and to confuse it by putting the emphasis on ratification as a means of ending the war, of which the nation was weary by now.

However, during the Senate debate a number of Senators from southern and mid-western states, where agricultural crops would be affected by competition with Philippine products, introduced resolutions opposing the Philippine annexation. The first of these, moved by Senator George G. Vest of Missouri on December 10, 1898 (the day the peace treaty was signed in Paris), sought to clarify the matter of the U.S. Constitutional provision on which the McKinley administration professed to base its policy of acquisition: "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property belonging to the United States."

The Vest resolution declared that "under the Constitution of the United States no power is given to the Federal Government to acquire territory to be held or governed permanently as colonies. The colonial system of European nations cannot be established under our present Constitution, but all territory acquired by the Government, except such small amounts as may be nec-

essary for coaling stations, correction of boundaries, and similar governmental purposes, must be acquired and governed with the purpose or intent of organizing such territory into States suitable for admission into the Union."

Another Constitutional issue was raised in a resolution of Senator William E. Mason of Illinois on January 7, 1899, which read: "Whereas, all just powers of government are derived from the consent of the governed: Therefore be it *Resolved by the Senate of the United States*, That the Government of the United States of America will not attempt to govern the people of any other country in the world without the consent of the people themselves, or subject them by force to our dominion against their will."

Said Mason of the Filipino people during debate on his resolution: "When did they take the oath of allegiance to our flag? . . . Cannot govern themselves! And are we to say that today to the poor, God-forsaken down-trodden people of the Philippine Islands, and, while we whisper the words of consolation into their ears that we are to give them liberty and life, we wink the other eye to the merchants of the country and say, 'We will extend commerce and sell more calico.'"

When brought to a vote, the efforts of Vest and Mason to rule out annexation on Constitutional grounds were defeated. A resolution was then introduced, on January 11, by Senator Augustus O. Bacon of Georgia, which asserted: "That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said islands, and assert their determination, when a stable and independent government shall have been duly erected therein entitled to recognition as such, to transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and control of the islands to their people."⁽⁵⁵⁾

This early effort to commit the United States to a pledge of granting independence to the Filipino people came from a senator who was acting for domestic sugar interests. This was brought out by Bacon in debate: "With that tropical climate and cheap Asiatic labor and directed with American brains, it would be impossible for the American sugar producer to compete with Philippine sugar. . . . So, you may go through the list of . . . products in the

Philippines. Their development will doubtless enrich the syndicates and trusts that will invest their capital there for that purpose, but the great masses of the [American] people . . . whom they are seeking to delude and mislead with the glittering bauble of Empire will have as their compensation the destruction of . . . industry."⁽⁵⁶⁾

Although each of these resolutions opposing a colonial policy was defeated by a simple majority vote, this was no indication that approval of the peace treaty itself was assured, requiring as it did a two-thirds majority. At this point, however, a number of events and maneuvers coincided to enable the imperialist grouping to carry the day.

On February 5, 1899, one day before the scheduled Senate vote on the treaty, hostilities broke out, at American instigation, between American and Filipino troops in the Philippines. Flashed to Washington, this sensationalized news reportedly caused at least two senators in opposition to the treaty to change their minds at the last moment and to vote in its favor. Three others were allegedly influenced to do the same by the distribution of patronage by the McKinley administration (including Senator Gray, the oppositionist at the Paris Conference, who was offered a federal judgeship).⁽⁵⁷⁾

Another, and perhaps more important factor, was the maneuver carried out by William Jennings Bryan. If Bryan had acted solely from a protectionist standpoint favoring the domestic agricultural producers whom he had previously championed, his influence would no doubt have been decisive. He was not content, however, to let the issue be settled by the vote on ratification of the peace treaty. His eyes were on the presidential election of 1900, in which he hoped to be the Democratic contender against McKinley. He saw himself carrying the banner of a campaign against imperialism to which he visualized the idealism of the American people being rallied as it had been over the issue of Cuban freedom.

Bryan, therefore, threw his support behind the treaty's ratification in February 1899 in order to provide himself and his party with the issue of independence for the Philippines in 1900. In part, he was influenced to do so by the fact that there was backing for ratification among many (particularly northern) Demo-

crats and by a large section of the Democratic press. To secure his party's nomination he had to appease these groups as well as agrarian interests.

Despite all the last minute pressures and maneuvers, the treaty attained the necessary two-thirds majority by a single vote, 57 to 27. Seven Democrats, three Populists, three Silverites and one Independent (the Bryan influence is apparent here) joined with 43 Republicans in favor, while in opposition were 22 Democrats, two Republicans, two Populists and one Silverite.

Immediately prior to the vote, a resolution was moved by Senator Samuel D. McEnery of the sugar-growing and rice-growing state of Louisiana, on February 6:

Resolved, That by the ratification of the pending treaty of peace with Spain it is not intended to incorporate the inhabitants of said islands into citizenship of the United States, nor is it intended to permanently annex said islands as an integral part of the territory of the United States; but it is the intention of the United States to establish on said islands a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants of said islands, to prepare them for local self-government, and in due time to make such disposition of said islands as will best promote the interests of the citizens of the United States and the inhabitants of said islands.

To this rather vague statement, an amendment was proposed by Senator Bacon of Georgia, which stated:

That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise permanent sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said islands, and assert their determination, when a stable and independent government shall have been erected therein entitled in the judgment of the Government of the United States to recognition as such, to transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession of Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and control of the islands to their people.⁽⁵⁸⁾

If approved, this would have committed the United States to pursue in regard to the Philippines a policy similar to that adopted toward Cuba under the Teller Amendment of April 1898. When brought to a vote on February 14 the Bacon Amendment produced a disconcerting tie on the Senate floor of 29-29, which was only broken by the dissenting vote of U.S. Vice-president Garret Hobart.

The McEnery resolution was then actually passed, by a vote of 26-22. As a statement of policy, however, it had no validity, because it was never placed before the House of Representatives for concurrence.

Such an extremely close vote on the Bacon Amendment favoring eventual Philippine independence and the passing of the McEnery resolution that, howsoever vaguely, did declare the impermanency of American occupation, were seized upon both by anti-imperialists and by the resisting Filipinos as evidence of a critical division in American ruling circles over holding the Philippines. This was quite true, but it was to be a division with delayed action effect.

To many of those who from the outset opposed expansionism, the peace treaty's ratification was a legal fact that settled the question of acquiring the Philippines as a possession. The tendency for the issue to subside can be seen in a scrutiny of the Senate voting on the Bacon and McEnery motions. Although 84 senators had voted on the treaty itself, only 59 voted on the Bacon Amendment and only 48 on the McEnery resolution. Out of 90 senators, only 29, or less than a third, were stirred to the point of voting for a resolution favoring Philippine independence. Fewer Democrats voted for the Bacon Amendment than had voted against the treaty. At the same time, it has been estimated that only 34 senators were classifiable as avowed imperialists.⁽⁵⁹⁾ The remaining 27 were hesitant "moderates," standing midway between approval of the treaty and an unwillingness to give clear-cut support to an indefinite holding of the Philippines.

As far as the Philippine question was concerned, treaty ratification had turned the struggles of Filipinos and of anti-imperialists alike into something resembling rear-guard actions. Bacon himself was an illustration of the acceptance of the situation. A year later, in the debate on the army appropriation bill of 1900, he was to declare his readiness and that of his fellow Democrats to send 100,000 troops or any force necessary to the Philippines for one, two, three or five years in order to enforce American control.

George F. Hoar, the Lincolnesque senator from Massachusetts, who was one of the two Republicans who voted against the treaty, was contemptuous of the position of Bryan and his Democrats: "The Democratic Party, as a party, never meant business in this matter. They never wielded their Party strength in opposition to it."⁽⁶⁰⁾

The anti-imperialist position, however, was not lost by the failure to defeat ratification, nor was the role of the Democratic party so thoroughly discredited. Resistance to the type of colonialism inaugurated by the taking of the Philippines was many-sided and persistent. Defeated on one issue, it interposed itself in another. Its lack of success in frontal political battles was no measure of its influence on the over-all struggle for policy.

AMERICANS AND FILIPINOS

Attraction or Subjugation?

1. Preparations to Strangle a Republic

Throughout the latter part of 1898, Filipinos, putting into effect their own laws and governmental machinery in their country, had been compelled to watch an American military government set up an enclave of foreign rule in their midst. In August, General Merritt was succeeded in command by General Elwell Otis, who exercised to the full his designation as military governor. He made it apparent in an infinitude of ways that a Philippine government would not be recognized or dealt with.

Having been refused a joint occupation of Manila after the Spanish capitulation, the uniformed and well-disciplined Philippine forces—in effect a regular army—were made to evacuate the city's suburbs under Otis' threat to use force if the order was not complied with. The result was a state of armed truce and a tindery situation of tension.

President Aguinaldo, even in confidential dispatches, was referred to only as an "insurgent general," and was addressed as "General" in correspondence. The Philippine flag was forbidden to be flown in Manila Bay on Filipino vessels. Civil affairs in Manila were run by an American provost marshall who directed frequent raids on Filipino (not Spanish) homes in search of arms. A post office set up in Manila by the Philippine government to facilitate its correspondence, was raided and shut down, its employees arrested.

Customs and internal revenue taxes were collected by U.S. officers and the returns allocated to suit American wishes, mainly for military purposes. A U.S. War Department order in August had directed that all customs and tax cases should be referred to the Assistant Secretary of War, and on December 13, only three days after the signing of the peace treaty and weeks before its

submission to the Senate, a Division of Customs and Internal Affairs was created in the War Department to administer ceded territory.⁽¹⁾

Schools were opened in Manila in September 1898, and the American soldiers in them taught the language of the occupier, English. American newspapers made their appearance; for others, press controls were instituted. Spanish newspapers were suppressed for criticizing the military government, and a Filipino request for printing their official organ, *La Independencia*, was refused.⁽²⁾ On September 26 Otis had gone to the extent of issuing a Chinese Exclusion Order, declaring, "The laws of the United States which prohibit the entrance of Chinese will be enforced here."⁽³⁾

In the same month of September, the military government began to issue licenses to American business firms to operate in the Philippines.⁽⁴⁾ Almost all of these, whether branches of firms in the United States or individuals setting up in business, flocked in at first mainly to serve the needs of the thousands of American troops. For example, Macondray and Co., a branch of a San Francisco firm, which remains today one of the largest companies in the Philippines, started as a supplier of Australian beef to the army; by November it had branched out into Manila real estate.⁽⁵⁾ These were the advance guard of the commercial interests that had been pressing for an Asian foothold.

Filipino revolutionary leaders watched these developments with trepidation. From their declarations in Hongkong and in the Philippines it is quite apparent that their intent was to create an organized position of strength from which to bargain with the Americans, to whom they were willing to make great concessions. The June 12, 1898 declaration of independence contained the phrase "under the protection of the Mighty and Humanitarian North American nation," and the idea of existing as a protectorate, with all that it implied, was in the minds of the principal Filipino policy-makers. Even after the Spanish army surrendered to the Americans, who proceeded to build up their forces in the city and to bar Filipino entry, Filipino leaders exercised restraint.

A significant trend, too, had occurred in the Philippine government. Emilio Aguinaldo, following the establishment of the Revolutionary Government in June, had brought into his cabinet a number of the wealthy Filipino landowners and moneylenders

who had consistently opposed the revolutionary cause. These wanted to be in the seats of power as they changed hands, and they were taking the ambivalent posture of readiness to collaborate with the Americans on the one hand while accepting posts in the Philippine government on the other. Among them were T.H. Pardo de Tavera, Cayetano Arellano, Benito Legarda, Gregorio Araneta, Felipe Buencamino and Florentino Torres.

From the time of the American arrival Arellano and de Tavera had been advocating annexation to the United States; Aguinaldo appointed them in charge of foreign affairs. (Arellano was even offered the presidency of the republic.) Legarda, vice-president of the Philippine Congress, had told the Belgian consul and businessman, Andre, that he "would be glad to see the United States take these islands under their protection and put an end to the constant appeal of funds from the rebels."⁽⁶⁾ To appease these elements, Aguinaldo had taken the step of dissolving the Katipunan, which they hated.⁽⁷⁾ The Philippine Congress itself was riddled with collaborationists, some of whom had signed statements offering allegiance to the United States and were rigidly opposed to revolutionary changes.

General Otis was well aware of this situation. "I had more influence in Aguinaldo's cabinet than he had himself," he said later. In his view, however, and in that of his superiors in Washington, there was no room for diplomacy or a negotiated arrangement with the Filipinos.

The main concern of Otis was to get enough American troops on hand to assert his authority over the whole country. His main problem was the Filipino army, the center of radical strength. His tactics were to encourage intrigues by the wealthy elements in the Philippine government and to prevent the radicals from taking full control.

When McKinley's hurried proclamation of December 10, ordering the complete extension of military authority, reached Otis, he was alarmed, regarding it as ill-timed and blundering. Its publication, revealing the full intent of American policy, would strengthen Filipino radicals led by Mabini and Luna before American troop reinforcements arrived. "Leading Filipinos . . . the ablest men in Manila" advised Otis not to issue the proclamation in its original form for fear that it enhance radical influence. Otis

proceeded to delete all references to United States assumption of sovereignty and rephrased the proclamation's wording to give it a different meaning.

These changes are perhaps the best illustration of the deception practiced by American authorities in their relations with Filipinos in that period. Otis deleted the references to "sovereignty," "control," "disposition," "local rule," "authority must remain supreme," and "the supremacy of the United States." The original wording that civil and municipal offices must "be under the control of such officers as may accept the supremacy of the United States by taking the oath of allegiance" was altered to "that the functions and duties connected with civil and municipal administrations are to be performed by such officers as wish to accept the assistance of the United States." The words "temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed" were twisted to "while holding the temporary administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed." Most deceitful of all were Otis' closing words, completely at variance with McKinley's original:

It is also my belief that it is the intention of the United States Government to draw from the Filipino people so much of the military force of the islands as possible and consistent with a free and well-constituted government of the country, and it is my desire to inaugurate a policy of that character. I am also convinced that it is the intention of the United States Government to seek the establishment of a most liberal government for the islands, in which the people themselves shall have as full representation as the maintenance of law and order will permit, and which shall be susceptible of development, on lines of increased representation and the bestowal of increased powers, into a government as free and independent as is enjoyed by the most favored provinces of the world.

In explaining this astonishing display of Machiavellian diplomacy, Otis said that "I did not wish to make use of words by which Mabini might excite the people just at that time."⁽⁶⁾ However, the General, who up to then had been signing his papers as "military governor *in* the Philippines," proceeded to commit the error of signing his proclamation as "military governor *of* the Philippines," which was immediately noticed by Aguinaldo and Mabini when the proclamation was issued on January 4, 1899.

Aguinaldo promptly issued a counter-proclamation to "protest most solemnly against this intrusion of the United States Government on the sovereignty of these islands."⁽⁹⁾ The situation was then immeasurably worsened when the American General Miller, sent by Otis to occupy the city of Iloilo in the central Visayan Islands and unaware of his superior's proclamation, issued there the original document of McKinley.

At this point Aguinaldo and the radical Filipino leaders were still hoping, despite the peace treaty signed in Paris, to negotiate a form of autonomy for their government. The wealthy conservative Filipinos, however, when the treaty terms and the McKinley proclamation were known, deserted Aguinaldo and sought accommodation with the Americans. Nevertheless, steps went forward for the formal establishment of a Philippine Republic, and this was finally inaugurated on January 23.

Otis made last ditch efforts to forestall this Filipino effort to assert sovereign rights. Since December 7 he had known that six regiments of regular troops were being readied in the United States to reinforce him. These were needed to replace volunteers whose enlistments were running out and who wanted to go home rather than fight a war they had not bargained for. Furthermore, Otis knew that the ratification of the peace treaty was pending in the Senate. He maneuvered to deceive the Filipino government once again, in order to gain time for these developments to strengthen his position.

After consulting with wealthy conservative Filipinos in Manila who had withdrawn their support from Aguinaldo, Otis took the initiative of sending one of their number, Florentino Torres (who had held a leading judicial post in the Spanish regime), to Malolos, where he persuaded Aguinaldo to enter into negotiations. Aguinaldo, in fact, went to the extent of allowing Torres to head a three-man commission appointed to confer with a similar American body headed by General Hughes. A series of six meetings took place from January 9 to 29.

On instructions, the Philippine commission began the talks with a firmly-stated position. Their orders were to uphold "absolute independence" at the outset and to point out that, while the Philippine government might have been able to afford to let pass previous infringements on its sovereignty, with McKinley's proclamation affairs "had arrived at an extreme of an attempt against

its independence and integrity." At Paris, "the cession of sovereignty was made on a basis which did not exist, inasmuch as the ceding power did not exercise sovereignty at the time of cession, and a de facto sovereignty over nearly the whole of the ceded territory was exercised by the Philippine people" who were "decidedly opposed to admitting any colonial government and are disposed to repel with force any attempt at coercion." Any discussion of future relations with the United States had to follow after the recognition of Philippine independence.

As the talks proceeded, however, the Philippine commission, which returned to Malolos to report and to receive instructions after each session, considerably watered down its position. In succeeding meetings, all three members professed support for a protectorate under the United States. At the request of the American commission, Torres put into writing as the Philippine position that the people's desire was "independence with the limitations which may result in the conditions agreed upon between their government and the American government when the latter agrees to officially recognize the former." Torres stated his own belief as to what these "limitations" might be, saying that he "readily saw how interior management [by Filipinos of their own affairs] might cause serious difficulties with the foreign powers, and that in his opinion the protector should be allowed at least great moral interference" to force Filipino leaders to "comply faithfully with the law that the same people had imposed on itself." In practice, such an arrangement would have been not much different from that which the United States imposed upon Cuba with the Platt Amendment.

The American commission, interested mainly in stalling on agreements with the Filipinos until the arrival of the expected troops, carried on an elaborate pretense of not understanding Philippine "aspirations" and kept asking for copies of the Philippine Constitution, for information on Aguinaldo's government, and for generalized "clarification." So indifferent was General Otis to the proceedings, except for their delaying value, that he did not bother to send minutes of the meetings to Washington.⁽¹⁰⁾

Toward the end of January the regular troops under General Lawton arrived. Although a seventh meeting with the Philippine commission had been scheduled, the talks were abruptly broken off, and American military leaders prepared for immediate drastic

steps. This was done despite the fact that a civilian Philippine Commission had been appointed by McKinley to investigate and to make recommendations concerning the situation in the Philippines, including relations with the Filipinos, and that this was known to be on its way.

A British authority on colonial affairs commented on the failure of the American military government to encourage a peaceful solution of problems, which could have avoided the tragedy that followed. "That the war could have been avoided by the exercise of the most ordinary prudence, that it could have been avoided if the advice of any British, French or Dutch colonial government in the Far East had been asked and acted upon, there can be no possible doubt."⁽¹¹⁾

It has been a matter of unresolved controversy as to whether Otis was involved in a plan to precipitate hostilities in order to facilitate approval of the peace treaty in the Senate. However, on February 5, one day before the Senate vote, using the pretext of a minor skirmish between American and Filipino pickets of the Manila perimeter (in which American troops fired the first shots), Otis ordered a general attack on the Filipino troops around Manila. No satisfactory explanation was made by Otis or by other American commanders as to why the picket incident could not have been clarified and settled by the simplest negotiation.

With the peace treaty ratified, claiming full legal possession of the Philippines, the United States proceeded to a war of suppression of the Philippine Republic.

2. The Schurman Commission and Alternatives to a Military Solution

At the beginning of the military conquest of the Philippines, an episode occurred involving a serious dispute over the need to implement such a policy. It was not a minor dispute since its participants were McKinley and his cabinet, Aguinaldo and his cabinet, the American military commanders in the Philippines, and the members of the civilian commission sent to the islands by McKinley to investigate Filipino attitudes and to recommend measures by which the country could be governed. This was the Schurman Commission, appointed early in January, before the ratification of the peace treaty and before the outbreak of Fil-American hostilities.

Admiral Dewey* had cabled McKinley on January 7, 1899 urging that a "civilian commission composed of men skilled in diplomacy and statesmanship should be sent to adjust differences."⁽¹²⁾ Dewey was at odds with Otis and his own clumsy relations with Filipino leaders may well have convinced him that civilians were better equipped than military men to discuss terms of political settlements.

In actuality, such a move had been under discussion in Washington prior to Dewey's cable. In appointing a commission, McKinley was motivated by more than a desire to be informed on Philippine attitudes, problems, and their solution. He was anxious to placate the opponents of expansionism who threatened to block ratification of the peace treaty and who were raising questions in influential quarters about the soundness of an imperialist policy. For this reason, as head of the Philippine Commission, he appointed Jacob Schurman, the president of Cornell University, a man of liberal reputation much respected in academic circles, an advocate of civil service reform, and one who had, at the beginning, publicly opposed the annexation of the Philippines.

Like many of his fellow oppositionists, Schurman did not at the time stand on the principle that the Filipinos should be allowed to govern themselves; he argued that their conquest would be expensive and burdensome, and that "democracy which is government by the people and for the people cannot afford to accept as citizens people who are not capable of self-government."⁽¹³⁾

When sounded out for the appointment, Schurman at first demurred on grounds of his opposition until McKinley assured him: "Oh, that need not trouble you; I didn't want the Philippines either, and in the protocol to the treaty I left myself free not to take them; but—in the end there was no alternative."⁽¹⁴⁾ McKinley knew his man and how to impress him. By the time the commission embarked in the latter part of January, Schurman, as its head, was telling the press: "The return of the islands to the authority of Spain was impossible, for we had destroyed that authority; to turn them over to the natives was a delivery to anarchy and misrule. The only choice left was to accept the trust for ourselves, however difficult and contrary to the spirit and form of our government it might be."⁽¹⁵⁾ The *New York Com-*

*Dewey had been promoted from Commodore to Rear-Admiral for his victory at Manila Bay.

mercial Advertiser commented shrewdly: "President Schurman is invited, apparently, as a representative of the opposition to expansion, like Senator Gray, to be converted, as he was, by the logic of facts, and to be exhibited as a demonstration on his return."⁽¹⁶⁾

In his other appointments to the five-man commission, McKinley, however, pursued the same tactics as in the case of the Paris Peace Commission: he packed it with pro-imperialists, guaranteeing that Schurman would be merely a figurehead. The other members were General Otis, Admiral Dewey, Dean C. Worcester and Charles Denby.

Otis and Dewey were part of the very framework of military conquest. Worcester, a professor of zoology at the University of Michigan, was then one of the few Americans with any knowledge of the Philippines, having spent three and a half years there during two zoological trips between 1887 and 1893. He and his companion on these trips, Frank S. Bourns, amassed considerable knowledge of the Philippines and of the relationships among the people. They made, in particular, numerous contacts with the wealthier circles of landlords and moneylenders. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion, in view of their later roles, that they were serving in an advanced intelligence capacity for expansionist interests.

Bourns accompanied the expeditionary forces in 1898 as a major in the medical corps, but his main task was to act as General Otis' chief adviser in Manila on political affairs. With a post as chief health officer in Manila as a screen, he acted as the head of Otis' spy system.⁽¹⁷⁾ It was Bourns who conducted secret negotiations with the wealthy Filipinos, including those who held posts in the Philippine government, and encouraged them to collaborate with the Americans. (Pardo de Tavera, at the same time that he held the foreign affairs post in Aguinaldo's cabinet, served on the Manila Board of Health under Bourns.)

Worcester wrote a book and a series of articles on the Philippines that appeared during the months in 1898 when American officials were casting about for information on the colony they were in the process of seizing. One article, published in the October 1898 issue of *The Century* magazine and entitled "Knotty Problems in the Philippines," was the first serious article suggesting a program to follow in that country when annexed.

"Things would at the outset naturally be under the direction of army men," wrote Worcester," and civil authority would very gradually take the place of military rule." He recommended the use of the Spanish colonial system with some modifications, the employment of "native clerks" in the administrative apparatus, the reformation of the taxation system and the use of taxes collected in the Philippines for meeting the expenses of the colony, the codification of laws, and a solution to the friar problem.

In the latter part of December, Worcester journeyed to Washington and requested an interview with McKinley "in order to communicate to President McKinley certain facts relative to the Philippine situation which it seemed to me ought to be brought to his attention." McKinley reportedly listened eagerly to Worcester and was so impressed by his information and suggestions that he at once asked him to go to the Philippines as his personal representative⁽¹⁸⁾ and promptly had his suggestions cabled to Otis.⁽¹⁹⁾ It can be assumed that McKinley was especially impressed by Worcester's understanding of the class psychology of Filipinos. When the Schurman Commission was created shortly afterward, Worcester was appointed a member. A hard-core conservative, catering to the most blatantly imperialist elements, he was to serve as a top-ranking official in the Philippine colonial regime longer than any other American.

Charles Denby, his fellow commission member, had for 13 years headed the U.S. consular mission in Peking. He had been assigned to the China post in 1885 at the behest of the American business interests who wanted to exploit the China market, especially railroad and cotton textile interests. It was he who had advocated a gunboat policy to give "armed protection to . . . all foreigners in China." Missionaries he called "pioneers of trade and commerce. . . . Fancy what would happen to the cotton trade if every Chinese wore a shirt. Well, the missionaries are teaching them to wear shirts!" A seizure of Formosa, he thought, "could be used as a link in the trade with China."⁽²⁰⁾ Before his appointment to the Schurman Commission he had called for the holding of the Philippines as a gateway to China.⁽²¹⁾ Considered also to be a man of the beef trust and the western packing interests,⁽²²⁾ he was on the commission to satisfy the most rabid expansionists.

Besides packing the commission in this manner, McKinley issued instructions that severely limited its role. It was defined as

advisory in nature, and it was told not to interfere with the military authorities, who were designated as the "temporary government." Significantly, while the Schurman Commission was being set up with public fanfare, the War Department, in actual command in the Philippines, quietly established its own Colonial Advisory Board on January 23, 1899.⁽²³⁾

Before the Schurman Commission reached the Philippines on March 4, 1899, the peace treaty had long been ratified and the war of conquest was under way. Its work as an advisory body, therefore, took place not under circumstances of preventing hostilities or of resolving differences peacefully, as Schurman himself had expected, but in a war situation in which it had to function as an adjunct to suppression. Unable to cross a battle front to interview any of the leaders of the Philippine government (except for minor emissaries sent to Manila), it had to confine itself to Manila and to interviews with wealthy Filipino collaborationist elements, leading Spanish friars, and foreign businessmen who were unanimous in opposing the "insurgents" and in favoring American rule.

Confronted with this situation, the commission became seriously divided between its chairman and its other members. Schurman himself, having the legalistic view of many academics, felt committed by the fact of ratification to working within the framework of American sovereignty. "On one point," he said later, "the Commission was inexorable. American sovereignty over the Philippines having been established by treaty was a fact which was no longer open to discussion by Filipinos in arms."⁽²⁴⁾ However, within this limitation, he came into conflict with the commission's other members over the manner of dealing with the Filipino leaders and over what concessions should be given to them in the way of self-government.

This was a critical question in the evolvement of American colonial policy. Schurman, himself a conservative, thought, as did others of more liberal persuasion, that the aims of obtaining bases and trade and investment opportunities could be gained without going through the whole costly colonial process of subjugation and military occupation. It was felt that it could be done by conceding a considerable degree of autonomy to Filipinos who were amenable to an American presence in the islands.

American policy, however, had been fixed in a rigidly military mold long before any understanding of Philippine affairs had been acquired, and a deviation from it would not be considered. This was embodied initially in President McKinley's instructions to General Merritt of June 29, 1898 which emphasized the dictum that "the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political conditions of the inhabitants."⁽²⁵⁾ It was repeated in the "benevolent assimilation" proclamation of December 21, 1898 with its stress on "the absolute domain of military authority."⁽²⁶⁾ And it was reiterated in the instructions given to Schurman's commission to conduct its work "without interference with the military authorities of the United States now in control of the Philippines."⁽²⁷⁾

The nature of the military regime entrusted by McKinley with the task of assuming control over a population of 6,700,000 people was exemplified in the person of General Elwell Otis. Schurman, on his arrival in Manila, was appalled at Otis' methods of military governorship: "He repels strangers by the brusqueness of his manner; his officers are half the time afraid to come near him; he will not listen to suggestions or even receive information from others; he does everything himself—sitting in his office . . . [Otis] is not the man to conquer the Filipinos."⁽²⁸⁾

General Otis was still brusque when confronting a U.S. Senate committee investigating the conduct of the war in March 1902. When asked why he thought he was sent to the Philippines, he answered: "To look after the troops." Pressed as to what policy he understood he was to carry out as supreme authority, he replied grudgingly: "To keep peace with the natives" who were "determined to have war." The Filipino people, he said "are not fitted for self-government." As he saw it, "they never intended to secure their independence." They set up an army "to over-awe the people"; it was "made up largely of robbers." Its purpose? "They wanted to drive the Americans into the sea and kill every white man in Manila." He was positive that "there is not a Filipino or anybody else over there who desires self-government."⁽²⁹⁾

Otis claimed that he had had no plan as to what step to take when the treaty of peace with Spain was ratified, but the immediate general attack that he launched on Filipino forces on February 5, 1899 was indicative of careful preparation. He himself

cabled the War Department on February 7, two days after hostilities broke out: "Positive insurgent attack not ordered by insurgent government." Nevertheless a military course had been decided upon and he pursued it vigorously.

On the day the attack began, Florentino Torres, representing Aguinaldo, urged an armistice, but his request was rejected. Three days later, on February 8, Aguinaldo sent an aide, Colonel Arguelles, to Otis, requesting peace talks. Otis sent the following cable to the War Department: "Aguinaldo now applies for a cessation of hostilities and a conference. Have declined to answer." Significantly, no order was sent by McKinley or by the War Department to halt military operations or to take advantage of the armistice proposals made by Aguinaldo. Instead a cable came from Secretary of War Alger congratulating Otis on his "magnificent victory."⁽³⁰⁾

By the time all the members of the Schurman Commission had arrived and were ready to get down to work early in April, the American army, relentlessly on the offensive, had captured the Philippine seat of government in Malolos, Bulacan and had advanced as far north as the Pampanga River.

The first act of Schurman was to issue a proclamation, stating the general policy of the United States toward the Philippines. In his own first draft, Schurman struck a high altruistic note: "Neither the American government nor the American people desire anything from the Philippine Islands for themselves. The sovereignty with which events have endowed them they regard as a trust, which, before the eyes of the whole civilized world, they are to discharge in the sole interest of the Philippine people."⁽³¹⁾ When this draft came under the scrutiny of Worcester and Denby, however, its tone was altered, with the final text projecting merely "an enlightened system of government under which the Philippine people may enjoy the largest measure of home rule and the amplest liberty... compatible with those obligations which the United States has assumed."

The Worcester-Denby approach could be seen in the primary principle laid down by the proclamation, stating that "the supremacy of the United States must and will be enforced throughout every part of the archipelago and those who resist it can accomplish no end other than their own ruin." A list of vague and undetailed "regulative principles" then followed, promising

"ample liberty of self-government," "civil rights," "religious freedom," a "civil service, in which, to the fullest practicable extent, natives shall be employed," a sound and honest system of taxation, the construction of public works, economic development, the establishment of schools, and "reforms in all departments of the government . . . in a way that will satisfy the well-founded demands and the highest sentiments and aspirations of the Philippine people." It was pledged solemnly that "honor, justice and friendship forbid the use of the Philippine people or islands as an object or means of exploitation."⁽³²⁾ In comparing the proclamation with the ideas of colonial government put forward by Worcester in his *Century* magazine article, it becomes apparent that references to "self government" were included at the behest of Schurman.

When posted in Manila, the proclamation met opposition from the uncompromising groups among both Filipinos and Americans. Filipino revolutionists in the city ripped it from the walls, while American army officers who thought in military terms of complete subjugation were contemptuous of it.⁽³³⁾

It is indicative of the attitude of the Philippine government leaders, however, that they viewed the proclamation as a basis for negotiation and decided to investigate the offer of a form of self-government. On April 29, Apolinario Mabini, then acting as foreign affairs minister, sent a letter to the commission, carried by Colonel Manuel Arguelles, in which he requested an armistice period of three months to enable the Philippine government to consult the people as to their desires, pointing out also that time was needed to form a proper panel to carry on discussions.⁽³⁴⁾ Arguelles was instructed to make it plain that, although the Philippine government itself desired independence, it would bow to the wishes of the people if they wanted to accept American sovereignty. It was insisted that details must be given instead of the vague outline presented in the proclamation.

Otis flatly refused to consider the request for an armistice and the war went on while attempted negotiations occurred intermittently for a month or more between a team of Filipino emissaries and the Schurman Commission, with which the Filipinos made it plain that they preferred to deal rather than with the military government.

At the request for details by the Arguelles mission, a rough plan of government was worked out for their benefit. (According to Worcester, the plan was evolved in private by him and his old cohort, Frank Bourns, a non-member of the commission, and then presented by him to the others.) In a manner typical of the high-handedness of Worcester, the plan was cabled for approval to Secretary of State Hay without the knowledge even of Otis, who was absent and who was furious when he learned of it. Hay cabled back approval, saying:

You are authorized to propose that under the military power of the President, pending action of Congress, government of the Philippine Islands shall consist of a governor-general, appointed by the President; cabinet, appointed by the governor-general; a general advisory council elected by the people, the qualifications of electors to be carefully considered and determined; the governor-general to have absolute veto. Judiciary strong and independent; principal judges appointed by the President. The cabinet and judges to be chosen from natives or Americans or both, having regard to fitness.⁽³⁵⁾

The second Philippine negotiating mission journeyed to Manila on May 19. This was a different body from that which had opened discussions. A struggle had occurred within the Philippine governing circles between those wishing to give in at once to the Americans and those wanting to hold out for a dignified settlement, with the latter prevailing. However, although the new body represented the more militant groupings, it raised no essential objections to the American plan presented to them, and merely requested further clarification. What concerned the Filipino mission was not so much the plan of government as the question of an honorable peace, a peace without the humiliation of abject surrender. The first mission had urged that they be able to "save the honor of the army"; the second mission expanded on this by asking that the Philippine army be incorporated without laying down its arms into the armed forces of the government to be.⁽³⁶⁾

Schurman's attitude on this was at variance with that of the other commission members, as it was on most questions affecting relations with the Filipinos. It was formed very early in talks with the first Filipino mission. He wrote to Assistant Secretary of State David J. Hill:

'Tis truly an inglorious contest . . . I sometimes think that if the leaders and ourselves could come together they would have sense enough to see that our offer of all the autonomy they are capable of—subject always to American sovereignty—does really offer a way of honorable escape for them, reconciling their legitimate aspirations with our sovereign rights and obligations. . . .

Feeling thus in regard to this conflict—its utter hopelessness for the enemy (who ought to be our friends) and its utter absence of glory for ourselves—I have cast about for means to bring it to a close by peaceful methods if possible. I have expressed great sympathy for the Philippine aspirations for home-rule—subject always to United States sovereignty, and I have pointed out, in influential quarters, how that could be realized if any peace were once established.

That brings up a question which may become vital in a short time—at any rate if these negotiations come to anything. *The Filipinos have no more confidence in us than in the Spaniards.* Consequently they want to know *exactly* the kind of government—the amount of home-rule—we propose to concede to them. They are all opposed to seeing their country a colony. All of them, who are intelligent, recognize the need, *for the present at least*, of American control and supervision. But two questions have already come up in a very definite form in these preliminary negotiations and conversations. They ask us, first, what we propose to establish here—a colony, a protectorate, or what; and, secondly, whether we will give the people absolute self-government, in a word, independence, when they are fit for it. . . .

As for the . . . question of promising independence, when they are fit for it, I feel so strongly the horrors of the present war—a war initiated for the liberation of Cuba ending in the subjugation of the Philippines—that I personally (I don't say *officially*) would do anything, except yield the point of United States sovereignty, for the sake of obtaining a satisfactory peace.⁽³⁷⁾

As time went on, Schurman became increasingly troubled by the determination of Otis and the other commission members to force an abject surrender upon the Filipinos, and a rift widened in the commission. Worcester even complained that Schurman (in his desire to achieve the utmost understanding) went to the trouble of learning Spanish and had talks with Filipinos that the others couldn't understand.⁽³⁸⁾ Hints of disagreement in the commission reached the McKinley cabinet by the latter part of May,

causing Secretary Alger to wire Otis on May 27: "Reports not credited by President that you and commissioners disagree. What are facts?" Replied Otis on May 29:

Know nothing of cable dispatches Schurman has sent or is sending. Decline to be compromised or advised by commission in war measures and am not aware that disposition to interfere exists. Do not think that gentlemen, Worcester excepted, understand conditions or mental adroitness of inhabitants, though Denby rapidly grasping situation. Commission has been beneficial in gaining confidence of leading well-disposed natives in beneficent intentions of United States. Doubt if it has accomplished anything further. Leading Filipinos unite with me in asserting that continued application of force followed by kind treatment and the establishment of a strong United States government will alone bring about desired results.' '(39)

On June 1 Schurman, confronted by this attitude, forced the issue by proposing to the commission that a cablegram he had composed be sent to the President recommending an alteration of American policy so that an honorable peace could be reached with the Philippine leaders. His cablegram stated that there were two alternatives: (1) for the American army to demand an unconditional surrender of Filipino forces, or (2) "by negotiations with Aguinaldo to adjust U.S. sovereignty and responsibility with reasonable aspirations [of the] Filipinos, governing and garrisoning mainly through themselves." Since he felt that the Filipinos would be prepared to conduct a prolonged war costly to the United States and necessitating in the future a large American garrison, Schurman urged the second alternative. It would be reasonable, he thought, to grant an autonomy of the Canadian type for the Filipinos and to convert the present Philippine soldiers into an autonomous army or militia. He urged that hostilities be suspended and that he be authorized to confer with Aguinaldo to end the war.

Worcester and Denby refused to join Schurman in signing this cable, whereupon he sent it alone, stating that he was prepared to confer with Aguinaldo himself if other commissioners would not.

The reply from McKinley, through Hay, was immediate and categorical. It rejected the views of Schurman, and asserted that there was "no excuse for further resistance by the Filipinos, and if it is continued the President will send all the force necessary to

suppress the insurrection and establish the authority of the United States in the islands." The commission had been sent, it was stated, to remove "misunderstanding" by the Filipinos concerning "the generous purpose and just and benevolent proposals" of the American government. "It is to be feared that those of the leaders who have skillfully and for their own purposes placed us in a false position before their deluded followers cannot be relied upon to set us right. . . . The President wants peace and means to have it, preferably by kindness and conciliation, but through force if need be."

At McKinley's request, the separate views of the other members of the commission were formulated and sent to Washington. A cable signed by Worcester, Denby and Otis recommended "prosecution of the war until Insurgents submit," holding that "when arms are laid down, if done soon, as free a government as people can safely administer will be inaugurated within a reasonable time." They contended that no further promises than those roughly outlined in Hay's May 5 cable should be made, and that this "is generally approved by natives and foreigners." (During this period in general, it was Worcester, conferring privately on tactics with Bournes, who took the lead in mobilizing the rest of the commission against the position of Schurman.)⁽⁴⁰⁾

The attitude of the fifth member of the commission, Admiral Dewey, during the dispute is not clear, but it is known that he had had antipathy toward Otis. He left the Philippines before the commission had completed its sojourn. In London, however, en route to the United States, he gave an interview quoted in the British press: "the only way to settle the insurrection and assure prosperity to the archipelago is to concede self-government to the inhabitants. . . . The islands are at this moment blockaded by a fleet, and war reigns in the interior. This abnormal state of things should cease. I should like to see autonomy first conceded and then annexation might be talked about. This is my opinion. I should like to see violence at once put a stop to. According to my view, the concession of self-government ought to be the most just and most logical solution. The Filipinos are capable of governing themselves; they have all the qualifications for it."⁽⁴¹⁾ Dewey at this time was savoring his moment of glory as the victor of Manila Bay and reportedly had presidential illusions; he may well

have considered siding with anti-administration forces. However, his remarks off the cuff and for the record had a tendency to differ. When he reached the United States and sampled opinion in leading circles, he reversed himself.⁽⁴²⁾

With the official rejection of Schurman's proposals, efforts to negotiate a settlement with Filipino leaders ceased, the work of the commission petered out, and the war of suppression went on. The usefulness of the commission was at an end, and, one by one, its members returned. Their *Report of the Philippine Commission*, containing much compiled information, was not published until January 31, 1900. In it the hand of Dean Worcester is most apparent; details of negotiations with Filipino leaders are conspicuously absent.

In its published conclusions, the *Report* recommended a "territorial government of the first class" in which the high offices would be held by Americans, including the heads of government departments and a number of offices intermediate between department heads and "native officials." It was asserted: "The United States cannot withdraw from the Philippines. . . . The Filipinos are wholly unprepared for independence, and if independence were given to them they could not maintain it. . . . There being no Philippine nation, but only a collection of different peoples, there is no general public opinion in the archipelago, but the men of property and education, who alone interest themselves in public affairs, in general recognize as indispensable American authority, guidance and protection."⁽⁴³⁾

Schurman, on his return, did not take the disagreement to the point of public issue. He signed the commission report, despite the fact that it represented in the main the views of Worcester and Denby. Although in his statements to the press he urged that "America must deal gently with the Filipino; he is entitled to sympathetic consideration," he coupled this with arguments justifying United States retention of the islands. "For reasons of commerce and because of opportunities of investment, the Philippines should remain as they are—a part of the United States," he said.⁽⁴⁴⁾ In another interview he commented: "I regard trade with China as extremely important, and if we want to get our share of the trade we must gain territory there [in Asia] I strongly favor the open-door policy."⁽⁴⁵⁾

In other words, Schurman did not disagree with the objectives of the imperialists in Asia; his disagreement was with the means by which these objectives could be attained, and sustained. During the lifetime of McKinley, to whom he owed the appointment that had projected him to prominence and to whom he felt an exaggerated sense of loyalty and gratitude, he kept relatively silent about his differing views. He was to emerge again, however, as an active partisan of gathering forces for alterations in the established colonial policy.

CONQUEST OF A COLONY

The policy of military conquest was applied in ignorance or in disregard of its effect on a people who had risen in revolution against the previous colonial regime. Confident American military commanders did not anticipate a long war. Otis expected the offensive he launched in Central Luzon in October 1899 to end the war. Uneasiness in the United States about a conflict that was inexplicable was reflected in a cable from the War Department to Otis on August 12, asking him ("in view of impatience of public") how many troops he thought necessary "to finish off the war." He replied that 50,000 at most would be needed;⁽¹⁾ at that time approximately that number were under his command or en route.

In Washington, the government accepted the Otis estimates. A member of the McKinley administration wrote in his diary of the President's reaction on November 1, while the "final" Otis offensive was under way: "He read me parts of Otis' reports. He predicts for Otis great fame when final results show what he has accomplished. Now Otis is unpopular, but the President, who knows his whole record, believes him not only a great soldier, but a great statesman."⁽²⁾

Policies of the military government, however, were arousing deep currents of opposition among the Filipino people, whose patriotic feelings had been stirred by the existence of their own functioning Republic. Rudiments of municipal government set up in the "pacified" areas were a caricature of "the most ample liberty of self-government" promised in the Schurman Proclamation. On August 8, 1899 Otis issued General Order No. 43 which provided for the establishment of municipal councils "charged with the maintenance of public order . . . but no order or decree shall be enforced until it receives the approval of the commanding officer of the troops there stationed."⁽³⁾ In this and in a succeeding order with a more elaborated code on March 29, 1900 the commanding officers were given the "discretion" to appoint or "to have elected" the officials of their choice.

A Filipino officer who visited Manila in the latter part of 1899 on a prisoner exchange mission obtained an impression of the new American dispensation: "The policemen, firemen, sanitation men, and the employees of the different Departments of the Government, the veterinarians, and even the bill collectors and street car conductors were all Americans recruited from among the soldiers who, upon being deactivated, elected to remain in the country. The treatment which the Filipinos received in all parts of the country was one of the roughest."⁽⁴⁾

In these policies and actions the military regime could not have done more to alienate the Filipino middle class groups who now saw precisely the positions they had hoped to occupy taken over or directed by the conqueror. The wealthy conservative elements, who had been content under the Spanish regime, quickly found accommodation with the Americans, but the middle class groups were driven to join or to support with greater zeal the revolutionary army of the Philippine Republic and its struggle for independence. The American military government left them little alternative.

Independence and national liberation had had its greatest impact on the peasant masses, to whom it meant agrarian revolution. They had occupied the vast estates of the Catholic Church religious orders. Nothing could have agitated them more than the close relations between the American military government and the friars. Tension was enormously increased with the arrival on January 2, 1900 of a new Apostolic Delegate to replace the Spanish Archbishop Nozaleda. It was none other than Placido Louis Chapelle, Archbishop of New Orleans, who had attended the Paris Peace Conference as the representative of the Vatican and who had skillfully managed to include in the peace treaty the protection of Catholic Church properties, which included the friar lands. On his arrival in Manila, Chapelle immediately made it known that he was on the side of the friars. Furthermore, he appeared on public occasions with General Otis, who made no comment on the question, creating the impression among Filipinos that the Americans intended to re-establish friar authority.

It was against this background that a determined Filipino resistance occurred, far beyond the anticipation of American leaders. For nearly a year a regular Philippine army was kept in the field, engaging in frontal warfare with American first line troops and

generals. It could not stand up to the superior armament of Otis' forces, which broke through Philippine defenses in the American October-November offensive in Central Luzon. On November 13, 1899, however, the Filipino leaders adopted the decision to disband their regular army and to shift to guerrilla warfare, confronting the American commanders with a totally new situation.

"The Filipino idea behind the dissolution of their field army was not at the time of the occurrence well understood in the American camp," wrote General Arthur MacArthur, second in command to Otis, in classical understatement (Otis was sending to Washington announcements of a crowning victory). "As a consequence, misleading conclusions were reached to the effect that the insurrection itself had been destroyed, and that it only remained to sweep up the fag ends of the rebel army by a system of police administration not likely to be either onerous or dangerous."⁽⁵⁾

Otis was completely confused by the widespread and mounting guerrilla action, and unable to contend with it. Wires from the War Department in April 1900 demanded to know what was going on, with officials friendly to the United States being assassinated in towns that were presumed "pacified." Otis replied, with traces of panic, that "we no longer deal with organized insurrection, but brigandage; to render every town secure against the latter would require a quarter of a million men."⁽⁶⁾

On May 1, 1900 Otis, the "great statesman," was removed and replaced as military governor by General Arthur MacArthur.* A diminutive but pompous Napoleonic figure, MacArthur put into effect the main policies required, from the military standpoint, to suppress a guerrilla struggle. He understood quite clearly that he was dealing with what was in effect an entire recalcitrant population. He reported that "most of the towns secretly organized complete insurgent municipal governments, to proceed simultaneously and in the same sphere as the American governments and in many instances through the same personnel. . . . In other words, the towns, regardless of the fact of American occupation

*General Arthur MacArthur was the father of Douglas MacArthur, later U.S. army general in command in the Philippines and the Pacific area.

and town organization, are the actual bases for all insurgent military activities. . . . The success of this unique system of war depends upon almost complete unity of action of the entire native population. That such unity is a fact is too obvious to admit of discussion."⁽⁷⁾

Conduct of the American army in the Philippines in anti-guerrilla operations was governed by "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field," issued during the American Civil War as General Orders No. 100 by the Adjutant General's Office in 1863 and prepared by a military legalist named Frances Lieber. Under its definitions, designed to cope with such Confederate elements as Quantrell's Raiders, those engaged in guerrilla warfare of the type encountered in the Philippines and "war rebels [who] are persons within an occupied territory who rise in arms against the occupying or conquering army" were not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war and "shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates."

After months of frustration, in which guerrilla activity became widespread throughout the archipelago, MacArthur reinforced these "Instructions" with his own proclamation, issued on December 10, 1900. This asserted that there had been "frequent violations of important provisions of the laws of war" of which "strict observance is required not only by combatant forces, but as well by noncombatants, native or alien, residing within occupied places." Filipinos of any category engaged in the forms that resistance was taking "are, collectively and individually, guilty of violation of the laws of war and must eventually answer for murder or such other crimes as may result from their unlawful actions." Such resistance to occupation "will necessarily terminate the possibility of those engaging therein returning to normal civic relations in the Philippines" and would result in criminal prosecution or "lifelong expatriation."

Civilian inhabitants in "secret committees" active in "collecting supplies, recruiting men, and sending military information to the insurgent camps . . . the well-disposed people who, from a sense of timidity or misplaced sympathy for neighbors, persist in screening these committees . . . expose themselves to the danger of being classified and tried as war traitors against the United

States." This applied "with special force" to the inhabitants of Manila who, by giving "aid, support, encouragement or comfort" to those in resistance would be guilty of "flagrant violations of American interests."

Guerrilla warfare, MacArthur contended, was contrary to "the customs and usages of war" which have been "adopted by all civilized nations," and those engaging in it "divest themselves of the character of soldiers, and if captured are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war."

In attempting to place the Filipino resistance struggle outside the bounds of recognized warfare, the American military authorities in effect and in practice gave sanction to barbarous methods by their own troops in contending with a guerrilla opponent. Coupled with a racist attitude of conquest that permeated American ranks, this produced a shameful record of atrocities in the Philippines.

From the outset of the Fil-American War, long before its guerrilla phase, there were persistent reports of cruelty on the part of American troops in carrying out their instructions. After the battle of Caloocan, a suburb of Manila, on February 19, 1899, enlisted men of the 20th Kansas Infantry Regiment testified that two officers of the regiment, Major Wilder Metcalfe and Captain William Bishop, ordered and participated in the killing of Filipino prisoners of war.

Although American army commanders denied that episodes of killing prisoners ever occurred (witnesses were invariably dismissed as being drunk and unreliable, a charge that in itself reflected on the behavior of troops in the field), figures of Filipino casualties published in official military reports over long periods of time strongly indicated the validity of the charges. A U.S. Senate committee, forced by public protest to investigate "Charges of cruelty, etc., to the Natives of the Philippines," confronted General MacArthur with figures from his own reports on casualties of both sides.

For December 1899 the reports from one Luzon sector were: "Enemy's loss: killed, 88. Our loss: killed, 1; wounded, 3." For March 1900: "Enemy's loss: killed, 29; wounded and captured, 5. Our loss: killed, 2; wounded, 1." For May 1900: "Enemy's loss: killed, 134; wounded, 21. Our loss: killed, 2; wounded, 8." For June 1900: "Enemy's loss: killed, 141; wounded, 1. Our loss:

killed, 1; wounded, 9." The year's summary showed 801 Filipinos killed to 38 wounded, while 40 Americans were killed and 72 wounded.

Questioned as to the extreme disproportion of Filipino killed to wounded, which was 25 to 1, whereas wars in general invariably showed a ratio of three wounded to every man killed, MacArthur insisted that "It arises from the fact that our soldiers are trained in what we call 'fire discipline'" (i.e., marksmanship). Training records were produced to show that the troops involved had, in fact, poor qualifications in target practice. MacArthur, unable to refute this and continuing to deny that slaughter had occurred, declared that "it has been the most legitimate and humane war ever conducted on the face of the earth."

In the course of this "humane war," reports, charges and evidence piled up in great quantities of atrocities committed against Filipinos, particularly after the Americans found it increasingly difficult to contend with guerrilla resistance. American newspapers printed a great many letters written by American troops in the Philippines, telling in detail of ruthless suppressive methods. These included not only shooting of armed and unarmed alike, but the "water cure," the "rope torture," and indiscriminate burning and looting.

Facts brought out in investigations confirmed the charges. The burning and destruction of homes and of whole towns were freely admitted by American commanders, who called these necessary acts to contend with a foe that relied on concealment. Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes, who was in command of the Army's Department of the Visayas from June 3, 1899 to November 30, 1901, was frank in his testimony before the Senate committee:

Senator Rawlins: If these shacks were of no consequence, what was the utility of their destruction?

General Hughes: The destruction was as a punishment. They permitted these people to come in there and conceal themselves and they gave no sign. It is always —

Senator Rawlins: The punishment in that case would fall, not upon the men, who could go elsewhere, but mainly upon the women and little children.

General Hughes: The women and children are part of the family, and where you wish to inflict a punishment you can punish the man probably worse in that way than in any other.

Senator Rawlins: But is that within the ordinary rules of civilized warfare? Of course you could exterminate the family which would be still worse punishment.

General Hughes: These people are not civilized.

Innumerable episodes were reported of the torture of captured guerrillas and of Filipinos arrested on suspicion of supporting guerrillas or of having information concerning them. The most frequently used method of extracting information was the "water cure." A first lieutenant in the 35th Infantry regiment, Grover Flint, described this method in testimony:

Q. Please tell the committee what you actually saw.

A. That is, you want me to describe one individual case of a man being put through the water cure?

Q. Yes, I would like you to do that, sir.

A. Very good, sir. A man is thrown down on his back and three or four men sit or stand on his arms and legs and hold him down, and either a gun barrel or a rifle barrel or a carbine barrel or a stick as big as a belaying pin—that is, with an inch circumference—

Senator Beveridge: As big in its diameter?

A. (Continued) Yes; it is simply thrust into his jaws and his jaws are thrust back, and, if possible, a wooden log or stone is put under his head—

Senator Patterson: Under his head or neck?

A. (Continued) Under his neck, so he can be held firmly.

Senator Burrows: His jaws are forced open, you say? How do you mean, crosswise?

The Witness: Yes, sir; as a gag. In the case of very old men I have seen their teeth fall out—I mean when it was done a little roughly. He is simply held down, and then water is poured onto his face, down his throat and nose from a jar, and that is kept up until the man gives some sign of giving in or becomes unconscious, and when he becomes unconscious he is simply rolled aside and he is allowed to come to . . .

Q. Is the water allowed to remain in the man or is it in any way expelled from him, by any method?

A. Well, I know that in a great many cases, in almost every case, the men have been a little roughly handled; they were rolled aside rudely, so that water was expelled. A man suffers tremendously; there is no doubt about that. His suffering must be that of a man who is drowning, but who cannot drown.

Q. Did you ever see a man place his foot on a man's stomach to force the water out?

A. Yes, sir.⁽⁸⁾

Lt. Flint had seen 20 or more persons treated in this way. Others who testified told of Filipinos being held similarly beneath a water faucet turned on full force, and of army medical officers using a syringe to inject salt water into the nostrils. Victims had been seen trodden upon, with water spurting from them like geysers. The cases were not isolated, but were reported from every part of the Philippines. Of all the records of court martial cases, of American troops whose extreme behavior at times caused them to be charged with abuses against the Philippine population, there was no case of court martial for application of the water cure, indicating an official sanction of it.

Evidence of the extent to which approval of this practice went is seen in an article written by a Protestant missionary in the Philippines, Rev. Homer Stuntz, for the *Central Christian Advocate*, Kansas City, June 4, 1902. He defended the "water cure" on grounds that "it was given only to spies and such captured Filipinos as could give important information as to military movements" and that "in all countries and in all times the life of the spy is forfeit to his captors. . . . He was given a severe time of it for an hour or so, told what he knew, often enabled the commanding officer of the squad that caught him to save valuable American lives and accomplish those ends for which he had been sent out with the greatest economy of blood and expense."

Another common torture was the rope treatment. This, which did bring court martial in a number of cases, involved, as specifications in charges cited, the hanging of prisoners by the neck with a rope "for a period of about ten seconds, more or less" resulting in "inflicting wounds and causing the said [prisoner] to suffer great bodily pain." The trials records of two officers, Capt. George W. Brandle and 2nd Lt. Alvin S. Perkins of the 27th Infantry, court-martialed on August 8, 1900 at Camp Stotsenburg, Central Luzon, were typical. They had tortured eight Filipinos in this manner. In the specifications, they were charged originally with "torture" done "wilfully and cruelly," but the court struck out the word "torture" and substituted the words "inflicting mental anguish upon," while the term "wilfully and cruelly" was struck out, along with all references to bodily injury, and the words "causing mental anguish" substituted. The sentence given to both men was nothing more than "to be reprimanded."

manded by the reviewing authority" and both were promptly returned to duty.⁽⁹⁾ Court martials of this type hardly served as a deterrent to atrocity.

In a similar instance, charges of inhuman treatment were made against a Lt. Ernst Hagedorn of the 16th Infantry regiment, in command of the town of Cabagan, Nueva Vizcaya in June 1900. In his reply to the charges, he admitted having arrested three civilians in the town ("suspicious characters") who gave no information. "I then ordered them confined to the stocks, with a diet of salt fish, without water. The diet had excellent results; after forty-eight hours all three gave more or less information. . . ." His commanding officer, Col. Charles S. Hood, absolved him with the endorsement: "Lt. Hagedorn has been most energetic in the performance of his duties, and has rendered valuable services in the pacification of this district. It is believed he acted in the best interests of the service, even if mistakenly, and it is recommended that no further action be taken in this case." None was.

Contributing to brutal treatment was the widespread attitude on the part of white American soldiers toward what were regarded as racially inferior people. The officer commanding one of the regiments accused of abuses of Filipinos, the 38th Volunteer Infantry, a Col. George S. Anderson, in refuting the charges, answered that: "It is true that the word 'nigger' was very often used as applied to the natives, probably correctly." Col. Anderson was also one of those who endeavored to reply to the charge of indiscriminate shooting of people, particularly when villages were raided: "Many men were shot as they fled, but they probably all deserved it."⁽¹⁰⁾

It is a matter of significance that virtually all of the ranking American military commanders in the Philippines were veterans of the American Indian Wars, which had frequently turned into campaigns of extermination. The association cropped up time and again in the course of the Philippine conquest. Its character was officially stamped by the U.S. Secretary of War Elihu Root in an address to the U.S. Army at the (official) termination of the war: "Utilizing the lessons of the Indian wars, it [the army] has relentlessly followed the guerrilla bands to their fastnesses in the mountains and jungle and crushed them."

American military commanders sought to mitigate the effect of these harsh methods on public opinion in the United States by re-

citing evidence of Filipino guerrilla atrocities against American troops. It could not be shown, however, that this was not the result of prior American acts. A circular issued by President Emilio Aguinaldo on January 17, 1901 enumerated American atrocities and called in "self-defense" for a policy of retaliation. Measures became harsher and more ruthless as the war went on.

Extremes in the policy of suppression could not be blamed, in the final analysis, on the exigencies of the battlefield. The policy emanated from Washington with the administrations of McKinley and of his successor, Theodore Roosevelt, fully aware of the course of events. In particular it came from the War Department, which was assigned authority over colonial affairs, and from Root as its secretary. The official biographer of Root admitted: "The important question from the standpoint of a study of Root's character and career, is whether he himself did everything possible to check the atrocities. Stated so broadly, the answer is probably no."⁽¹¹⁾

On July 1, 1901 a formal transfer took place from military to civil government in the Philippines, with William H. Taft assuming authority as governor-general from General MacArthur. Bitterly disputed by military commanders, this was a decision largely dictated by two factors: the need for other tactics to win cooperation from Filipinos, and the need to screen the harshness of policies that were an acute embarrassment to the administration at home. Actually military control was continued over large areas of the country. The provinces of Batangas, Cebu, Bohol, Samar, Cavite and Albay were returned to military rule for extended periods between 1901 and 1905, extensive military operations were carried on under civil rule in Rizal, Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Laguna, Tayabas, Leyte and Negros, and the large island of Mindanao was kept under military government until 1913. The worst examples of ruthless suppression were to occur after the creation of civil authority, which yielded to military rule whenever frequent unrest and revolt occurred.

A total of 126,000 American troops were employed in suppression campaigns, and the greatest number of military posts established, 639, was not reached until December 1901, six months after the setting up of civil rule. In addition, a national police force built on military lines, the Philippine Constabulary, comprising 6,000 men, made up of Filipinos whose critics ac-

cused them of being *lumpen* thugs, officered by Americans and veterans of the Spanish *Guardia Civil*, was put into the field where civil authority prevailed.

During the very period that the U.S. Senate committee sat in session investigating atrocities (January-June 1902), the two most brutal campaigns of the war were in progress, in the provinces of Samar and Batangas. In Samar a guerrilla base had remained steadfast under the Filipino general, Vicente Lukban, while in Batangas the Filipino commander was General Miguel Malvar. The Americans admitted that the support for guerrillas in these regions was overwhelming and embraced all classes of the people. U.S. Army campaigns were launched in both provinces in December 1901, under the direction of Major General Adnan Chaffee, who succeeded General MacArthur as military commander in July 1901.

The Samar island campaign was under the command of Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith. His directives to his troops, issued to quell a condition of mass resistance, illustrated the nature of his policy:

Under such conditions there can be but one course to pursue, which is to adopt the policy that will create in the minds of all the people a burning desire for the war to cease. . . . The policy to be pursued in this brigade, from this time on, will be to wage war in the sharpest and most decisive manner possible . . . even though such territory is supposedly peaceful or is under civil government. . . . Short severe wars are the most humane in the end. No civilized war, however civilized, can be carried on on a humanitarian basis. . . . Every native, whether in arms or living in the *pueblos* or *barrios* will be regarded and treated as an enemy until he has conclusively shown that he is a friend. . . . Neutrality must not be tolerated on the part of any native. The time has now arrived when all natives in this brigade who are not openly for us must be regarded as against us. In short, if not an active friend he is an open enemy."⁽¹²⁾

Liberally interpreted by troops who felt freed from restraint, the orders brought about unparalleled death and destruction on Samar. General Smith was reported as ordering that Samar be turned into a "howling wilderness." Questioned by the Army's Inspector General Breckinridge as to what he thought he was doing, he replied "killing niggers."⁽¹³⁾ Occurring in the midst of an investigation of atrocities in the Philippines, the Samar campaign led to the court-martialing of General Smith for "cruelties practiced by troops on natives."

Major L.W.T. Waller, brought to trial on the same charges, testified against his commanding general. It was reported to the U.S. Senate investigating body that "testimony was given by Waller, corroborated by other witnesses, that Gen. Jacob H. Smith instructed him to kill and burn; that the more he killed and burned the better pleased General Smith would be; that it was no time to take prisoners, and that when Major Waller asked General Smith to define the age limit for killing, he replied 'Everything over 10'."

In the case of the Batangas campaign, the commanding officer, Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, issued virtually identical orders, plainly showing their top level origin. General Bell, however, embellished the policy by resorting to a severe form of the *reconcentrado* method employed by Spain in Cuba (the fact of which had been used to arouse American popular sentiment against Spain in the 1898 war), which meant forcing the peasant population into zoned towns to prevent them from aiding the guerrillas. His orders to subordinate commanders were that they will immediately specify and establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone within which it may be practicable with an average sized garrison to exercise efficient supervision . . . [and] will also see that orders are given at once and distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of the towns over which they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining outside of these limits, and that unless they move by December 25 from outlying *barrios* and districts with all their movable food supplies, including rice, *palay*, chickens, livestock, etc., to within the limits of the zone established at their own or nearest town, their property (found outside of one at said date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction.

General Bell specifically said that his set of instructions "authorizes the starving of unarmed hostile belligerents as well as armed ones." After January 1, 1902, "any able-bodied male found by patrols or scouting detachments outside of protected zones without passes will be arrested and confined, or shot if he runs away."

The orders of General Bell became progressively harsher as the campaign continued (it went on for five months). Towns in the vicinity of guerrilla warfare activities were ordered burned. His subordinate officers in Batangas and Laguna were warned "against beginning to issue food gratuitously until want and privation absolutely necessitate it." He directed that "the principal

people of each town have either got to go to prison as suspects or organize and work for peace." It was his belief that "with very few exceptions, practically the entire population has been hostile to us at heart. In order to combat such a population, it is necessary to make the state of war as insupportable as possible, and there is no more efficacious way of accomplishing this than by keeping the minds of the people in such a state of anxiety and apprehension that living under such conditions will soon become intolerable."⁽¹⁴⁾

A traveller in Batangas six months after the campaign against the forces of General Malvar reported (November 12, 1902): "Batangas was the garden spot of Luzon. It was covered with fine haciendas of sugar, coffee, tobacco and rice. Now it is a jungle. We did not see a man working between Batangas and Taal, nor a cultivated field."⁽¹⁵⁾ General Malvar, a man of honor whom even the American commanders were compelled to respect, declaring that he wanted to relieve further suffering of the inhabitants of the region, surrendered on April 16, 1902 with 3,236 of his men.

It was the estimate of General Bell himself that one-sixth of the inhabitants of Luzon died from the direct or indirect effects of the war of suppression (a figure approaching 600,000).⁽¹⁶⁾ The generally accepted figures of deaths of Filipinos directly due to the war is 200,000. By 1902, in addition, 90 per cent of *carabaos* (water buffaloes), the common work animal in the fields, had died or been slaughtered, the all-important rice crop had been reduced to one-fourth of normal production, and a severe cholera epidemic aggravated by the war had further decimated the population.

On July 4, 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed that the Fil-American War was officially terminated. This, however, was more the product of the embarrassing investigation of atrocities coupled with a U.S. election in the coming November than it was the reflection of complete peace in the Philippine colony. Resistance of a guerrilla character continued for years in widely separated parts of the country.

It was so persistent that Governor General W.H. Taft, at the head of the American civil regime, felt compelled to push through a law on November 4, 1902, called the "Bandolerismo Statute." It classified guerrilla resistors as common bandits to be given the penalty of death or not less than 20 years in prison. Those "aiding or abetting such a band of brigands" were subject to not less than 10 years in prison.⁽¹⁷⁾

Under this law the jails in the Philippines were jammed with arrested suspects. Appalling conditions of bad treatment and of starvation were reported. In the Albay provincial jail 120 died, primarily of undernourishment, from May 20 to December 3, 1903⁽¹⁸⁾ In Bilibid Prison in Manila, which was under American administration, there was a soaring death rate: 72 per 1000 in 1902, 99 in 1903, 118 in 1904, and by 1905, 438 per 1000.⁽¹⁹⁾

"Reconcentration" continued to be a policy of contending with mass discontent. During a revolt in Albay and other provinces of the Bicol region of Luzon in 1903, up to 300,000 were driven out of their homes and concentrated in garrisoned towns. "Naturally, the effects of this unusual volume of persons in a limited area was disease and suffering for want of food and ordinary living accommodations," reported the Albay provincial governor, an American named A.U. Betts.⁽²⁰⁾

Extensive reconcentration was again resorted to in Batangas and in the neighboring province of Cavite when, in January 1905 a state of insurrection was declared in those provinces. The revolt was led by a Filipino named Macario Sakay, who attempted to set up a new Philippine Republic. He was encouraged to surrender in September 1906 through promises of full protection from any punishment, but after a few days of freedom he was suddenly and treacherously seized by American military officers, to be swiftly tried and executed.⁽²¹⁾

The last Filipino guerrilla leader on the island of Luzon was not captured and executed until October 1911.

On the big southern island of Mindanao military government was continued long after civil rule was established in the rest of the Philippines. In this predominantly Moslem Filipino region, a deliberate policy was pursued of perpetuating the old Spanish tactic of creating artificial divisions between Moslem and Christian Filipinos and of breaking up the Moslem pattern of life. Moslem Filipinos persistently resisted American efforts to subjugate them.

The American military governors on this island put into effect "the same general rules that have always governed our actions in intercourse with the Indian tribes of our western frontiers."⁽²²⁾ Major General Leonard Wood, when he assumed military governorship in 1903, termed the Filipino Moslem *datos* and sultans "nothing more nor less than an unimportant collection of pirates and highwaymen."⁽²³⁾ This harsh attitude, devoid of ef-

fort to understand the population and its way of life, produced continual localized revolts, which were put down with vigorous force.

Moslem Filipino resistance did not have the same guerrilla character as that of Filipinos on other islands. The practice was for *dato*-led communities in revolt to withdraw to a hill-top fortress, or *cotta*, and to adopt a defensive position, which American troops would besiege and attack. In an American assault on a *cotta* on Mount Dajo in Jolo in March 1906 over 600 men, women and children were killed.⁽²⁴⁾ The "massacre of Bud Dajo" caused much protest in the United States, especially when a photograph of the heaped bodies of women and children was printed. As late as June 1913 American troops attacked another community that had fled from military jurisdiction to Mount Bagsak, also in Jolo. "This resulted in the extermination of all the Moros who had taken their stand on Mount Bagsak," reported American Governor General W. Cameron Forbes.⁽²⁵⁾

Military rule was not replaced in Mindanao by civil government until December 1913, nearly fifteen years after American occupation.

The harsh measures and atrocities that followed from military rule and from the policy of absolute subjugation merely helped to stimulate a fierce type of national resistance. Even when Filipino leaders accepted collaboration with the Americans, their identification with those responsible for brutalities caused many Filipinos to rebel against them along with the conqueror. There is reason to believe that if the policy advocated by Jacob Schurman and others early in 1899 had been followed, the tragedy of a cruel war of suppression that extended over the better part of a decade might have been avoided.

THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST MOVEMENT 1898-1900

1. The Opposition to Colonial Conquest

In the United States, with the brutal colonial war of conquest continuing, there were profound repercussions as to its motivations and to its character. The formalities of annexation had solved none of the problems that disturbed its opponents. With the declaration of a Philippine Republic in January 1899 and with the determined resistance of that republic to the American military conquest which followed, fresh impetus was given to the growth of anti-imperialist sentiment at home.

Those who argued that the Constitution of the United States gave no sanction to the seizure of colonies to be ruled without the consent of the governed were galvanized by the Filipinos' organized war for freedom. They cried that fundamental American principles were being destroyed for minor commercial gain. The failure of Congress to declare any intention regarding the political status of the Philippines as it approved occupation of that colony alarmed a variety of sectional interests that felt themselves threatened.

The labor movement had been initially concerned about an influx of cheap labor from Asian colonies as a threat to workers' living standards. Broader fears of imperialism soon developed, however. When the American Federation of Labor held its annual convention in December 1898 it adopted a resolution (by a virtually unanimous voice vote) condemning the fact that "a new and far-reaching policy commonly known as 'imperialism' or 'expansion' is now receiving the attention of the National Government" and opposing the pending ratification of the peace treaty with Spain which "will seriously burden the wage-workers of our country, thrust upon us a large standing army and an aristocratic navy, and seriously threaten the perpetuity of our Republic."⁽¹⁾

A militarist policy abroad with the standing army necessary to pursue it particularly alarmed the labor movement, which saw this as a danger to workers' rights to organize and to strike. The use of federal troops and of militia to break strikes during the previous decade had already set a pattern. In a speech in Boston on March 20, 1899 Gompers expressed the now increased fear: "The organizations of labor view this question from the standpoint that to maintain a policy of expansion, it is necessary to maintain a large standing army. Standing armies are always used to exercise tyranny over a people, and are one of the prime causes of rupture in a country."⁽²⁾

Within a month, in April 1899, this fear was borne out when the new Secretary of War Elihu Root (architect of the new American army that was to fit the new global role of the United States) ordered out troops to break a strike of copper miners at Couer d'Alene, Idaho. Striking miners were held in custody by troops for months without charges. Root called this strike "an insurrection," the same words applied to Filipinos resisting conquest. Troops were again employed against strikers at mines in Arizona in June 1903.⁽³⁾ This was paralleled by the handling of strikes and trade unions in the new colonies. In Havana, Cuba in September 1899 the military governor, Brigadier General William S. Ludlow, broke a strike of Cuban workers by throwing its leaders in jail,⁽⁴⁾ a policy emanating from Root's War Department which was to be repeated in Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Hawaii.

It was the alarm in the labor movement that caused Gompers to align himself with a broad anti-imperialist movement which did not become full-fledged until the Fil-American War was well under way. It began within a month after Dewey's victory in Manila Bay; significantly, it originated in the old cradle of American independence, in Boston, Massachusetts.

A letter from Gamaliel Bradford, the social reformer, appearing in the Boston *Evening Transcript* on June 2, 1898, stimulated a meeting at Faneuil Hall, Boston on June 15, called "to protest the adoption of a so-called imperial policy by the United States." At this meeting the principal address was delivered by Moorfield Storey, a former president of the American Bar Association. "We are not here to oppose the war [against Spain]," he said, "or to throw any obstacle in the way of its speeding a successful determination. We are here to deal with a far graver issue: to insist that

a war begun in the cause of humanity should not be turned into a war for empire." He asserted that this would lead to the corruption of the United States as it had done for Rome.

A Committee of Correspondence (it had the ring of similar committees set up in New England in colonial days) was established at this meeting and proceeded to send communications around the country, laying the groundwork for a national movement. The Massachusetts Reform Club was the first to respond and to set up an Anti-Imperialist Committee. By November 18, 1898, while the Paris Peace Conference was in progress, an Anti-Imperialist League with a nationwide endorsement was launched. In its constitution it asserted that its objective was "to oppose, by every legitimate means, the acquisition of the Philippine Islands, or of *any* colonies away from our shores, by the United States."

The new movement had hardly begun to mobilize itself when the peace treaty was ratified. Military conquest in the Philippines, however, brought awareness that more than the writing of letters and the signing of statements was needed if a nakedly imperialist policy was to be defeated. A national call for action went out from the organizers of the Anti-Imperialist League, producing a meeting of 3,000 representative people in Chicago on April 30, 1899. Termed a "Liberty Meeting," it adopted a resolution stating: "It is the spirit of '76 that our government is striving to extinguish in those islands: we denounce the attempt and demand its abandonment. We deplore and resent the slaughter of the Filipinos as a needless horror, a deep dishonor to our nation."⁽⁵⁾

Resistance by Filipinos under their own proclaimed government had a profound effect on the anti-imperialist movement. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities or to ratification of the peace treaty, emphasis had simply been on not acquiring colonies, to the point of standing aside to allow any other imperialist power to take the Philippines. As with Jacob Schurman, the League's adherents felt compelled to accept the legal framework of possession and to work within it. A change of position therefore occurred, with demands now centered on conceding independence to Filipinos or at least for a protectorate only to be established with Filipinos governing themselves. It is interesting that the Chicago assembly put forward these demands at the same time that Schurman was evolving them in the Philippines.

This was an important evolvement in the position of the anti-expansionist forces. Implicit in the idea of a protectorate was the obtaining by American imperialism of a base in the Philippines without the cost or responsibility of operating a colony. This was quite in keeping with the anti-imperialist argument that territorial acquisition was not necessary for the expansion of American trade and investment abroad.

By the following month, May 1899, the Anti-Imperialist League had 30,000 members, and local committees were being set up in all major cities. At the end of the year it was claimed that half a million people had made contributions to the organization. The most active local bodies were in Boston, Springfield (Massachusetts), New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, St. Louis, Los Angeles and Portland (Oregon).⁽¹⁶⁾

National headquarters were set up in Chicago, and it was there that a national conference was held on October 17-18, 1899. It was attended by 10,000 delegates from 30 states, who agreed to the creation of a national American Anti-Imperialist League⁽⁷⁾ The platform adopted at the conference, which looked toward the presidential election to be held in the following year, made these points:

We hold that the policy known as imperialism is hostile to liberty and tends toward militarism, an evil from which it has been our glory to be free. We regret that it has become necessary in the land of Washington and Lincoln to reaffirm that all men, of whatever race or color, are entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. We maintain that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. We insist that the subjugation of any people is "criminal aggression" and open disloyalty to the distinctive principles of our government. . . .

We demand the immediate cessation of the war against liberty, begun by Spain and continued by us. We urge that Congress be promptly convened to announce to the Filipinos our purpose to concede to them the independence for which they have so long fought and which of right is theirs. . . .

Greatly as we abhor the war of "criminal aggression" in the Philippines, greatly as we regret that the blood of the Filipinos is on American hands, we more deeply resent the betrayal of American institutions at home. The real firing line is not in the suburbs of Manila. The foe is in our own household. The attempt of 1861 was to divide the country. That of 1899 is to destroy its fundamental principles and noblest ideals. . . .

The training of a great people for a century, the aspirations for liberty of a vast immigration are forces that will hurl aside those who in the delirium of conquest seek to destroy the character of our institutions. . . .

We propose to contribute to the defeat of any person or party that stands for the forcible subjugation of any people. We shall oppose for reelection all who in the White House or in Congress betray American liberty in pursuit of un-American ends. We still hope that both of our great political parties will support and defend the declaration of independence in the closing campaign of the century. . . .⁽⁸⁾

At this stage, the Anti-Imperialist League represented to a considerable extent a broad cross-section of those who opposed expansionism and the evils it brought with it. Leadership of the League then and throughout its existence was mainly in the hands of a group of political independents who were associated with the movements for civil service and municipal reform, or who had been linked with the anti-slavery abolition movement. These included Moorfield Storey, Edward Atkinson, Erving Winslow (who became secretary of the League and remained so until dissolution), Gamaliel Bradford (who was also an ardent defender of Indian rights), and Carl Schurz. The organization's first national president was the 80-year old George S. Boutwell, an original organizer of the Republican Party of Lincoln who had had a distinguished career as a Radical Republican senator.

Other members identified with reform movements were Charles Francis Adams, E.L. Godkin, Herbert Welsh, Edwin Burritt Smith, Hazen Pingree (who had been mayor of Detroit and Governor of Michigan), Edward M. Shepard, Samuel Bowles and James Coolidge Carter. Outstanding social workers like Jane Addams, Josephine Lowell and Ernest Crosby were active in the League, as were single-tax followers of Henry George, pacifists and prohibitionists, and such crusading clergymen as Charles H. Parkhurst, Henry Van Dyke, Theodore Cuyler, Bishop Henry Codman Potter and John White Chadwick, who fought corruption and the cruder forms of exploitation.

Some of the foremost political leaders from both major parties aligned themselves with the League. Two former presidents, Grover Cleveland (Democrat) and Benjamin Harrison (Republican) endorsed its program; Cleveland agreed to be one of the League's 41 vice-presidents, as did John G. Carlisle, secretary of the treasury in his cabinet. Republican John Sherman (brother

of General W.T. Sherman), who was secretary of state for a time under McKinley (1897-1898), was also a vice-president, as was John Wise, Republican secretary of the interior 1877-1881 and a Civil War major general. Other leading Republicans who supported the League were Senators George F. Hoar, Justin Morrill and R.F. Pettigrew and Speaker of the House Thomas B. Reed (Morrill, Pettigrew and Reed had led the fight against annexation of Hawaii).

Leading anti-imperialist Democrats who put their names on League letterheads were Senators Ben Tillman (a vice-president), Donelson Caffrey, Champ Clark and Augustus Bacon. In the main, these were "Silver Democrats," followers of Bryan, voicing the discontent of agrarian interests.

Perhaps the broadest response came from American intellectuals, in university and literary circles. David Starr Jordan, president of Stanford University, and Henry Wade Rogers, president of Northwestern University, were both League vice-presidents, while some leading college professors were vocal in support: Charles Eliot Norton, William Graham Sumner, William James, Felix Adler, Franklin Henry Giddings, T.J. McGinity, Herman E. von Holst, and James Burrill Angell. Jacob Schurman's appointment to the Philippine Commission could be traced to the sentiment in this stratum.

The literary anti-imperialists were even more outstanding, including Mark Twain, William Dean Howells, Hamlin Garland, Thomas Bailey Aldrich, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Finley Peter Dunne, Henry B. Fuller and William Vaughan Moody. Two of the finest odes in American poetry were written by Moody in protest against the Philippine conquest: "An Ode in the Time Of Hesitation" ("*Blindness we may forgive/But baseness we will smite*") appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly* in May 1900, and "On a Soldier Fallen in the Philippines" was printed in the same publication in February 1901. An anthology of anti-imperialist poetry was published in Boston in 1900, *Liberty Poems*.

Mark Twain's bitter "To a Person Sitting In Darkness" condemned imperialism in the harshest terms, as did his "Salutation of the 19th to the 20th Century" ("I bring you the stately nation called CHRISTENDOM—returning bedraggled, besmirched and dishonored from pirate raids in Kiaochow, Manchuria, South

Africa and the Philippines, with her soul full of meanness, her pocket full of boodle and her mouth full of pious hypocrisies. Give her soap and towel, but hide the looking glass.")

"*G is for guns that McKinley has sent/To teach Filipinos what Jesus Christ meant,*" wrote Henry B. Fuller. Ernest Crosby parodied Kipling's poem "The White Man's Burden," which was written in support of American seizure of the Philippines and was enthusiastically popularized by Theodore Roosevelt: "*Take up the White Man's burden/And teach the Philippines/What interest and taxes are/And what a mortgage means./Give them electrocution chairs/And prisons, too, galore,/And if they seem inclined to kick/Then spill their heathen gore.*"

Among the Anti-Imperialist League's sponsors, however, there were only a few businessmen. Andrew Carnegie, who accepted a vice-presidency at the outset, was the foremost, others being Dana Estes, Richard T. Crane, John J. Valentine, George Foster Peabody and Robert Fulton Cutting. Peabody and Cutting were both directors of the American Beet Sugar Co. In general, the industrialists and producers who opposed an imperialist policy refrained from association with the League, which came to acquire a radical tinge, and carried on their opposition through the private pressures of lobbying.

This was also true of the labor movement. Gompers, a vice-president of the League, was its only outstanding labor figure. This was largely due to the fact that Gompers, typical of conservative labor leaders, did not link the struggle against the trusts, with which trade unions were occupied, with the struggle against imperialism, which they limited to resisting the importation of cheap labor. Only a relatively few unions, mainly on the west coast where Asian labor would enter, were aroused to protest on this score, while those who feared competition from colonial labor were limited to the cigarmakers.⁽⁹⁾

With its diverse membership, the libertarian principles in the League's platform did not echo the composition of the movement as a whole. These were written in by the Moorfield Storey-Erving Winslow-Edward Atkinson group in the organization. Such a principled stand on their part was mixed with the murky beliefs of others that sprang from the conflicts in American society. One of the strongest currents in the Anti-Imperialist League and in the

general opposition to Philippine annexation was racist, objecting to it on the grounds that Filipinos were colored barbarians who were not fit to become part of the American community. In the national councils of the Anti-Imperialist League the former abolitionists could be found accepting unity with the most intransigent of the southern racialists and accommodation with their arguments; in effect, the League endorsed the view that Americans — white Americans — and Filipinos were unequal.

Most southern Democrats condemned "imperialism" with arguments that Asian peoples were like Negroes in being "inferior" to white people and could not be assimilated into American life. The choice of this argument rather than the agrarian economic one was like a taunt to the former Northern Radical Republicans and liberals who not too long before would have sharply challenged such ideas. It illustrated the compromise of principle which had taken place in American society in regard to Negro freedom and that was certainly a contributing factor in the imperialist attitude. There was no better indication of the lack of real depth in the anti-imperialist movement.

One of the leading "unreconstructed" southern Democrats, Senator "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman of South Carolina, was a vice-president of the Anti-Imperialist League. While lending his support to any movement that would prevent the bringing of Filipinos into the framework of American life, he used the imperialist issue at the same time to reinforce white racist rule in the south. "Republican leaders do not longer dare to call into question the justice or the necessity of limiting Negro suffrage in the South," he said, and taunted the Republicans for their abandonment of principle in making colonial subjects of Filipinos: "Your slogans of the past — brotherhood of man and fatherhood of God — have gone glimmering down through the ages. The brotherhood of man exists no longer."⁽¹⁰⁾

When the Anti-Imperialist League eventually allied itself on a national level with the Democratic Party, the "solid South" of the Democrats was viewed as an important factor of strength, regardless of that region's commitment to violent suppression of American Negroes.

The Southern Democrats, however, were not the only elements who opposed Philippine annexation on racist grounds. Carl

Schurz, a Union general in the Civil War and a vice-president of the League, wrote this while the Paris peace conference was under way:

Now they would take in Spanish-America, with all the mixtures of Indian and Negro blood, and Malaya and other unspeakable Asiatics, by the tens of millions! What will become of American labor and the standards of American citizenship then?

We are vexed by a very troublesome race problem in the United States now. That race problem is still unresolved, and it would be very sanguine to say that there is a satisfactory solution in near prospect. Cool-headed men think that we have enough of that. What will be the consequences if we indefinitely add to it by bringing under this republican government big lots of incompatible races—races far more intractable, too, than those with which we have had so far to deal?⁽¹¹⁾

It was a mark of the nature of the issue as it was felt by all concerned that in the speeches and statements of both pro-imperialist and anti-imperialist there were to be found contemptuous denigration of Filipinos; both used the same argument for opposite ends. Defending the policy of conquest, Theodore Roosevelt called Filipinos “a jumble of savage tribes” and Aguinaldo “the Ocoala* of the Philippines.”⁽¹²⁾ The imperialist economist Charles A. Conant spoke of “the comparative backwardness of tropical peoples and their need for caucasian leadership.”⁽¹³⁾ Anti-imperialist opponents of Roosevelt and Conant used identical or even more scurrilous references. Gompers repeatedly termed Filipinos a “semi-barbaric population, almost primitive in their habits and customs.” Speaker of the House Reed, against annexation, spoke contemptuously of Filipinos as “yellow-bellies” and “naked Sulus.”⁽¹⁴⁾ Senator Vest of Missouri, author of a resolution opposing acquisition of the Philippines, defended it by denouncing “the idea of conferring American citizenship upon the half-civilized, piratical, muck-running inhabitants of 2,000 islands, 7,000 miles distant in another hemisphere, and creating a state of the Union from such materials.”⁽¹⁵⁾ One of the prominent intellectuals and educators who aligned himself with the Anti-Imperialist League, David Starr Jordan, president of Stanford

*Ocoala was leader of the Seminole Indians in Florida in the early 19th century, and headed resistance to white settler conquest.

University, could make a statement that "if a Methodist missionary and a New England schoolmarm should marry and live in the tropics, the 3rd generation would ride bareback on a burro to see a cockfight on Sunday."⁽¹⁶⁾ The Philippine plank in the Democratic Party platform of 1900, which was reportedly written by League leaders and caused the League to support its candidate, Bryan, said: "The Filipinos cannot be citizens without endangering our civilization."⁽¹⁷⁾

The co-existence of racialist and humanitarian in the League was not its only contradictory aspect. "Free-Silverites" and backers of gold coinage in both parties found grounds in it for a temporary alliance that was shaky at best. Bryan and Cleveland, for example, had this difference, and it was to prove unbridgable.

It was the amorphous and essentially limited character of the anti-imperialist movement of the period that gave it its initial broadness and impact, and it was these same characteristics that contributed to its relatively quick subsiding. Once the fears of its various components had been dispelled—the fear of competition from cheap labor, of citizenship for another colored people, of threat to domestic industry—the movement as such melted away. The form of colonial system that was to be established—and this came to appease even the libertarians—did not have to go too far to satisfy a movement that, despite the high-sounding declarations, did not concern itself greatly over the effect of American policy on the Filipino people themselves.

Of all those who publicly condemned the Philippine conquest, it was the humanitarians who stand up best in the light of history. Moorfield Storey, who was one of them, remained an anti-imperialist for 30 years, until the day of his death in 1929. Typical of his devotion to principle was his break with Henry Cabot Lodge, who had been his classmate and close associate in the early Massachusetts reform movement. When Lodge abandoned reform for political advancement and took the path leading to imperialism, Storey took bitter parting with him and reportedly never spoke to him again.⁽¹⁸⁾ Another was Senator George F. Hoar, who never formally joined the Anti-Imperialist League but who heeded its calls as an independent within the Republican Party. Wrote Hoar:

When I think of my party, whose glory and whose service to liberty are the pride of my life, crushing out this people in their effort to establish a Republic, and hear people talking about *giving* them good Government, and that they are better off than they ever were under Spain, I feel very much as if I had learned that my father, or some other honored ancestor, had been a slave-trader in his time, and had boasted that he had introduced a new and easier kind of handcuffs or fetters to be worn by the slaves during the horrors of the middle passage. . . .

I would rather have the gratitude of the poor people of the Philippine Islands, avoid their sorrow, and have it true that what I may say or do has brought a ray of hope into the gloomy caverns in which the oppressed peoples of Asia dwell, than to receive a Ducal Coronet from every Monarch in Europe, or command the applause of listening Senates and read my history in the nation's eyes.⁽¹⁹⁾

Diverse and strange bed-fellows as they were, the opponents of colonial conquest exerted considerable influence against the policies employed to carry out conquest. The Anti-Imperialist League has been called the first organization in the 20th century to use modern methods of propaganda on a national scale. Scores of pamphlets, reprinted speeches, magazine articles and books were written and circulated in the campaign. Storey, Herbert Welsh, Edward Atkinson and Henry Parker Willis authored the most effective material. A total of 1,184,188 printed items were issued during the League's existence.⁽²⁰⁾

An embarrassing issue for the McKinley administration arose from the sending of League pamphlets to troops in the Philippines. This brought an order from the Secretary of War to General Otis: "Edward Atkinson is sending out pamphlets entitled 'The Cost of a National Crime,' 'The Hell of War with its Penalties,' 'Criminal Aggression, By Whom Committed.' You will have all such pamphlets, if any are sent, taken from the mails and destroyed." This arbitrary act of censorship caused an uproar over the destruction of American liberties.

One of the earliest effective campaigns was against the enlistment of troops to serve in the military suppression. General Otis, in Manila, reported to the War Department on April 23, 1899 about a flood of telegrams from home to the troops originally sent to the Philippines to fight Spain: "Boys, don't reenlist. Insist

immediate discharge," read one to an Omaha regiment. "People demand that the Tenth return," said another from Ohio; "Don't reenlist," was another sent by "Citizens" to Company D, Daytonites, Washington Volunteers.⁽²¹⁾ As a result, there were so few reenlistments that a whole new expeditionary army had to be organized and shipped to the Philippines.

It particularly infuriated the military authorities that the Filipinos in resistance drew encouragement from an American movement opposing conquest of their country. The Anti-Imperialist League was called a "copperhead movement"* and "the blow from behind" (a term brought into use by John Barrett, the former U.S. consul in Bangkok who worked hard to promote expansionist interests in Asia). The Civil War veterans' organization, the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR), passed resolutions at its encampments branding League members as "unworthy of the name of American citizens."⁽²²⁾ Filipino dependence on activities of the League and of other opponents of annexation was much less than reported, but the exaggerated tirades of army officers against it were given much circulation. General Lawton was quoted as saying, "I know from my own observation, confirmed by stories of captured Filipino prisoners, that the continuation of fighting is chiefly due to reports that are sent out from America and circulated among these ignorant natives by the leaders who know better."

General Funston (who captured Emilio Aguinaldo in 1901 through the use of deception) charged in a speech in Chicago:

Had it not been for the so-called peace party in the States the insurrection would have been suppressed finally in January 1900. Since that time 600 lives have been sacrificed and millions of dollars have been spent. Were it not for the hope of the few leaders still under arms that the U.S. is on the verge of a civil war in their behalf all resistance would be at an end. . . . The responsibility for the continuance of the resistance to our army should be placed where it is due. From the lips of Aguinaldo himself and from other leaders of the insurrection, I know that for the last two years they have been encouraged to shoot down our men and continue their warfare by the copperhead sentiments of people in the States.⁽²³⁾

*A term originally applied to sympathizers of the Southern Confederacy living in the North during the Civil War and committing acts of sabotage against the Union forces.

Beyond doubt, the activities of the Anti-Imperialist League contributed greatly to the opposition to imperialist policy and in particular to the Fil-American War that it had brought about, causing the McKinley administration to take steps to mask the harsh and unseemly methods being used to bring the Philippines under American control. Both the Schurman Commission of 1899 and the Taft Commission of 1900 were sent out to the colony as civilian bodies to soften the appearance of a naked military policy, although neither on appointment had authority to supercede the military commander on the spot. It was with a view to quieting the popular opposition that the Taft Commission, although carrying out a phase of suppression, was publicized at home as introducing normal civil government as part of a "benevolent" extension of American rule.

Neither the Republican nor the Democratic parties could ignore the Anti-Imperialist League nor the other sectors of resistance to colonial acquisition. Beginning with the presidential election of 1900, the platforms and campaigns of both parties for over a decade were influenced and considerably shaped by the opponents of a colonial empire.

2. The Inconclusive Election of 1900

Having put forward, at its October 1899 national conference, the perspective of contesting the election of 1900 on the issue of imperialism, the Anti-Imperialist League was confronted with the difficulty of finding a party and a national candidate to carry the issue effectively.

Initially, an attempt was made to launch a third party based on a frankly anti-imperialist program. A meeting was held in New York on January 6, 1900 at the Plaza Hotel to discuss the formation of a third party. Present were Carl Schurz, Brisbane Walker, Gamaliel Bradford, Franklin Giddings, Andrew Carnegie, Edward Burrit Smith, and a dozen others; Gompers, who was invited, failed to attend. As tentatively agreed by this gathering, the proposed new party was to have the financial backing of Carnegie.

However, between January and the middle of 1900, when the holding of the major party national conventions occurred, the third party movement had the wind taken out of its sails by the

withdrawal of Carnegie as its source of financing. This was reportedly due in large part to pressure brought to bear by the other big steel interests which, together with Carnegie, were in the process of forming the giant monopoly to be known as U.S. Steel. Carnegie was to have a bond share of nearly one-third in the new corporation (i.e., \$160 million out of \$400 million), but the other interests refused to proceed unless Carnegie abandoned his third party ideas and clung to support of McKinley and the Republican party. Carnegie agreed.⁽²⁴⁾ (Afterward he was to contend that an interview with McKinley had swayed him, and he pointed to the speeches of the last tour of McKinley before his death by assassination in 1901, in which the president elaborated on the expansion of U.S. markets abroad by manipulation of tariffs rather than by taking of colonies, as evidence that McKinley had altered his position.^{(25)*}

Left without financial support, the third party idea collapsed. When adherents of the Anti-Imperialist League met in a Liberty Congress at Indianapolis on August 15-16, 1900 to map out election policy, they ended up with no alternative but to support the Democratic Party candidate, William Jennings Bryan.⁽²⁶⁾ In the definition of their position it was evident that this was done with reluctance. It was urged that votes be withheld from McKinley, that votes be given to congressmen who openly opposed imperialism, and that "while we welcome any other method of opposing the re-election of Mr. McKinley, we advise direct support of Mr. Bryan as the most effective means of crushing imperialism." Even after this, a last ditch effort was made to convene a conference in New York on September 5 to form a third party despite financial shortcomings but it came to nothing because of lack of a candidate of sufficient national stature.

Reluctance to support Bryan and the Democrats had its basis in the fact that the Democratic party was divided over policy,

*Said McKinley: "The period of exclusiveness is past. The expansion of our trade and commerce is the pressing problem. Commercial wars are unprofitable. A policy of good will and trade relations will prevent reprisals. Reciprocity treaties are in harmony with the spirit of the times; measures of retaliation are not. If perchance some of our tariffs are no longer needed for revenue or to encourage and protect our industries at home, why should they not be employed to extend and promote our markets abroad?"

with Bryan himself torn between its segments. There were Democrats who were highly vocal for expansion, and this included such major newspapers as *The New York Times*, the *Washington Times*, the *Atlanta Constitution*, and the *Louisville Courier-Journal*.⁽²⁷⁾ Furthermore, it was still thought that the free silver issue was the great vote-catcher in the agrarian areas, and this was a temptation for Bryan, for whom it had been the standard in 1896. At the 1900 Democratic national convention the main dispute was over whether to make free silver or imperialism the central issue of the campaign. The Anti-Imperialist League, fighting for the projection of their issue, had to contemplate support for the Democrats with the cold memory of Bryan's behavior during the ratification question.

In the formulation of a Philippine plank in the Democratic Party Platform, however, the Anti-Imperialist League and other anti-colonial forces, for whom it was shaped, were able to score at least a partial success. The plank read:

We condemn and denounce the Philippine policy of the present administration. It has involved the Republic in unnecessary war, sacrificed the lives of many of our noblest sons and placed the United States, previously known and applauded throughout the world as the champion of freedom, in the false and un-American position of crushing with military force the efforts of our former allies to achieve liberty and self-government. The Filipinos cannot be citizens without endangering our civilization; they cannot be subjects without imperiling our form of Government, and as we are not willing to surrender our civilization or to convert the Republic into an Empire, we favor an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose to give to the Filipinos, first, a stable form of government; second, independence; and third, protection from outside interference, such as has been given for nearly a century to the Republics of Central and South America.

The greedy commercialism which dictated the Philippine policy of the Republican administration attempted to justify it with the plea that it will pay; but even this sordid and unworthy plea fails when brought to the test of the facts. The war of criminal aggression against the Filipinos, entailing an annual expense of many millions, has already cost more than any possible profit that could accrue from the entire Philippine trade for years to come. Furthermore, when trade is extended at the expense of liberty, the price is always too high.

We are not opposed to territorial expansion when it takes in desirable territory, which can be erected into States in the Union, and whose peo-

ple are willing and fit to become American citizens. We favor expansion by every peaceful and legitimate means; but we are unalterably opposed to seizing or purchasing of distant lands, to be governed outside the Constitution, and whose people can never become citizens.

We are in favor of extending the Republic's influence among the nations, but believe that influences should be extended not by force and violence, but through the persuasive power of a high and honorable example.

The importance of other questions now pending before the American people is in no wise diminished, and the Democratic Party takes no backward step from its position on them; but the burning issue of Imperialism growing out of the Spanish war involves the very existence of the Republic and the destruction of our free institutions. We regard it as the paramount issue of the campaign.⁽²⁸⁾

Although this did not conform fully to the position of the Anti-Imperialist League (it called only for "a declaration of purpose" and not for the immediate independence advocated by the League at the time), it was probably the most concise statement of the general view of all those who then opposed expansion through territorial colonialism, but who favored expansion through those other forms of imperialist development, the protectorate and the sphere of influence, which was implied in the reference to extending the Monroe Doctrine idea to Asia.

Despite the Democratic platform's assertion that imperialism was "the paramount issue of the campaign," this turned out to be much less the case than imagined or intended. In part, this was due to Republican tactics in the campaign, which were to evade the imperialist issue rather than to meet it head on.

A frontal clash over imperialist policy did appear to loom as the election campaign of 1900 opened. At the Republican National Convention the keynote speech on June 20 was delivered by one of the most strident of the imperialist spokesmen, Henry Cabot Lodge. He orated:

We make no hypocritical pretense of being interested in the Philippines solely on account of others. While we regard the welfare of those people as sacred trust, we regard the welfare of the American people first. We see our duty to ourselves as well as to others. We believe in trade and expansion. By every legitimate means within the province of government and legislation we mean to stimulate the expansion of our trade and to open new markets. Greatest of all markets is China. Our

trade there is growing by leaps and bounds. Manila, the prize of war, gives us inestimable advantage in developing that trade. It is the cornerstone of our Eastern policy.⁽²⁹⁾

No other approach was more likely to inflame the issue and the opposition than this. In the same month of June it led Jacob Schurman, who had differed over the policy pursued in the Philippines, to write privately to McKinley with advice on how to conduct his reelection campaign:

Assuming then that the Philippines will be the supreme issue in the campaign, what should be the declaration of the party platform in relation to it? I answer succinctly: a cordial approval of all that the President has done without mention of any other reason for it than the necessities of the case and the dictates of national honor and duty. Beside this supreme reason, which I doubt not the nation will approve, any allusion to the wealth of the Archipelago would appear as sordid and distracting gloss. . . . As I think it unwise to find any extrinsic reasons for our taking and holding the Philippines, so I think it unwise to declare that we shall hold them forever. . . . We gain nothing by declaring either that we shall withdraw at a particular time or that we shall never withdraw.

McKinley immediately replied: "I have read [your letter] carefully and have been much interested in your suggestion. I wish you would prepare a draft of what you think would be a proper presentation of the subject of which you write."⁽³⁰⁾

When the Republican platform of 1900 finally appeared, it was not Lodge's approach that was used, but Shurman's. The plank on the Philippines read:

In accepting by the treaty of Paris the just responsibility of our victories in the Spanish war, the President and the Senate won the undoubted approval of the American people. No other course was possible than to destroy Spain's sovereignty throughout the Western Indies and in the Philippine Islands. That course created our responsibility before the world and with the unorganized population whom our intervention had freed from Spain, to provide for the maintenance of law and order, and for the establishment of good government, and for the performance of international obligations. Our authority could not be less than our responsibility, and wherever sovereign rights were extended, it became the high duty of the Government to maintain its authority, to put down armed insurrection, and to confer the blessings of liberty and civilization upon all the rescued people.

The largest measure of self-government consistent with their welfare and our duties shall be secured to them by law. To Cuba independence and self-government were assured in the same voice by which war was declared, and to the letter this pledge shall be performed.⁽³¹⁾

In the course of the campaign the Philippine issue was presented in this toned-down fashion, dealt with not on the grounds of the islands' commercial value, which was submerged, but as a philanthropic, civilizing, missionary endeavor. The Republicans, in fact, avoided the issue as much as possible, putting their emphasis instead on the national prosperity then developing.

Sidestepping of the issue by the Republicans had more than simple tactical purposes in winning an election; it reflected the beginning of a tendency to re-think expansionist ideas. It was only one aspect in the blurring of imperialism as the central question in the 1900 election, as the Anti-Imperialist League sought to make it. On March 20, 1900 Secretary of State John Hay announced agreement among the major powers on the American-initiated "open door" policy in China, a policy that the anti-imperialists could accept because it fitted their arguments for trade without territorial seizure. Significantly, the Anti-Imperialist League made no issue of this partitioning of the China market, just as it made no issue of the Platt Amendment providing for intervention in "independent, self-governing" Cuba to safeguard American interests.

An equally important factor in the campaign was the handling of issues by Bryan, as the Democratic candidate, which confirmed all the reservations of the League. Beginning with an attack on imperialist policy, he shifted midway in the campaign to concentration on the free silver issue and on attacking "the trusts." Since it was a time of relative prosperity, which was extending even to depressed agrarian regions, this gave the Republicans a perfect chance to go over to the attack themselves. Bryan's resurrection of free silver, beyond doubt, sent many wavering voters into the Republican camp. Not only had the discovery of gold in the Klondike and in South Africa greatly increased supply of that basic metal, but industry was thriving on the high Republican Dingley tariff of 1897; it was feared that victory for free silverites would collapse the boom.

As a result, some leading foes of imperialism, such as Senators Hoar and Hale and Representatives McCall and Littlefield, ac-

tively supported and campaigned for McKinley as a spokesman of industrial advancement. Carnegie did likewise, as did Schurman and Abram S. Hewitt, a backer of the Anti-Imperialist League. Schurz, with great reluctance, supported Bryan only as a lesser of two evils. Cleveland and Speaker Reed stood apart and supported no one; Charles Francis Adams, a League leader, took the same position. Some members of the Anti-Imperialist League advocated "vote for McKinley first, take care of the Philippines afterward."⁽³²⁾

Bryan, in consequence, was overwhelmingly defeated. Although there was a decline in the vote as compared with 1896, McKinley won by the largest popular plurality recorded to that time in American elections. A stock market boom of unprecedented proportions was set off by his victory; on the day after his election, two million shares were traded, more than on any other day in the history of the Exchange.⁽³³⁾ It was a symptom of the prosperity that had returned him to office.

With him McKinley carried, as his vice-presidential running mate, Theodore Roosevelt, who had helped make the seizure of the Philippines possible. As with other factors in the election, however, this did not indicate endorsement of Roosevelt's imperialist enthusiasms; his choice as a candidate had come about as a maneuver by the Republican bosses to shunt him into political obscurity in the vice-presidential post. The election, although termed by the more ardent expansionists as a mandate for imperialism, was, because of a confused complexity of issues, hardly a mandate for any policy except the domestic status quo. This was pointed out in a number of newspapers, which warned against accepting the vote as approval of imperialism.

A few days after the election, on November 13, 1900, the New England Anti-Imperialist League adopted a resolution: "That the Executive Committee of the New England Anti-Imperialist League, in view of the fact that the anti-imperialists of the country were divided in sentiment as to the candidates in the recent presidential election, does not and cannot recognize that the question of Anti-Imperialism was settled by that election, and urges its members to continue their agitation for the independence of the Philippine Islands and for the recognition of the principles of Independence."⁽³⁴⁾

The debate went on, moving to the detailed aspects of governing a colony.

COLONIAL POLICY

Conflict or Curtailment?

1. Imperialism and the Lawmakers

Immediately after the election of 1900 came the first clash over the formulation of a specific Philippine policy. It proved that, although those identified with expansionist aims had retained control of the administration, this did not mean that they had a free hand in the implementation of those aims.

The issue concerned a bill first introduced in the Senate by Senator John C. Spooner of Wisconsin early in 1900. As originally presented it would authorize the President, following the putting down of Filipino resistance, to assume "all military, civil and judicial powers necessary to govern the said islands," enable him to vest those powers in whatever persons he would direct, and also determine the manner in which these powers would be exercised. Implied was the exercise by designated American authorities in the colony of unlimited power to issue franchises to American corporations wishing to exploit opportunities in the Philippines.

In the heat of pre-election debate over retention of the islands, the anti-colonialists in the Senate succeeded in preventing the bill from coming to a vote, on grounds that it established indefinite retention. Once the election was out of the way, however, it was felt by imperialist groups that the question of retention was no longer at issue and that obstacles to exploitation had been removed. A clamor arose for the passage of the side-tracked Spooner bill.

Pressure for this came from the Philippine Commission of William Howard Taft, which was being besieged by impatient American individuals and interests on the scene in the Philippines. The military rule employed to cope with the unexpectedly prolonged Filipino resistance lacked authority to enact civil legislation on

property and contract. Taft's Commission, in its report for 1900, dated November 30, hailed the result of the American presidential election ("Capital and all business interests hung upon the predictions of success of the one party or the other" and "from now on conditions in these islands will grow steadily better"), and urged the following:

It is necessary that there be some body or officer vested with legislative authority to pass laws which shall afford opportunity to capital to make investment here. This is the true and most lasting method of pacification. Now the only corporations here are of Spanish or English origin, with but limited concessions, and American capital finds itself completely obstructed. Such difficulties would all be removed by the passage of the Spooner bill, now pending in both Houses.

On January 2, 1901 the Taft Commission reemphasized its recommendation by sending an urgent wire to Secretary of War Root:

Until [Spooner Bill] passage no purely central civil government can be established, no public franchises of any kind granted, and no substantial investment in internal improvements possible. . . . Sale of public lands and allowance of mining claims impossible until Spooner bill. Hundreds of American miners on ground awaiting law to perfect claims. More coming. Good element in pacification. Urgently recommend amendment Spooner bill so that its operation be not postponed until complete suppression of all insurrection, but only until in President's judgment civil government may be safely established.

Root, forwarding this appeal to Congress, reinforced it with urging of his own: "The army has brought the Philippines to the point where they offer a ready and attractive field for investment and enterprise, but to make this possible there must be mining laws, homestead and land laws, general transportation laws, and banking and currency laws."⁽¹⁾

As head of the Philippine Committee in the Senate, Henry Cabot Lodge was in charge of maneuvers to push through the substance of the Spooner bill, which he sought to do before the expiration of the 56th Congress in March. His tactic was to affix the Spooner bill as an amendment to the army's appropriation measure, and to smooth its passage past anti-colonialist opposition by attaching a provision that reserved a right to alter, amend or repeal any franchises granted under it.

Lodge's maneuver, however, ran into stiff opposition. While the anti-colonialists no longer felt able to block the setting up of colonial government in the Philippines, they fought determinedly against any move that would give latitude to unrestricted exploitation. Several factors enhanced their position. Domestic interests were undiminished in their desire to prevent the development of competitive enterprises in the colony. Reformist circles in addition, particularly conservationists, were then in the midst of a fight to curtail the ruthless plunder of American resources and wished to prevent its repetition in a distant possession. Furthermore, a corruption scandal had been unearthed among American officials in the Cuban post office system in the spring of 1900, and this was fresh in congressional minds now being directed to a Philippine policy.⁽²⁾

Attempts were made by the opposition to amend the Spooner measure with provisions for extending Constitutional guarantees to the Philippines, and for declaring an intention to withdraw from the islands after a stable government was established. These were defeated. However, a stern amendment was approved, made by Senator Hoar, forbidding the disposition of public lands in any manner until a "permanent government" was established, and severely limiting franchises. This virtually emasculated the Spooner bill as originally conceived and was a sharp setback to Root, Lodge, Taft and the interests they spoke for.

As finally approved on March 2, 1901, the Spooner bill (or amendment, to be more precise) was an act of Congress authorizing the President of the United States to take the necessary steps toward establishing civil government in the Philippines. However, no date was specified for this and it was plainly stated that it was a temporary measure pending more definite action by Congress, while all franchises granted under it were subject to amendment or repeal. Senator Hoar's restrictive amendment stated:

Until a permanent government shall have been established in said archipelago full reports shall be made to Congress on or before the first day of each regular session of all legislative acts and proceedings of the temporary government instituted under the provisions hereof; and full reports of the acts and doings of said government, and as to the condition of the archipelago and its people, shall be made to the President, including all information which may be useful to the Congress in providing for a more permanent government: Provided, That no sale or lease or other

disposition of the public lands or the timber thereon or the mining rights therein shall be made: *And Provided further*, That no franchise shall be granted which is not approved by the President of the United States, and is not in his judgment clearly necessary for the immediate government of the islands and indispensable for the interests of the people thereof, and which can not, without great public mischief, be postponed until the establishment of permanent civil government; and all such franchises shall terminate one year after the establishment of such permanent civil government.⁽³⁾

The effect of the modified Spooner amendment was merely to facilitate the gradual transfer of power from the military regime to the civil commission under Taft. On June 21, 1901 McKinley directed the inauguration of Taft as civil governor general of the Philippines, the formal change-over occurring on July 4, 1901. As previously stated, this was to a great extent a measure to mask the continued military suppression policy. As governor general, however, Taft remained without authority to enfranchise economic exploitation of the islands. At the end of 1901, Taft's Philippine Commission was still calling for the means to grant franchises, mining claims and land sale and lease.⁽⁴⁾ It was not until July 1902, three and a half years after the ratified acquisition of the colony, that the U.S. Congress resolved differences to the point of formulating such a policy.

This bridling of the rush to exploit the new colony was followed by a dispute over trade policy, with domestic interests determined to deny to the Philippines a status that would allow the free entry of its competitive products into the United States. The issue came to a head in the so-called Insular Cases, brought before the American courts in 1899 and 1900 and settled by the Supreme Court in 1901.

There were three cases involved, none of which directly concerned Philippine products but all of which had a bearing on policy toward them. In one, an American soldier, E.J. Pepke, returning from duty in the Philippines, brought suit against the seizure by U.S. authorities of 14 diamond rings which he had carried with him and on which he had paid no customs duties. The other two cases had to do with the importation of products from the new colony of Puerto Rico—sugar by De Lima and Co. and oranges by an importer named Downes, both of whom were forced to pay duties and who brought suit against the government.

Pepke, De Lima and Downes acted in the belief that the islands concerned were American territory, subject to U.S. general laws.

Legal aspects of the decisions in these cases had already been laid down by reports made to Secretary of War Root by the War Department's chief legal expert, Charles E. Magoon, in February 1900. Magoon had written that land acquired from Spain as a result of the war "became land appertaining to the United States and in the possession of the United States, but not within the territorial boundaries of the United States." He made a distinction between the extension of sovereignty and the extension of boundaries, holding that "There may be some question as to whether or not all the country within the territorial boundaries of the United States is bound and privileged by the provisions of the Constitution, but there can be no question that territory without the boundaries of the United States is not bound and privileged by our Constitution." As far as the legal status of the Philippines and its inhabitants was concerned, "*The exact rule is that wherever the sovereignty of the United States may be asserted, the Congress of the United States may prescribe the ways and means, the manner and methods by which such sovereignty is to be asserted.*"⁽⁵⁾ In practice this meant that Filipinos had to swear allegiance to the United States without enjoying the rights of citizenship, while they were subject to special laws of Congress different from those affecting American citizens.

The Supreme Court decisions in the "diamond rings" and De Lima cases followed these legal opinions. They declared that U.S. tariff laws defined in the Dingley Act of 1897 did not apply to the new possessions because they were not foreign countries (that is, not "exclusively within the sovereignty of a foreign nation and without the sovereignty of the United States"). In the Downes case, however, it was declared that the Philippines and Puerto Rico were not part of the United States but merely territory that had been acquired, to which the Constitution did not apply directly but only through the "formally and legally expressed will of the President and Congress." In other words, trade relations and tariffs operating between the United States and its colonies were to be determined by Congress apart from existing laws. The principle expressed in the popular parlance of the day, "the Constitution follows the flag," was rejected.

Affecting these decisions had been "A Brief in Behalf of Industrial Interests in the States" that had been submitted to the Court in opposition to the applicants Pepke, De Lima and Downes. It argued:

Suddenly, and for the first time in our history, the nation finds itself possessed of vast and even unexplored areas of *tropical* territory, *populated* by millions of people of the Latin and Malay races, who have long been accustomed to monarchical or no government ideas and either not ruled at all or with despotic power, many of them only semicivilized. The areas of the ceded possessions are given over to the production in abundance of such products as tobacco, sugar, hemp, rice and fruits, for which the climate and soil are best adapted, and which, therefore, and because of cheap labor conditions, can be raised therein at comparatively small cost. . . .

A decision in these cases adverse to the Government would make it possible not only to suddenly endanger our revenues upon a mere *cession* of acquired territory—no one can say to what extent—without the consent of Congress, but it would jeopardize a very large amount of capital invested in the States in *certain agricultural industries*, the protection and development of which it has long been the policy of the Government to safeguard in our customs-revenue laws. These industries, embracing tobacco, sugar, rice, hemp, fruits, etc., can not compete on the unequal terms which would be forced upon them with like products grown in ceded (tropical) possessions.⁽⁶⁾

The outcome of the Insular Cases answered the demands of sectional interests which could now be satisfied with the foundation that was being laid for the colonial relationship. Domestic industries, with a powerful bloc representing them in Congress, could be assured of the protection they desired.

When a tariff act incorporating the Insular Cases declarations was submitted to Congress and approved on March 8, 1902, it compelled Philippine products to pay 75 per cent of the established Dingley duties, a rate too high to offer any encouragement to those products. The only reason why any reduction at all was allowed on the Dingley rates was the urgent plea of the Taft Commission for some encouragement to Philippine industry because the colony's revenues, from which its operating costs were taken, depended on it, and because the class of Filipino export producers were a necessary ally in pacification.

At the same time, however, the special Philippine tariff law put into effect the complimentary implication of the Court's decisions on the Insular Cases, that Congress could adjust tariffs in the Philippines itself to allow preferential entry of American goods. A policy had been worked out, therefore, through which both the expansionist manufacturing-exporting interests and domestic agricultural producers could be satisfied. The tenor of these developments coming from the Supreme Court and from Congress indicated a readiness to trim and to reshape colonial policy to suit the demands of all sectors in the United States.

Another anti-colonial opposition argument that was satisfied was the protestation that Philippine annexation would mean the influx of cheap "Asiatic" labor. Legislation was introduced to extend the Chinese exclusion laws prevailing in the United States to the Philippines. "If the gap is left open," said Senator Hatfold of Idaho, "the islands will afford the open door through which the yellow horde can reach the U.S." The Exclusion Bill was approved on April 29, 1902.⁽⁷⁾

By withholding the Constitution from the colony, the whole question of American citizenship for Filipinos and of free entry for them into the United States was answered in the negative. Racist anti-colonialists were contented by a provision embodying this included in the Organic Act that formally established permanent civil government in the Philippines on July 2, 1902 ("all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands . . . shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States.")⁽⁸⁾

2. The Organic Act and the Boundaries of Exploitation

By the beginning of 1902 pressures for definitive legislation on all aspects of Philippine policy had become imperative. Investors and prospectors were demanding a clearing away of the restrictions on the granting of franchises and mineral rights; prospectors who had numbered in the hundreds at the time of the Spooner bill had now swelled to nearly 2,000.⁽⁹⁾ Taft was pressing for full civil government with an aspect of permanency and with limited representation for Filipinos, which was needed to encourage collaboration from the population. The administration of Theodore Roosevelt (who had succeeded to the presidency upon the

assassination of McKinley on September 6, 1901) was anxious to present a picture of stable civil government so that the Philippines would be removed as an issue from the elections of 1902 and 1904, which Roosevelt hoped to win on his own merits. His administration was harassed by increasing demands, beginning to mount in the latter part of 1901, from opponents of the Philippine policy for a wholesale investigation of the harsh methods of military suppression, of unrepresentative colonial rule, and of the steps that had led to this situation.

In the report of the Taft Commission for 1901, a set of recommendations was made that provided the scope and outline of a general policy measure. It included a recommendation for "a popular assembly of not exceeding 30 representatives," requests for authority to grant franchises, charters and claims, to issue bonds and to dispose of lands ("in tracts of comparatively large extent"), and proposals for coinage and banking laws.⁽¹⁰⁾

Secretary Root, in the War Department, who not inclined to favor any concession to Filipino representation in the colonial government. He preferred to pass a series of separate acts, as in the case of the tariff, on franchises, public lands and mining, and to leave colonial administration tightly in the hands of his War Department. As head of the Philippine Committee in the Senate, Lodge, however, preferred an omnibus bill as the best way to cope with the mounting criticism in Congress, of which he felt himself a target.⁽¹¹⁾ Lodge faced a delicate situation in the Senate, where Senator Hoar, on January 13, 1902 introduced a resolution for the setting up of a special committee to investigate Philippine affairs, including atrocities committed by the American army. Alarmed by such a step, which would take the direction of policy out of the hands of his Philippine Committee, Lodge agreed to hearings provided they were handled by his committee.⁽¹²⁾ He managed them as hearings for an overall Philippine bill, and these were held from January 31 to June 28. Congress in the same period debated the Philippine legislation which Lodge reported out of his committee on March 31.

Lodge's remarks accompanying the Philippine bill to the Senate floor were tempered by the sharp differences in Congress on the question. He referred cautiously to the bill as "intended to provide temporarily for the administration of civil government in the Philippine Islands until Congress is sufficiently informed to es-

tablish a permanent system," and mentioned proposals as "open to future consideration in the light of a fuller knowledge and larger experience." As for franchises, "The committee feel that it is of the greatest importance for the proper development of the islands that capital be encouraged to enter the islands, but in order to prevent any improper exploitation which would be to the detriment of the inhabitants these sections are strongly guarded. Ample opportunity is given to capital, but the restrictions are rigid."

Acceptance of restrictions on an expansionist policy that Lodge himself had done much to construct, can better be understood in relation to the minority views in his committee, appended to his report. These urged that provisions be included in the Philippine bill for a constitutional convention to be called in the Philippines within 90 days after the end of armed resistance, that provisions be included in the constitution for permitting U.S. naval, military and coaling stations in the islands and for protection of rights and property acquired under the authority of the United States, that a proclamation of Philippine independence be issued by the U.S. President once such a constitution had been framed, that subsequent negotiations be conducted with Great Britain, France, Germany and others for a treaty of perpetual neutrality for the Philippines and for equal trading opportunities, and that U.S. troops be withdrawn 60 days after officers had been elected under the constitution.⁽¹³⁾ This was a statement of the position evolved by the anti-imperialists by that time.

In the hearings conducted by the Philippine Committee of the Senate, the administration was thrown seriously on the defensive. Lodge, as chairman, contrived to narrow the scope of investigation by confining invited witnesses to those identified with administration policy: Taft, General MacArthur, General Otis, Admiral Dewey, General Hughes and David Barrows (a member of Taft's Commission).⁽¹⁴⁾ Moorfield Storey's request to appear as investigative counsel was denied. No Filipinos were permitted to appear as witnesses, and no effort was made for investigations to be conducted in the Philippines itself. Not even Jacob Schurman, head of the first Philippine commission, was called to testify. As chairman, Lodge gave wide latitude to Senator Beveridge, a committee member, to defend the administration, while he curtailed the critical examination of its opponents. Nevertheless,

anti-colonialist senators on the committee (particularly Senators Patterson, Dubois and Carmack) succeeded in forcing exposure and admission of atrocities and brutalities committed by the U.S. Army in its suppression campaigns and of contempt for Filipino capacities and aspirations. This helped to make it possible for sympathetic consideration to be given by Congress to the question of representative government in the colony.

During the course of Senate discussion the opponents of expansionism proposed amendments for extending Constitutional guarantees to Filipinos and for promising independence at a given date. These were rejected, but the sentiment for a bill that would hasten withdrawal from the Philippines was shown in the final vote on the Senate bill, which won approval by 48 to 30. More senators voted against it than voted against the Paris peace treaty or in favor of the resolutions of January 1899 that favored Philippine independence.

In the House of Representatives, the companion bill, introduced by Congressman Henry W. Cooper, was enlarged during debate by provisions for an elective Filipino assembly in the islands that went far beyond the recommendations of Taft or of Root (who is credited with authoring the original bill). Taft had called for a legislature of only 30, but the proponents of Philippine autonomy won House support for an assembly of 50 to 100 members. Anti-colonialists introduced a substitute bill for a Filipino government of limited independence until 1911, with full independence to occur after that, but this was defeated. Nevertheless the final House vote on the Philippine bill recorded an opposition of 97, to 140 who voted in favor. A sharp wrangle occurred between Senate and House committees before agreement on the Organic Act was reached, with the Senate accepting the House provisions on the composition of the Filipino assembly. The Organic Act came into force on July 2, 1902.

Provisions of the Organic Act had been subjected to the stern scrutiny of American sectional interests, and in final form they went far toward satisfying those with qualms about annexing a colony of alien people. Section 4 of the Act defined the status of Filipinos as "citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States," thus quieting racialist and conservative labor protests about an uncontrolled influx of "savage tribes" of cheap labor.

Sharpest attention to the Act had come from representatives of agrarian states who were particularly concerned with the sections on public land laws. (In the Senate hearings the most most searching and relentless interrogation of witnesses had come from Senator Patterson of Colorado, a sugar beet-growing state.) Governor General Taft's recommendations (for which he and the colonial government continued to press unsuccessfully for years after the Act's passage) were for landholdings of 25,000 hectares or more. Sections 13 to 16 of the final Act overrode the wishes of those who had their eyes on carving out large plantations in the Philippines; strict limitations were laid down of 16 hectares for an individual acquiring public land and of 1,024 hectares for a corporation. Domestic agrarian interests in the United States thus doubly protected themselves, through tariffs and through limiting landholdings to a point where large-scale efficient production was made difficult if not impossible in the Philippines which was the only imperialist colony in Asia where a foreign-owned plantation economy based on hired labor did not develop.

Strict limitations on the issuing of municipal bonds for "public improvement" in the Philippines were provided for. This was one of the main sources of corruption in American cities of the period, and was one of the chief targets of the municipal reform movement then under way. The Organic Act limited the indebtedness of any Philippine municipality through bond issues to five per cent of the assessed valuation of its property, a figure so low that it impeded rather than facilitated the islands' development.

In effect, the Organic Act embodied a trimming of the imperialist sails that had been raised in 1898. Its curtailment of avenues to exploitation or to colonial plunder and the insertion of "watch-dog" provisions that made all acts of the colonial government subject to the review and to annulment if felt necessary by Congress,⁽¹⁵⁾ where American sectional interests were strong, put limits on the practice of traditional colonialism. At the same time, the provisions on representative government for Filipinos were a step toward the autonomy and self-government advocated by the moderate anti-colonialists.

It is not surprising that "anti-imperialism" as a movement tended to simmer down in the United States after its initial outburst following ratification of Philippine annexation.

3. From "*Colonial Department*" to "*Bureau of Insular Affairs*"

The concluding section of the Organic Act, Section 87, had an important significance in the evolution of Philippine policy and of American colonial policy in general. It stated:

That the Division of Insular Affairs of the War Department, organized by the Secretary of War, is hereby continued until otherwise provided, and shall hereafter be known as the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department. The business assigned to said Bureau shall embrace all matters pertaining to civil government in the island possessions of the United States subject to the jurisdiction of the War Department; and the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to detail an officer of the Army whom he may consider especially well qualified, to act under the authority of the Secretary of War as the chief of said Bureau; and said officer while acting under said detail shall have the rank, pay and allowances of a colonel.⁽¹⁶⁾

The decision to administer colonial affairs in this way amounted to a down-grading of the whole prospect of colonial administration and was an integral feature in the working out of an American imperialist pattern.

A popular revulsion against the very word "colony" had been the product of the propaganda of the Anti-Imperialist League and of those who endorsed it in whole or in part. Tendencies to use the standard trappings and phraseology of imperialism were limited to only a handful of ardent American expansionists. The greater tendency was reflected in the report of the Schurman Commission, which asserted righteously:

the Commission desires, on behalf of all the Filipinos, to protest against the suggestion of calling the archipelago a colony. It may be asked, What's in a name? In this case, certainly much; for the experience of the Filipinos a 'colony' is a dependent political community which the sovereign power exploits, oppresses and misgoverns. No other word in their whole political vocabulary is so ill-omened, so terrible, so surcharged with wrongs, disasters and sufferings. Merely to call it colonial would insure the emphatic and universal condemnation of the Filipinos for the most perfect system of free government which the mind and heart of man could devise for the inhabitants of that old Spanish colony of the Orient.

At the same time that the Schurman Commission adopted this pious posture (which it would be unlikely to have put into print

two years later), it included in its report, as an Exhibit for comparative reference and application, a study that it had requested of the British colonial civil administration of India, Ceylon, Burma, the Federated Malay States, and the Straits Settlements.⁽¹⁷⁾

Although the word "colony" itself was shunned, there was from the outset and later a great reliance on and imitation of British colonial administration as a model on the part of American policymakers. No man in American public life had closer and more admiring relations with the British than John Hay, who as Secretary of State instructed the Schurman Commission as to the type of government to place before the Filipinos in negotiations in 1899; Hay's outline conformed to the British system in Hong Kong and other colonies, and it comprised the basis for Commission rule in the Philippines.

The banking system instituted by Lord Cromer in Egypt was carefully studied by American administrators when agrarian banks were set up in the Philippines. The British native police units employed in India and in Malaya were used as models for the Philippine Constabulary. Taft sent men to British Borneo and to the Dutch East Indies to study and report on features of colonial administration that could be adopted in the Philippines. Even the development of Baguio in the northern Luzon mountains as a summer resort by the Taft Commission was inspired by the British summer capitol at Simla in India and by Kipling's stories of life at Simla.

Elihu Root, the chief architect of Philippine policy, had 15 works on British colonial policy in his office library. He confessed: "The first thing I did after my appointment was to make out a list of a great number of books which cover in detail both the practice and the principles of many forms of colonial government under the English law, and I am giving to them all the time I can take from my active duties."

As Root later put it, "I came to the conclusion . . . that we'd got to take the lessons we could get from the colonial policy of other countries, especially Great Britain, and to apply it to the peculiar situation arising from the fundamental principles of our own government." The "peculiar situation" was the strong opposition by the anti-imperialists and others to the concept of a colonial empire for the United States.

The thorny problem of developing a colonial system without appearing to do so was complicated by the unanticipated strong and prolonged resistance by the Filipino people to American conquest. Difficulties of reconciling military and civilian government brought confusion to colonial policy-makers. When the Schurman Commission was dispatched to the Philippines it took its instructions from and reported to the State Department under Secretary Hay. With the outbreak of the Fil-American War, greater emphasis was put on military government and Philippine affairs were transferred to the province of the War Department. The Taft Commission's instruction in April 1900 came from the War Department (they were written by Root) and the Commission made its reports to Root. When the exigencies of suppression in the Philippines and of quieting opposition in the United States made it necessary to switch emphasis to civil government in 1901, the question of administration again arose.

McKinley then had come to the conclusion that administration of Philippine affairs should now be shifted to the State Department and that a Colonial Bureau should be established for that purpose under the State Department, with the perspective of eventually establishing a separate Colonial Department. On July 22, 1901, two months before his assassination, McKinley wrote to Hay to urge that this be done. He had even selected a man, Charles H. Allen (then Governor of Puerto Rico), to head the proposed Bureau.

Root also wrote to Hay on September 4, 1901: "I think that both for the name of it and the substance the insular business should be got out of the War Department as early as practicable and the earlier the process begins the better. . . . I hope . . . that this condition of unstable equilibrium will soon be over and that the whole business can go where it belongs under civil control in the nearest approach as we can make to a Department of Colonial Affairs."

When Theodore Roosevelt assumed the presidency in September, however, he set the plan in abeyance. This was due to the continued armed resistance of Filipinos and to the need for military suppression. It was felt that a shifting of administration to the State Department would heighten differences between military and civil authorities in the Philippines who were continually at

odds.⁽¹⁸⁾ Root, therefore, was still in authority when the Organic Act was conceived and he contributed substantially to the writing of it.

The failure to go through with the plan for a Colonial Department thereafter can be attributed to a number of factors. Hawaii, virtually run by American planters and shipping interests, had acquired the status of a territory in 1900, was administered by the Department of the Interior, and was eligible for statehood, reducing the possessions that could be classed as colonies. Furthermore, the development of power relationships in Asia, with the threat of armed conflict over territories and spheres of influence, made the Philippines an area of military strategical concern, a factor that became more pronounced and that alarmed Roosevelt when Japan proved its aggressive potential in the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905. It therefore answered strategical needs to have the Philippines under the War Department. Of equal weight in the pigeon-holing of the separate department idea was the pressure on the shaping of Philippine policy by the anti-colonialists and by domestic interests that would be afforded a convenient target of attack by a Colonial Department. The word "colony" itself disappeared from official terminology; the Philippines became referred to as a "dependency" or as an "insular possession" as were Guam, Wake, Samoa, Midway and other Pacific islands (which were administered by the U.S. Navy). Generations of Americans grew up without being aware of the colonies of the Philippines and Puerto Rico existing behind the facade of an administration of "insular affairs."

There was no better evidence of the adjustment of colonial policy to the demands of the anti-colonialists than in the diminution of colonial administration to a Bureau of Insular Affairs.

4. MacArthur vs. Taft: The Imperialist Mind, Military and Civil

While at home modification was occurring of the uninhibited imperialism that had led to the acquisition of colonial territory in Asia, it was paralleled by a struggle in the Philippines itself over colonial policy. On the surface it was a question of which was to be predominant, military or civil government, but underlying it were differences on the exploitation of the Philippine market and on the handling of relations with the Filipino population.

In April 1900 the second Philippine Commission, headed by William Howard Taft, was sent to the islands. Its creation had been decided upon by the McKinley administration before the wearing guerrilla warfare phase had set in, at a time when there was belief in General Otis' claim of quick military victory over Filipino resistance. However, McKinley, in his message to Congress of December 5, 1899 merely described the commission as a means "to aid the existing authorities" by helping to set up a governing apparatus in territory "held and controlled by our troops." As a civil commission it was to be bound, as was the Schurman Commission, by the stipulation that "as long as the insurrection continues the military arm must necessarily be supreme."

The instructions to Taft, in the form of a letter by McKinley to Secretary Root, actually comprised the executive order placing Philippine affairs under the War Department ("all their action will be subject to your approval and control"). They made precisely plain that any contemplated transfer of authority from military to civil officers "will be gradual and will occupy a considerable period."

In his authorization to create the framework of civil government at municipal and at provincial level, Taft was enjoined to follow the pattern of municipal and provincial government already laid down in orders issued by the military authorities. The more important function of his commission, however, was to act as a legislative body from September 1, 1900, and to draw up laws, rules and regulations governing taxation, revenues, appropriation and expenditure of funds, the establishment of an educational system (as begun by the army), courts, civil service and governmental structure, i.e., a working system of colonial government.⁽¹⁹⁾

At this period in American government, the commission concept was a means of getting around problems that would bring a government under fire if it dealt with them more directly. In its effect, and undoubtedly in its intention, the Taft Commission was a means of by-passing the American Congress at a time when the introduction of colonial legislation in that body would have precipitated a bitter debate on imperialism that would have affected the election of 1900. By delegating powers to a commission, the work of which, it was pointed out, would be subject to endorse-

ment or disapproval of the Congress in the long run, legislative tasks essential to colonial administration could not only be accomplished, but a picture of stability and progress could be presented to the electorate.

In the circumstances in which it was dispatched, the Taft Commission was conceived of as an adjunct to and a mask of military conquest. Taft balked at first in accepting an appointment in which he would hold so little authority, until, at the advice of the man appointed to the commission to handle financial matters, Henry C. Ide, he insisted on having an ultimate control of the purse strings in the colony by having legislative powers of appropriation and expenditure.⁽²⁰⁾ Root yielded on this, but simultaneously he appointed as successor to General Otis as military governor the vain and ambitious General Arthur MacArthur, who took over command on May 1, 1900 while the Taft Commission was still en route on the Pacific. Also, at the same time that Taft's instructions were being prepared (they were actually written by Root), Root created under the War Department a separate Military Division of the Philippines, divided into four departments (Northern Luzon, Southern Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao-Jolo),⁽²¹⁾ an arrangement suited to the needs of military suppression.

Taft's instructions had stressed that the success of his mission "will require the most perfect cooperation between the civil and military authorities in the islands." From the moment of his arrival, however, a bitter clash developed between the commission and the army that was to persist for years.

In part this stemmed from the character of General MacArthur, who was a forthright advocate of aggressive imperialism. An arrogant man, conscious of the uses of power, he had greater pretensions than Otis, who saw himself merely as a military officer carrying out orders. MacArthur, imbued with the ideology of imperialism, saw himself as a proconsul of the new American Empire. His ideas corresponded with those of the most ardent expansionists.

As late as 1902, before the Senate Committee holding hearings which led to a trimming of the more grandiose imperialist views, he could pontificate that in the United States

the productive capacity of various industries is likely soon to exceed the effectual demand of the home market . . . which, of course, means stagnation of business and a mass of unemployed laborers, large enough, perhaps, to cause great uneasiness if not to become an actual menace to our institutions. . . . In pursuance of this pressure, from which there is no escape, the United States will soon have to seek trade everywhere on earth, as it must have ever-expanding markets to meet ever-increasing powers of production. In a word, foreign markets will soon become a vital necessity, a necessity America cannot dispense with even if she would, and must even fight for if they are not to be secured otherwise.

The application of that premise is this: The power that holds the Philippine Islands must of necessity, and from that fact alone, exert an active and potential influence upon the affairs of Asia. The archipelago affords an ideal strategical position. It is the steppingstone to commanding influence—political, commercial, and military supremacy in the East . . . possession of the Philippine Archipelago by the United States is not only of paramount importance, but is absolutely essential to the progressive development of American national interests.

MacArthur exhibited little understanding of how the Philippines might develop as a colony or of how it might be governed. As for the Filipino people, he said that "I became very much attached to them," as a man might speak of his house servants. Of them he said: "When the Filipino people realize the grandeur of their future destiny by reason of association with the great Republic, and come to understand that they are a chosen people to carry not only American commerce but also republican institutions and the principles of personal liberty throughout Asia, they may be relied upon to rally to the inspiring thought thus suggested and follow and support the American flag in whatever contests the future may have in store for it as the symbol of human liberty through the world."⁽²²⁾

Before this realization might come about, in his frankly expressed opinion, the Filipinos would need bayonet treatment for ten years.⁽²³⁾

During his period of military governorship, from May 1, 1900 to July 1, 1901, General MacArthur did apply the bayonet treatment. In this period the committing of atrocities, which he could have halted with stern discipline, became common and engrained in his army. As a ranking officer, however, he was typical rather

than unique in his attitudes. The American army in the Philippines was a racist and domineering conqueror, to a degree seldom matched by the armies of other imperialist powers.

Open racial prejudice was the rule, with both officers and men commonly referring to Filipinos as "gu-gus" or "niggers." In Manila itself, as an example, the Filipino *cocheros*, or rig drivers, were so often beaten, abused and cheated by American soldiers that they went out of their way to avoid taking them as fares, preferring to take Filipino passengers at less fare.⁽²⁴⁾

The Taft Commission, on arriving in the Philippines, found a complete absence of social contact even between the American commanders and the wealthy Filipino mestizo collaborators who aided the army. Wives of American army officers were among the most open in their discrimination. Wrote the wife of a leading member of the Taft Commission: "One of the vital questions in the Philippines relates to the social relations between the two races. The army, except in a few cases, has tabooed the native socially. A friend, the wife of an officer of high rank, said to me one day when I was preparing to make some calls on native acquaintances: 'I pity you Commission people. Thank heaven, the army has no social duty toward these natives'."⁽²⁵⁾

Ordinary American soldiers who formed relationships with Filipino women were looked upon as having "gone native," and were considered degrading examples. One official report spoke of "the influence of native women upon white men" as "not wholesome, however honorable or conventional the relation of the two may be. The white man almost never brings the woman up to his level. . . . He 'degenerates' . . ."⁽²⁶⁾

This military attitude persisted throughout American rule in the Philippines. Army men who remained in the islands as businessmen or as members of the colonial civil service preserved their associations and their attitudes in organizations like the Veterans Army of the Philippines and the more exclusive Military Order of the Carabao. The latter, at annual get-togethers called "wallows," indulged in slanderous, racist songs and speeches that were directed at Americans who advocated greater opportunities for Filipinos as well as at Filipinos themselves. As late as 1913, a "wallow" of the Military Order of the Carabao, held after the election of Woodrow Wilson to the presidency, engaged in such excesses of slander that Wilson himself delivered a public reprimand.

mand to "officers of the Army and Navy of the United States who think it fun to bring their official superiors into ridicule and the policies of the government into contempt."⁽²⁷⁾

Military government and the emphasis on military conquest had a distorting effect on the very objective of colonial acquisition: economic exploitation. A swarm of business entrepreneurs entered on the heels of the army to form an American business community motivated by the narrowest of imperialist interests, which was to serve the needs of the occupying troops. A get-rich-quick atmosphere prevailed, in which profit margins of 20 per cent or more were realized.

A large proportion of this trade, while Senators Beveridge and Lodge were extolling its possibilities in and out of Congress, was made up of beer and distilled liquors that, in a country with a population of temperant habits, gave the American soldier a drunken image. In the first 11 months of American occupation alone, the importation of these beverages nearly quadrupled (from 916,501 liters in the normal year of 1893 to 3,564,432 liters from August 22, 1898 to July 31, 1899). Over 400 American "saloons" licensed by the military government existed in 1900 in Manila alone. The *Manila Times*, the city's leading American newspaper, was described at the end of 1900 as follows: "The chief advertisements are those booming the liquor business, the leading business of the place since Uncle Sam's troops entered it. It contains 266 inches of liquor advertisements, 60 inches of tobacco advertisements, 88 inches of shipping advertisements, and for all other advertisements but 178 inches of space are given."⁽²⁸⁾ (This situation, incidentally, caused many leading figures in the National Women's Christian Temperance Union and the National Anti-Saloon League to associate themselves with the anti-imperialist movement and to lobby against the operations of the military government in the islands.)

The almost total preoccupation of American businessmen with the profitable trade with American troops, who were kept at a level of 70,000 from 1899 to 1902, brought about not only a close link between them and the military government but fostered among them the same discriminatory attitudes found in army officers. As a consequence of this commercial incest, the early American business community was intensely anti-Filipino and fought hard to retain the military government and the presence of

the large occupying army from which it profited. Taft's Commission and the prospect of civil government were received with open hostility.

Contempt for the Filipino led to virtually no effort being made to explore or to develop the market potentiality of the population. This attitude, in fact, remained long after the transfer from military to civil government. For many years, the period of army rule was referred to nostalgically as "the days of the empire." In fact, prior to 1909, there was no year when the sale of American goods in the Philippines exceeded \$200 per capita for American residents. "An analysis of the American goods shipped to the islands during that period," wrote one careful observer, "reveals the fact that a very large proportion of these were for Americans, and were shipped to Manila solely to supply the transported demands of customers who had always been used to and demanded American goods."⁽²⁹⁾ This, in spite of all the propaganda about the dire need of the American economy for markets abroad.

Arrival of the Taft Commission was anticipated with dread and at once precipitated a cleavage among the Americans in the Philippines. General MacArthur, who had just begun to implement his own policies of suppression and who resented any diminution of his own power, complained that Taft's instructions were "an unconstitutional interference with his prerogative as Military Commander in these islands" and looked upon the commission as "an injection into an otherwise normal situation." He protested against the transfer of any of his powers to civilian authority, and wrote to the War Department asking for the curtailment of the commission's powers of appointment. MacArthur refused to accept civilian estimates and proposals in a situation that he regarded as a military one. The American business community supported him almost to a man.

It was not only the prospect of a decreased army that caused resentments over the coming of a civil commission. The American community was equally aroused over the sections of Taft's instructions that had to do with creating governments and civil service posts staffed by Filipinos. Passage of a Civil Service Act, one of the first measures enacted by the commission when it began to function as a legislative body, drew some of the harshest antagonism from Americans; many who had come as soldiers had elected to remain after discharge in order to occupy colonial posts.

When Taft declared the Filipino (in a statement notable for its condescension) a "little brown brother," an American newspaper, the *Manila Sunday Sun*, printed a poem that became very popular and echoed the American attitude:

*I'm only a common soldier man in the blasted Philippines,
They say I've got Brown Brothers here, but I dunno what it
means.*

*I like the word Fraternity, but still I draw the line;
He may be a brother of William H. Taft, but he ain't no friend
of mine.⁽³⁰⁾*

Taft and his commission members, while in conflict with MacArthur's military government, had not come to the Philippines as anti-colonialists or in contradiction with imperialist aims. Both MacArthur and Taft served expansionist interests and differed in tactics and grasp of the situation, not in strategic objectives. Taft, "born in the higher ranks,"⁽³¹⁾ was the son of a secretary of war in President Grant's administration and was a protegee of Senator Joseph B. Foraker of Ohio,⁽³²⁾ one of the ardent imperialists in the Republican party. His brother, Charles, was a wealthy corporation lawyer linked with the J.P. Morgan interests,⁽³³⁾ and was one of those in the family grooming him carefully to hold high government posts. In 1890 Taft had been appointed solicitor-general under President Harrison.

To both the Harrison and McKinley administrations, Taft had appeal for his strongly anti-labor bias. During the bitter Pullman strike in 1894 he confided that "The situation in Chicago is very alarming and distressing and until they have had much bloodletting it will not be better. The situation is complicated by the demagogues and populists . . . who are continually encouraging resistance to federal authority. Word comes tonight that 30 men have been killed by federal troops. Though it is a bloody business, everybody hopes that it is true." Later he commented: "They have only killed six of the mob as yet. This is hardly enough to make an impression."⁽³⁴⁾

In the Philippines Taft saw his task as one of clearing the way for the big monopoly investment groups—railroads, public utilities, sugar plantations, mining, construction firms—and for major exporters like the textile industry. His commission's recommendations (and those of the commission heads that followed him) concentrated mainly on the need for land and franchise laws that

would benefit these groups to the maximum, and he was to continue to press for legislation altering the Organic Act to achieve these ends as Secretary of War and as President. During his presidency he used the term "dollar diplomacy" to describe his foreign policy, which he endeavored to use to renew a drive for Asian penetration.

The other members of his commission were uniformly conservative. Ranking second to Taft in the list of appointments was Dean Worcester, the only carryover from the Schurman Commission, who had proven himself an able defender of imperialist interests. In the colonial government Worcester headed the department of the interior and directed the disposal of lands, mining claims, timber and other resources. He was to serve as a ranking officer in the colonial regime longer than any other American, until 1913, but, although holding seniority, was never to become governor general due to the detestation in which Filipinos held him for his racial prejudice and arrogance. Other members were: Luke E. Wright, who had been a Confederate officer in the Civil War and had held a judgeship in the state of Tennessee; Henry C. Ide, from Vermont, who had served in a colonial post before as a judge in the American island possession of Samoa and who was an economist; and Bernard Moses, president of the University of California, whose appointment was based on his reputed knowledge of Spanish colonies in Latin America and on his writing of a book, *The Colonial Systems of Different Countries*.

There were no differences in outlook on the Taft Commission as had occurred in the body headed by Schurman. At no time was there any objection within the commission to the absolutely dominant role of Taft or to any measure proposed and adopted, however reactionary it may have been.

Taft, operating within the substance of his instructions which were mainly to create a magnet of attraction while the army swung its hammer, quickly grasped the faults in military government. These were exhibited in the very manner in which he was greeted. "I cannot describe the coldness of the army officers and army men who received us any better than by saying that it somewhat exceeded the coldness of the population," he wrote.⁽³⁵⁾ He saw at once that MacArthur and his military government were incapable of diplomacy in dealing with Filipino leaders and factions. "The army," he wrote to his brother Charles within nine

days of arriving, "is a necessary evil, but it is not an agent to encourage the establishment of a well-ordered government." MacArthur, he informed Root, "regards all the people as opposed to the American forces and looks at his task as one of conquering eight millions of recalcitrant, treacherous and sullen people. . . . I have no doubt that he is a good soldier but his experience and his ability as a statesman or politician are nothing."⁽³⁶⁾

This dispute between the military and civil authorities severely hampered the work of the commission for several months. Both continually complained and appealed to the Secretary of War for the upholding of their authority. Root vacillated and took his time about defining their roles, and eventually put his weight behind Taft.

In essence and in objective, however, the roles of the two were not widely separate, and were complementary. It is perhaps best seen in the way in which the commission functioned as a legislative body. The first law passed by the commission was for the appropriation of two million pesos (\$1,000,000) for the construction of roads; in Taft's phrasing of the law it was described as "conducive to the public welfare," and this was how Taft projected and boasted of his measures⁽³⁷⁾; in actuality it had been asked for by MacArthur for military purposes.

MacArthur was franker than Taft when it came to explaining the purposes of measures "conducive to the public welfare." He said:

One of my purposes was to improve roads for strategical purposes entirely. I got \$1,000,000 gold for that purpose. Whatever incidental advantage arose to the communities was, of course, in consequence of the military necessity. My view was to make passable roads during all seasons, so that by assembling troops at central points and connecting the outpost by wire we could rapidly move from the rendezvous to the extremities, and thereby avoid the necessity of scattering into so many small posts. . . . Now, in the expenditure of that million dollars, which meant two million pesos [it was paid for by taxing Filipinos], there was a great deal of incidental benefit done to the country; but the primary purpose was for our military advantage.⁽³⁸⁾

The same frank viewpoint was put forward by MacArthur in regard to the opening of schools and the creation of an educational system, which the Taft Commission called "one of the most forceful agencies for elevating the Filipinos, materially, socially,

and morally.”⁽³⁹⁾ Wrote MacArthur: “This appropriation is recommended primarily and exclusively as an adjunct to military operations calculated to pacify the people and to procure and expedite the restoration of tranquillity throughout the archipelago.”⁽⁴⁰⁾

Assigned to carry out a policy of attraction, Taft proved himself a clever politician and played his role to the hilt. Adopting an outward attitude of affability and good-fellowship (which included meeting Filipino leaders on a social level, dancing with their wives at functions, and entertaining them in his residence, all to the horror of the army and the businessmen), he went about his task with cold calculation. In Philippine affairs he appears as a contradictory personality, exhibiting sympathy with Filipinos on certain occasions and looking with disfavor on them on others. The fact that the former attitude was invariably taken when speaking in the Philippines and the latter while speaking in the United States was the key to his posture: the Philippine attitude was a smooth pose behind which the colonial aims were pursued.

While Taft was criticizing MacArthur for being an obstacle to “the establishment of a well-ordered civil government,”⁽⁴¹⁾ he was writing to a friend in the United States, John M. Harlan, that any idea that Filipinos were capable of self-government was “ill-founded;” they were, he said, “nothing but grown-up children” who would need training for “50 or a hundred years” before they could run their affairs. The educated Filipinos were “most glib in running off phrases” but had no idea of their country’s problems or their solutions.⁽⁴²⁾ To Secretary Root he confided the judgment that Filipinos were “a vast mass of ignorant, superstitious people, well-intentioned, light-hearted, temperate, somewhat cruel” who were easily influenced by a small class of educated elements that had “superficial knowledge of general principles of free government” and who “like to give the appearance” of a knowledge of the science of government; they were, he thought, “generally lacking in moral character, are with some notable exceptions prone to yield to any pecuniary consideration, and are difficult persons out of whom to make an honest government.”⁽⁴³⁾

While holding this viewpoint, Taft proceeded to draw up a Civil Service Act (September 19, 1900), an act to establish municipal governments (January 31, 1901), and a provincial govern-

ment act (February 6, 1901), all of which were intended to offer governmental posts to precisely such Filipinos to persuade them to cease resisting American conquest.

As for the "notable exceptions" who could not be bribed to yield, Taft wrote to Root urging him "to have a prison constructed at Guam to which we may send those whom we think worthy of a less punishment than hanging. The insurrection must be suppressed for the benefit of the United States and, still more, for the benefit of the Filipino people. The lenient methods, having been tried for two years, must be changed to those more severe."⁽⁴⁴⁾ Among those sent to Guam was the captured Apolinario Mabini. Taft also approved the ruthless proclamation by General MacArthur on December 10, 1900, declaring guerrillas to be criminals to be treated outside "the laws of war."

Toward those who continued to resist American authority the Taft Commission approved the most iron-handed of methods. The modification it introduced was to supplement the stick of suppression with the carrot of profitable collaboration. The Spooner Bill of March 2, 1901, which transferred the direction of Philippine affairs from McKinley as military commander-in-chief to McKinley as President and civil ruler, laid the basis for the transfer from military to civil government in the Philippines. This was formally done on July 4, 1901, with Taft assuming the post of governor general. (MacArthur, resentful to the end, departed on the same day.)

Underlying Taft's critical attitude toward the military government and its bayonet policies was his shrewd awareness that the long-range interests of American imperialism were not served by an approach that disregarded the Filipinos and that generated lasting hostility among them. It was Taft who urged the passage of the Spooner Bill that would create a framework for stability enabling long-term investment franchises to be undertaken. He devoted his term as governor general, from July 4, 1901 to December 23, 1903, to developing an attraction policy that would benefit the creation of a market for American goods in the Philippines.

He sought to further this by introducing the slogan "the Philippines for the Filipinos," which pleased the population but earned him the epithets of the American business community. In a speech delivered at the Union Reading College in Manila on De-

cember 17, 1903, Taft answered his critics by formulating a commercial and investment policy suited to long-term colonial possession.

Hitting at "those venturesome business spirits that thrive best in times of trouble and excitement, when the opportunities for making money suddenly for those upon the spot are good," he described the abnormal situation brought about by the presence of large numbers of American troops who

created a demand so large for American supplies of food and drink and other things, that the American merchants, who were the only merchants familiar with the demands of American soldiers, found themselves with a larger business on their hands than they could take care of, the profits from which were very great indeed. They then in the islands had no need to look for other trade or patronage than this. The necessity for cultivating the taste or the good-will of the Filipinos for business purposes was wholly absent, because the patrons who were making their money were deeply imbued with feelings of hostility and contempt toward the native population.

Urging the commingling of "honor and profit," Taft outlined what he believed to be the proper development of the Philippine market:

The American trade in these islands—and by that I mean the demand of Americans for goods and supplies—can never exceed that of twenty thousand people in addition to the soldiers who may be here. The demand of the Filipino people will be a demand, when created and encouraged, of seven and one-half million persons. The only hope, the only possible source, of real business and of real trade that can be dignified by the name, which the United States or any of our merchants, whether living in the United States or in these islands, can have is with the Filipino people. The promotion of their material and intellectual welfare will necessarily develop wants on their part for things which in times of poverty they regard as luxuries, but which, as they grow more educated and as they grow wealthier, become necessities. The carrying out of the principle, "the Philippines for the Filipinos," in first promoting the welfare, material, spiritual and intellectual, of the people of these islands, is the one course which can create any market here among the people for American goods and American supplies that will make the relation of the United States to the Philippines a profitable one for our merchants and manufacturers.

Taft went to considerable pains to explain what he meant by "the Philippines for the Filipinos." He said:

Does the doctrine exclude the encouragement of American enterprise, the investment of capital in these islands? No; emphatically no. There is nothing which Americans can bring, and I do not except education or a free form of government, which can make more for the elevation and civilization of the Filipino people than the investment of American capital in the material development of these islands. Civilization follows material development.

The doctrine does not include, necessarily, the independence of the Filipinos, nor any particular degree of autonomy. It is entirely consistent with the principle to object to an immediate extension of popular government on the ground that we are going too fast for the political digestion of the people, and that it is not, therefore, for their good.

He thought that when American policy had "made the commercial bonds between the two countries close and profit-giving to both, the Filipinos will love the association with the mother country, and will be the last to desire a severance of those ties."⁽⁴⁵⁾

In the official reports of the Taft Commission the same arguments were put forward for the benefit of Congress and the U.S. government: "The American business man in the islands has really, up to this time, done very little to make or influence trade. He has kept close to the American patronage and has not extended his efforts to an expansion of trade among the Filipinos. Until this is done and more American capital is brought here for the purpose, we can not hope that the imports from the United States to the islands will be increased in very large proportion."⁽⁴⁶⁾

When Taft returned to the United States (to accept appointment as Secretary of War) he continued to press for such a policy in addresses to businessmen. In speaking to the New York State Chamber of Commerce on April 21, 1904, he described "the seven million Christian Filipinos" as being anxiously "willing to follow American styles, American sports, American dress and American customs" to the point where it would be a great boon to the cotton goods trade "except the fact that there are no American houses in the islands that have devoted their attention to winning Filipino trade."⁽⁴⁷⁾

Between September 1898 and May 1904 over 5,000 firms and individuals were licensed to do business in the Philippines, but by the end of that period, with American troops being withdrawn in proportion to "pacification" successes, less than one-fifth of that number remained, while firms of any significant size could be counted on the fingers.⁽⁴⁸⁾ This situation Taft sought to change.

It was not an easy process. Even after the formal transference from military to civil government, the extensive guerrilla resistance and the measures used against it gave the army a dominant role in which it took advantage of every opportunity to discredit civil rule, and to flout its administrators. The American governor of the Luzon province of Tayabas, Cornelius Gardener, appointed by Taft, in his annual report of December 16, 1901, described the behavior of the U.S. Army in his province:

The attitude of the Army, thereby meaning most of its officers and soldiers, is decidedly hostile to the provincial and municipal government in this province and to civil government in these islands in general It is openly stated that the Army should remain in charge for the next twenty years. . . .

Of late, by reason of the conduct of the troops, such as the extensive burning of *barrios* in trying to lay waste the country so that the insurgents cannot occupy it, the torturing of natives by so-called "water cure" and other methods to obtain information, the harsh treatment of natives generally, and the failure of inexperienced, lately appointed lieutenants commanding posts to distinguish between those who are friendly and those unfriendly and treating every native as if he were, whether or no, an insurrecto at heart, the favorable sentiment referred to above [i.e., brought about through Gardener's efforts to carry out Taft's attraction policy] is fast being destroyed and a deep hatred toward us engendered.⁽⁴⁹⁾

The attitude of the American business community proved equally difficult to alter. After Taft's departure at the end of 1903, he was replaced as governor general by Luke E. Wright, a member of his commission. Wright, a Southerner who had fought for the slave-owning Confederacy, was less inclined toward amiable relations with Filipinos. He sided from the outset of his regime with the American businessmen. In his inaugural address on February 1, 1904 he stated flatly that the colony's success depended on the attitude of the Filipino people themselves, and not the Americans: "The coming of Americans to these islands to build railroads and other works of public utility, to engage in agriculture, manufacturing, or the mechanical arts can only be of advantage to the Filipino people. There is room in these beautiful and fertile islands for all. The door of equal opportunity should be thrown wide open for all alike—European, American, and Filipino."⁽⁵⁰⁾

Wright pointedly had dropped Taft's slogan of "the Philippines for the Filipinos" and had placed the emphasis on "equal opportunity," which in the circumstances shoved the Filipinos again to one side. This was well understood by both Filipinos and American businessmen. Wright antagonized even the most eager and willing of the Filipino collaborators by throwing the burden of taxation upon their interests, and eventually had to be removed because of the general deterioration of his regime's relations with the Filipino population.

In his attraction policy Taft worked from the standpoint of a keen understanding of Filipino class relationships and aspirations, and weaknesses. To win the fullest cooperation from the wealthy elements who had no sympathy with their revolutionary countrymen and who had welcomed the Americans from the outset, he encouraged them to set up a political party, the Federalista party, with a platform for U.S. statehood. With crude deception, he fostered in them a belief that the American government was seriously prepared to grant statehood.

Attraction of the landlords, real estate speculators, money-lenders and businessmen who made up this grouping was no problem. Taft's main target was the middle strata of medium land-owners and professionals, the discontented middle class force that had conducted the campaign for reforms under Spain and that had formed the leadership of the Philippine Republic and its agencies. Under Spain these had demanded the fruits of political power in a Spanish province. Taft, Root and other American policy-makers proposed to extend to them the same posts in an American colony: as municipal *presidentes*, provincial governors and board members, members of the civil government's departments, eventually members of a colonial legislature. Spain had denied them this; under American colonial administration their situation was at least improved by its granting.

The indispensable factor in the success of this attraction policy was the willingness of the Filipino middle class elements to capitulate to obtain these limited gains for themselves. It embodied the complete abandonment of the agrarian revolution fought for by the peasant masses and an alliance with the American imperialists for the suppression of any further revolutionary movement from among the people. The behavior of the Filipino ruling classes, wealthy and middle class alike, illustrated the necessary, com-

plementary feature of an imperialist system: the collaboration of the colonial ruling circles with the foreign dominating power.

Under the Organic Act of 1902 it was provided that an election for a Philippine Assembly would take place within two years after the completion and publication of a census. A census was carried out in 1903, and published in 1905. Scheduled for 1907, the assembly election, however, was threatened with postponement because of a spreading upsurge of revolt in the provinces around Manila, led by a young revolutionary, Macario Sakay. Former Filipino revolutionary middle class leaders, anxious for Assembly posts, cooperated in obtaining the surrender and betrayal of Sakay and his followers.⁽⁵¹⁾ These were the terms wrung from them by Taft and his successors.

Civil government for the Philippines, as shaped by Taft, embodied significant changes of approach, compared with the military government. The attraction policy itself modified the absolute surrender, absolute submission demands of military conquest, and the concession of an Assembly was at least the first stage on the road to a form of autonomy. Taft, a conservative imperialist, while realizing the need for such a gesture of concession, practiced a great deal of deception in his relations with the Filipinos ("the Philippines for the Filipinos" was merely clever, false propaganda) and sought to keep Filipino political activity subordinate to highly centralized American control. The anti-imperialist and moderate imperialist forces at home, however, forced an enlargement of the policy, more than tripling the membership of the Assembly as recommended by Taft, for instance. Attraction, a necessity for the suppression of Filipino resistance, was to have broader implications as time went on.

It was necessity, also, that forced Taft to urge concessions in the American market for Filipino landowner-producers. Taft was pressing for land laws that would benefit big American plantation investments, and any such concessions would of course aid these investors, but this was not the consideration that made him call urgently for at least a 75 per cent reduction in U.S. tariffs for Philippine products. There was a political reason in that it satisfied the demands of the wealthy landowning class, the backbone of the Federalista party and of collaboration on which the colonial regime relied. There was an economic reason in that the colonial

regime relied greatly for its operating expenditures on a land tax that it imposed;⁽⁵²⁾ a degree of prosperity for Filipino landowners was the means for a self-supporting colony.

Essentially Taft tried to represent imperialist long-range trade and investment interests of the aggressive expansionist type. His recommendations, if adopted in full, would have created a traditional plantation-mining type of colony, and his attraction policy was intended to supplement this. Contradictory forces operating at home, however, put strictures on economic exploitation and accentuated the trend to autonomy.

FRUSTRATIONS IN ASIA

Open Door to Holding Action

1. The Elusive China Market: Rivals and High Stakes

In the decade between the passing of the Philippine Organic Act in 1902 and the defeat of the Republican party in the national election of 1912, the American imperialist venture in the Philippines, and in Asia as a whole, was adversely affected by major problems in both the external and internal processes of American growth. Problems of strategy in the entire Pacific area affecting the trends of overseas investment and trade were paralleled by problems of change and adjustment occurring within the framework of American economic and political life.

Although the expansionist trends of investment and trade went on at an accelerated over-all pace in this decade, with investment abroad (including Canada) rising from \$684.5 million in 1897 to \$3.5 billion in 1914 and with exports increasing from around \$1 billion in 1900 to \$2.3 billion in 1914, the flow to Asia was relatively minimal. In Cuba and adjacent islands alone, direct and portfolio investments (at \$336.3 million) in 1914 were nearly one and one-half times those in the whole of Asia (at \$245.9 million), almost half of which consisted of loans to Japan.⁽¹⁾ The bulk of the outward flow went into international areas over which the United States at this time had a degree of influence or control (in Canada and Latin America, due to proximity), or where it did not have to contest the ground militarily with other imperialist powers (in Europe, prior to World War I). American interests had no such favorable situation in Asia, and the Philippines consequently became reduced to the status of a sometimes uncomfortable outpost.

Over these years the administration of the Philippine colony remained in the hands of the McKinley appointees and of the original expansionist forces, their tenure secure as long as the

Republican party was in power in Washington. Taft, elevated from the islands' governorship to be Secretary of War in December 1903, continued as head of the War Department to have direct supervision over Philippine affairs, and went on to do so from the higher authority of the presidency after the election of 1908. One of the members of the Taft Commission, Luke E. Wright, after succeeding Taft as governor general, directed Philippine policy as Taft's Secretary of War from 1908 to 1909.

In the Philippines itself, the civil governorship passed from Wright to Henry C. Ide, another original member of the Taft Commission, then to W. Cameron Forbes, from Boston, a millionaire protege of Senator Lodge who had been appointed to the Commission in February 1904 to fill the vacancy left when Taft departed. One of the most ardent imperialists in the colonial government, Dean C. Worcester, remained in the key post of head of the Philippine Department of the Interior from 1901 to 1913. Within the confines of the Organic Act, and sometimes exceeding it, these men still sought in every way to make the Philippines a full-fledged colonial possession of the traditional type. However, bearing upon such administrators were strategic realities in Asia, together with opposition of section and reform interests at home.

On the broader canvas the United States faced serious problems in regard to the China market, the primary goal of those who had been behind the seizure of the Philippines.

Manufacturers and exporters of cotton goods, always in the vanguard of imperialist ventures of the period, were after the market in North China and Manchuria (British textile interests dominated in South China and the Yangtze Valley). E.H. Harriman, the railroad monopolist, owner of the Union Pacific line, and J.J. Hill, owner of the Northern Pacific line, had controlling interests in shipping operating out of the states of Oregon and Washington and figured prominently in the China trade campaign; subsequently Harriman was attracted by railroad investment in Manchuria and northern China. J.P. Morgan interests, especially after obtaining control of steel manufacturing through the financing of the giant U.S. Steel Corp., had many reasons for being drawn to investment in Chinese railroads: principal initial profits derived from the supplying of construction materials, steel rails, engines and cars, plus interest from loans, progressed to proceeds from control of freight charges.

American consular representatives in North China, in Peking and Mukden, who helped pave the way for these interests, were prone to link the American market drive with the Philippine acquisition. One of them, Charles Denby, who had been a corporation lawyer for U.S. railroads and who recommended American-built railroads in North China to facilitate commercial penetration, became, as related, a member of the Schurman Commission. His successor in China, E.H. Conger, hailed the conquest of the Philippines from his Peking post, considering that "next to controlling a desirous port and commodious harbor in China, the permanent ownership or possession of Manila and vicinity would be most valuable to us in securing and holding our share of influence and trade in the new era just beginning in this country," since it would provide "a convenient and essential base of supplies, where American trade, capital and brains could and would be massed ready for the commercial conquest."⁽²⁾

After Conger, as consul general in Peking (1906-1908), came Willard Straight, a direct agent of Harriman, later associated with the Morgan, Kuhn-Loeb and other banking interests, who argued that American power in China was dependent on the extent of actual investments. Straight became one of the mentors of Taft, who had tried so hard to promote favorable concessions for American railroad, mining and large landowning investors in the Philippines, and then, while President, turned to active promotion of American railroad ventures in China.

The American Asiatic Association, set up in the United States in 1898 when war with Spain was pending, established a branch in Shanghai as soon as the Philippines was occupied. One of its leading spokesmen was John Barrett, the former U.S. minister in Siam who had journeyed to the Philippines prior to 1898 "to get thoroughly in touch with the political and commercial situation." Barrett addressed the Chamber of Commerce of New York on June 1, 1899, saying "You of the East, you of New York, Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia and New Orleans, will have Cuba and Puerto Rico all to yourselves; we of San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Portland, Tacoma and Seattle, contend that you should at least approve of our having some interests and opportunities in the Philippines and in China . . . [we] look forward to the successful conquest and control of the great market reaching from Batavia and Bangkok to Peking and Vladivostok, representing 500 million people and 500 million dollars of trade exchange."⁽³⁾

Unfortunately for these vast hopes, the United States came on the scene as a power in Asia too late and with too little force to gain an immediate share in the China spoils. In North China, where the American prospects were felt to be brightest, tsarist Russia was moving down from its Siberian territories to take full control, with large land armies to back this up. (During the 1890s a group of American railroad and other businessmen, headed by James J. McCook, aware of this threat, had proposed to McKinley an entente with Russia in China, against Japan, to facilitate penetration, but this had not prospered, largely because the Morgan interests, which had always been linked with British investment capital in U.S. railroad development, did not want alliances with Britain's rivals.⁽⁴⁾) Imperialist bloc alliances, based on territorial possession and on military presence in Asia, had been taking shape for some time. Britain, beginning with a treaty in 1894, had already chosen Japan as its ally against Russian incursions in China, reinforcing this by mediating the Japanese-Chinese War of 1895 (through which Japan took Formosa) in such a way as to facilitate a Japanese stake in northeast China and in Korea, in the path of the Russian advance. By 1898, therefore, the United States was confronted in its chosen market area in China with strong Russian and Japanese rivalry.

In these circumstances, despite the belief that the Philippines provided the necessary lever for the exertion of American influence, the United States was forced to rely as always on its traditional policy in China, based essentially on weakness: diplomatic maneuvering to win "most favored nation" concessions. The "open door" proposal was the main feature of this.

In the latter part of 1898, Lord Charles Beresford, representing the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Great Britain, had resumed the British advocacy of an "open door" in China to prevent the complete territorial partitioning of that country, which would terminate competitive trade. Visiting the United States in 1899, Beresford recommended a British-American-Japanese-German alliance to back such a move, aimed mainly at thwarting the moves of Russia, which drew much of the backing for its expansion in China from French bankers. Britain, however, shied away from a formal move of its own for an "open door," aware that such a step on its part would not be likely to make much headway in view of suspicion from the other major world powers.

A British proposal early in 1898 for an American "open door" initiative had been declined, but the Philippines was now definitely American and, as U.S. Secretary of State, the Anglophile John Hay was more prone to accept the wisdom of the step. The precise American and British diplomatic interplay on the question is unrevealed, but the draft of the "open door" note to be circulated among the powers was written in August 1899 by Alfred E. Hippisley, an Englishman who had been employed for 30 years in the Imperial Chinese Customs. It was revised to fit American needs by W.W. Rockhill, Hay's assistant secretary of state, and sent out as an official U.S. note on September 6 to Great Britain, Russia, Germany, Japan, France and Italy.*

The Hay note did not propose to disturb the existing "spheres of influence" in China held by the various powers. It stated, in fact, that these would be recognized. What it urged were merely that "the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as come within said 'sphere of interest' (unless they be 'free ports'), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties shall be collected by the Chinese government" (Britain at this time had predominant control over the Chinese customs), and that the powers concerned "will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such 'sphere' than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled or operated within its 'sphere' on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such 'sphere' than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances."⁽⁶⁾

*Certain sectors of American business did not favor the "open door" concept in Asia. Part of Andrew Carnegie's opposition to taking the Philippines had been a distrust of the British support for it. The provision in the peace treaty with Spain that provided a 10-year "open door" period in the Philippines (until 1909), ostensibly for the benefit of Spain, Carnegie saw as a British scheme: "By Britain's neutrality, and by that alone, were we permitted to take the Philippines at all from Spain. But for that, France, Germany and Russia would never have stood aloof, and the price demanded President McKinley has had to pay — the 'open door,' which secures the trade of our possessions for Britain."⁽⁵⁾

It was not until March 1900, a slow six months after its issuance, that Hay formally declared that his "open door" note had been approved. Actually, Britain gave the only unreserved support. Japan, Germany, France and Italy made their agreement conditional on acceptance by all others. Russia's attitude was non-committal. Since there were no outright rejections, the United States tended to claim a diplomatic success. In truth, no definite agreement was reached and the Russian attitude cancelled out the tentative acceptance by the others.

Three months later, in June 1900, another factor emerged to give warning that the plunder of China, territorial or otherwise, faced an unforeseen obstacle: the Chinese people themselves. This was the anti-foreigner Boxer Revolt, which culminated in the besieging of the foreign legations in Peking. American commercial interests in northern China demanded protection from the Boxers, and President Theodore Roosevelt immediately responded by ordering the sending of American troops from the Philippines. These were the first of the foreign contingents to arrive for the joint relief expedition to Peking. This was played up at the time as proving the value of the Philippines base in Asia.

The outcome of the Boxer incident, however, disproved the claim of newly-won influence. Russia made use of the opportunity to move large military forces into northern China, over which it extended its control. The American position in the region showed no improvement. During the Boxer crisis, Hay attempted a second "open door" note, to "safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese empire." It failed to gain any support, except from Britain. When an indemnity was forced out of the Chinese government in 1901 to pay for the damages to foreign property in the revolt, the United States resorted to the tactic of offering to give back its share (seven per cent of 450 taels) in exchange for a trade treaty. Signed in October 1903, its main aim was to gain commercial posts in Mukden and Antung, but this was thwarted by effective possession of the area by Russia, which barred entry to American interests. Coupled with the trade negotiations was a U.S. effort to have three new "free" or "treaty" ports opened in northeast China, but this, too, was blocked by Russia, which went to the extent of forcing on China a convention prohibiting any further "treaty" port arrangements.

A setback was also given to another revealing American attempt. In November 1900, Hay, in a secret move, attempted to obtain a naval base and territorial concessions at Samseh Bay, in South China's Fukien province. This came to nothing, being thwarted by Japan, which had prior claims in the area. The episode, coming so soon after the circulation of the "open door" notes, indicated, as clearly as anything could, the inadequacy and frustration of American imperialist policy in Asia.

A further lesson of American ineffectuality came with the signing of an Anglo-Japanese treaty on January 30, 1902. This came after an attempt by Japan unsuccessfully to get a specific American commitment against Russian advances in Manchuria. The new treaty, while calling for the territorial independence and integrity of China, defined the recognized special interests of Britain in China and of Japan in China and Korea. Its key provision stated that if either country was involved in a war with one other power, the other would remain neutral, while if either country became involved in a war with two other powers, the other would join as an ally in that war. Translated into the relationships of the time, if Japan was at war with Russia, Britain would be neutral, but if France entered on the side of its partner, Russia, Britain would enter on the side of Japan. As time went on, and as Germany emerged as a major aggressive naval power, Britain reinforced its treaty with Japan (in 1905 and in 1911), with the aim of making Japan the protector of its Asian flank while Britain concentrated its naval strength in European waters, against Germany.

To the United States, the Anglo-Japanese treaty bore home the hard fact that it could exert no weight in Asia without the commitment of large-scale military force. The treaty (which came at the time when the American Congress was beginning to consider the Organic Act) had a depreciating effect on plans for the Philippines.

The "open door" initiative and its essential failure, together with the course of events in Asia, had a decided influence on the more aggressive of the American trans-Pacific expansionists. On the one hand, the mere inclination to resort to an "open door" policy was an acceptance of anti-imperialist arguments that expansionist aims should be realized without the outright territorial seizure of areas. On the other hand, it became increasingly clear

that the acquisition of the Philippines did not provide the hoped for leverage for prying open entry to China, which could only be attained by a huge military and financial effort for which Americans at the time were not prepared.

Another salient fact had emerged by this time, that the whole idea of Manila serving as a distributing center for American trade with Asia was fallacious. It was borne home by experience that the augmenting of freight charges due to transshipment and storage costs was prohibitive. In cost terms, it was as expensive to ship from Manila to Hong Kong as from San Francisco to Manila. A member of Taft's Philippine Commission, after living in the Philippines, wrote that there was "as much sense in such speculation as there would be in drawing a map showing Havana to be the 'trade center' around which the adjoining countries to the North, as well as South America and the adjacent shores of Europe, were to center. . . . Why it should be supposed that goods for Asia, coming from America or Europe or elsewhere, should ever be transshipped at Manila for the commonly rough trip thence to the mainland, is a thing totally inexplicable, assuming that one has any conception whatever of the lines along which modern trade and shipping develop."⁽⁷⁾

With the outbreak of the Russian-Japanese War in 1904, fresh currents were set in motion in the disturbed Asian waters. Japan had been encouraged to enter such a conflict by the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1902, and it now received additional support from the United States. In the view of the Roosevelt administration, with its desires of furthering American ambitions in North China, Russia was the main threat to be countered. American bankers, therefore, were encouraged to join with British bankers in helping to finance the Japanese war effort (French bankers, as usual, aided the Russians). This gave the United States a check-rein on Japan's designs. Neither Britain nor the United States wanted a decisive outcome of the war, with Japan replacing Russia in a position of dominance in the region, but preferred a stalemate of exhaustion, and this was what developed. After American and British bankers drew the line at any further financing of Japan, Roosevelt, as a financial creditor, then stepped in to mediate the peace treaty.

Japanese victories in the war, however, produced a result that Roosevelt and his advisers had not fully expected: it fed Japanese

imperialist appetites and produced an insolent attitude toward westerners and Americans in particular. A wave of apprehension rose in the United States over the "yellow peril" which was pictured as poised for conquest of the Philippines after overcoming Russia. Japanese living in Hawaii (the annexation of which and its conversion into a Territory Japan had protested: 39.7 per cent of the population were Japanese in 1900) demonstrated such aggressive attitudes early in 1905 that Roosevelt considered sending a regiment or two of troops to Hawaiian Governor Robert Carter.⁽⁸⁾ Fears were expressed that Japan wanted both the Philippines and Hawaii, and there were reports that Japan regarded the contemplated building by the United States of naval and other military facilities in the Philippines as aimed at itself.

The fact that these fears were blown up without much real basis at the time reflected the uncertainty and sense of ineffectuality that had pervaded the whole American venture in Asia and in particular in the Philippines. Japanese interests in the Philippines itself were then minimal; moves to invest in hemp production in Davao, Mindanao had only begun in 1904, and by 1914 these involved only one and one-half per cent of Philippine hemp production. The main line of Japanese expansion was toward Korea and Manchuria. Furthermore, Japan itself had developed into the biggest trading and investment possibility for the United States in Asia; by 1914, out of \$235 million of U.S. investments in Asia, about half were in Japan, largely in the form of loans beginning with the Russian-Japanese war.⁽⁹⁾

Nevertheless, prior to the opening of the Russian-Japanese peace talks in August 1905 (held in Portsmouth, in the United States), Roosevelt sent Secretary of War Taft to Japan on July 29 for exploratory talks on the Asian situation with the Japanese premier and foreign minister, Count Katsura. Ostensibly, Taft was accompanying a U.S. congressional investigating committee to the Philippines. He asked for Japan's attitude toward the American colony. The essence of the exchange was summarized in the memorandum, written by the Japanese and approved by Taft, that came out of it:

... in speaking of some pro-Russians in America who would have the public believe that the victory of Japan would be a prelude to her aggression in the direction of the Philippine Islands, [Taft] observed that

Japan's only interest in the Philippines would be, in his opinion, to have those islands governed by a strong and friendly nation like the United States, and not to have them placed either under the misrule of the natives, yet unfit for self-government, or in the hands of some unfriendly European power. Count Katsura confirmed in the strongest terms the correctness of his views on the point and positively stated that Japan does not harbor any aggressive designs whatever on the Philippines, adding that all the insinuations of the yellow peril type are nothing more or less than malicious and clumsy slanders calculated to do mischief to Japan.

[Taft] remarked to the effect that, in his personal opinion, the establishment by Japanese troops of a suzerainty over Korea to the extent of requiring that Korea enter into no foreign treaties without the consent of Japan was the logical result of the present war and would directly contribute to permanent peace in the East.⁽¹⁰⁾

The understanding thus reached was a secret agreement at ministerial level (it was not even known to the American ambassador in Japan). In effect it was agreed that the United States would support a Japanese protectorate or domination over Korea in exchange for a Japanese assurance that it would not infringe on American possession of the Philippines. When this became publicly known in October 1905 due to a Japanese allusion to it, it was interpreted in the United States as American complicity in the seizure of Korea by Japan and as a repudiation of the "open door" policy. On both scores this was inaccurate: Japan's extension of control over Korea had been in progress for over a decade and had been made certain in the war with Russia, fought largely on Korean soil, while the "open door" policy had been rendered inoperative virtually from the outset. What the Taft-Katsura talks did reveal was American sensitivity over the insecurity of its position in Asia, particularly in the Philippines.

When the Portsmouth peace talks were held, the United States, far from being an impartial mediator, was committed in advance, by secret agreement, to support the main Japanese demands.

Japan's victory, however, made it an immeasurably stronger power in Asia, quickly taking shape as the growing major rival to American ambitions in the region. Fears born during the Russian-Japanese war grew with the realization that Japan was now as much of a competitor in North China as Russia, and that, with the possession of Formosa, it stood astride shipping routes to China as well as being poised just above the Philippines. The Japanese

navy, by destroying the Russian fleet in the battle of Tshushima Straits during the war, had emerged as a formidable force that the American navy in its prevailing stage of development and commitment could not hope to match in Asia.

Whatever good will had existed between Japan and the United States under the exigencies of war dissipated almost immediately when the peace treaty had been concluded. In Japan criticism was voiced of Roosevelt's role as mediator in blocking the Japanese demand for large indemnities from Russia, which was part of Roosevelt's tactics of barring decisive victory for either power. Undoubtedly also underlying the antagonistic Japanese attitude, however, was opposition to a fresh move by American interests to take advantage of Russia's and Japan's exhaustion to increase their stake in Manchuria and North China. In the summer of 1905 Harriman endeavored to obtain the financing of the South Manchurian Railway.

Once the Portsmouth peace treaty was out of the way, Japan, with the aid of a loan from Britain, in November 1905 quickly moved to take over financial control of the disputed railroad. In the Roosevelt administration there were some who toyed with the idea of a show of military force in North China "to protect American missionaries and traders." From the Philippines, General Leonard Wood wrote to Roosevelt on February 5, 1906 proposing such a step, in which "I am strongly in favor of using the native [Filipino] troops, to a limited extent, as it will do more than anything in the world to bring the peoples together, and it will be the greatest possible compliment we can pay the Filipinos."¹¹ The idea remained on confidential paper.

It was not the end of Harriman's efforts. In 1907 he made another bid, for the financing of a Hsinmintun-Fakumen railroad. At the same time negotiations occurred for a large loan to China for industrial development and currency reform, with Kuhn, Loeb figuring in the talks. The Japanese reaction to this was to revive threatening talk about having an interest in the Philippines. It was phrased politely to Taft, for example, in September 1907 when he visited Japan after attending the inauguration of the Philippine Assembly: he was asked by Count Hagashi if there were any truth to a rumor that the United States was ready to sell the Philippines. In July 1907 General J. Franklin Bell in the

Philippines sent an alarmist letter to Roosevelt, reporting that a Japanese diplomat had said that Japan would take the Philippines, Hawaii, Alaska and the Pacific Coast.⁽¹²⁾

Grist had been added to Japanese feeling by a resolution passed in October 1906 by the San Francisco Board of Education, setting up separate segregated schools for Japanese, Chinese and Korean children. They were to be lumped with "children of vicious habits and children suffering from contagious or infectious diseases."⁽¹³⁾

The effect of these moves and countermoves was most apparent in the case of President Roosevelt, the formerly enthusiastic imperialist who had been responsible to a large extent for the seizure of the Philippines. He was now convinced that the United States, far from having gained a secure foothold in Asia by taking the islands, had actually put itself out on a limb which the Japanese could easily lop off. Roosevelt, who also went to the extent of communicating with U.S. commanders of the Pacific fleet alerting them to possible Japanese attack, wrote to Taft on the eve of his departure for the Philippine Assembly inauguration, on August 21, 1907:

The Philippines form our heel of Achilles. They are all that makes the present situation with Japan dangerous. I think that in some way and with some phraseology that you think wise you should state to them [the Filipinos] that if they handle themselves wisely in their legislative assembly we shall at the earliest possible moment give them a nearly complete independence. . . . Personally I should be glad to see the islands made independent with perhaps some kind of international guarantee for the preservation of order, or with some warning on our part that if they did not keep order we would have to interfere again; this among other reasons because I would rather see this nation fight all her life than to see her give them up to Japan or any other nation under duress. . . . In the excitement of the Spanish-American War people wanted to take the islands. They had an idea they would be a valuable possession. Now they think they are of no value.⁽¹⁴⁾

This rather despairing outlook was not shared by Taft, who did not follow Roosevelt's suggestion; to Filipinos in the new Assembly he projected an indefinite period of retention. Roosevelt, however, considering the American spearhead in Asia in danger from over-extension, took steps to come to an agreement with

Japan that amounted to a yielding to Japanese desires. The Root-Takahira Agreement on November 30, 1908 (Root had become secretary of state) approved the maintenance of "the existing status quo" in Asia and pledged respect for each other's territorial possessions. In it the United States recognized Japanese dominance in Korea and in Southern Manchuria, which lay at the crux of the disturbed relations, in exchange for a Japanese assurance once again of no intent toward the Philippines. The agreement, which demolished further the concept of the "open door," put an end to Harriman's ventures in Southern Manchuria.

Fear of Japanese designs on the Philippines had its affect on the U.S. Congress, which received a number of resolutions during this period for steps toward the neutralization of the islands. These were introduced early in 1906 by Representatives Samuel McCall of Massachusetts and Burgess of Texas and by Senator Crane of Massachusetts. A hearing was held on April 6, 1906 on the resolution by McCall (who had been elected to Congress with the support of the Anti-Imperialist League). The neutralization move was supported by the League (Erving Winslow, its secretary, had been the first to raise the issue, in 1904, at the Universal Peace Conference⁽¹⁵⁾), and the principal speaker who appeared before the hearing was Moorfield Storey.

It was proposed by McCall that "whereas it is frequently urged as a reason for refusing their independence to the Philippine Islands that some other nation would take the islands if the U.S. abandoned them" the danger should be removed by "an agreement between the U.S. and the great nations of Europe and Asia . . . for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands and the recognition of their independence whenever same should be granted to them by the U.S."⁽¹⁶⁾

Neutralization was supported by Schurman and by a considerable section of the press. *The Nation*, endorsing it on January 18, 1906, said: "If President McKinley could return to earth he would be astounded at the change in sentiment. He would hear many party leaders privately wishing the islands anywhere but in our care. He would be surprised at the number of Imperialist newspapers, like the Minneapolis *Tribune*, which are heartily sick of the whole business."

Although the congressional resolutions failed to win approval, the issue of neutralization as a way to avoid the unappealing pos-

sibility of having to fight for the Philippines continued to be raised in both conservative and progressive circles. The conservative journal of George Harvey, the *North American Review*, an ardent sponsor of imperialist ambitions but a few years before, gave space in its September 1907 issue to an article advocating neutralization written by Erving Winslow. The *Minneapolis Journal*, about the same time, stated that "we believe that any American statesman who discovers a way to get rid of the Philippine Islands with honor to ourselves and justice to them, will be remembered when all the brilliant reputations won in the Spanish war and the crusade against the trusts will be forgotten" and contended that getting rid of the colony "would reduce half our exposure to attack by withdrawing an exposed and useless outpost."⁽¹⁷⁾ In 1911 this continued pressure caused nine resolutions for neutralization to be introduced in Congress.⁽¹⁸⁾

Prevalence of the idea caused the Democratic party to elevate the question to the level of party policy in its election platforms both in 1908 and in 1912, urging neutralization of the Philippine Islands through a treaty with other powers.

Nevertheless, after Taft was elected to the presidency in 1908, he made encouragement of U.S. foreign investment one of the cornerstones of his administration. He reversed the position of Roosevelt and did everything possible once again to inject American investment into China. Willard Straight, the railroad and bankers' agent, was given the Far Eastern desk in the State Department, from which he energetically tried to promote railroad financing schemes in Northern Manchuria and in South and Central China. In 1909 J.P. Morgan, Kuhn, Loeb, the First National Bank and National City Bank were encouraged to participate in the efforts.

The Northern Manchuria railroad project collapsed when Russia and Japan, opposed to it from the beginning, arrived at a treaty on July 4, 1910 which definitely divided the whole of Manchuria between their spheres of influence. This was supported by Britain and France, as a means of protecting their own interests in the region. The Hukuang Railway project (Hankow to Canton to Chungking), in South and Central China, also proved unrealizable. Straight sought to join an American bankers' share to an international consortium composed of British, French and German financial groups which were floating a loan for the railways.

The Americans were frozen out until Taft took the unusual step of bringing pressure to bear by going to Prince Chun, the Chinese Regent, to insist on participation (he threatened not to return the \$12 million sum of indemnity paid by China for Boxer damages). This brought American admission into the consortium, whereupon Japan and Russia also demanded and obtained entry.

Eventually the inflated consortium lost sight of its original intent in expanded proposals to handle all of China's financial arrangements. When this bogged down in negotiations, Taft's Secretary of State, Philander Knox, endeavored to persuade American bankers to join another consortium to extend loans to China for the development of Manchuria. This was bitterly opposed by Japan and Russia, and American financial circles, faced with a struggle that would strain their resources, balked at any further prodding by Taft's administration. At the end of 1913, after all the endeavors to promote U.S. participation in international consortiums, the United States held only \$7.3 million of the \$835 million Chinese debt to foreign bankers.⁽¹⁹⁾ A few months after the election of Woodrow Wilson in 1912, with Wilson's support, they backed out of China and the China consortiums entirely. Wilson, after election, also made a declaration of policy in regard to the Philippines that fitted anti-imperialist wishes: "Every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the islands and as a preparation for that independence."⁽²⁰⁾

A decade and a half after the whipped-up imperialist gallop toward the China market, the results were extremely meager. American investments in China rose from \$19.7 million in 1902 to only \$49.3 million in 1914 (in the same period British investments went up from \$260.3 million to \$607.5 million, and Japanese investments from \$1 million to \$219.6 million).⁽²¹⁾ American trade with China, standing at \$42.2 million in 1902⁽²²⁾, showed little improvement in 1914. What is further revealing is that while American exports to Asia in 1900 were 4.8 per cent of their world total, in 1910 these had actually diminished in proportion to only 4.5 per cent of the total.⁽²³⁾

The reasons for the failure of American imperialist forces to follow through on their initial plunge into Asia lay in at least two aspects of their situation. One was the unwillingness to mobilize sufficient capital to throw into China to compete with and to wrest market and investment areas from the other imperialist

powers on the scene: other, easier areas of penetration of a less openly colonial nature were available. The other was the fact that the American government and its machinery of power was not yet prepared to serve imperialist aims by contending with powerful Asian rivals in the sphere of force.

Hard-core advocates of expansion in Asia had retreated to a claim that the base obtained could be used in the future. This view was put by Herbert Croly, writing in 1911: "The chief advantage of possession of the Philippines is in keeping the American public alive to their interests in the grave problems which will be raised in the Far East by the future development of China and Japan."⁽²⁴⁾

The more sober view was put by Theodore Roosevelt, writing to President Taft in 1910 to dispute Taft's China policy:

I do not believe in our taking any position anywhere unless we can make good, and as regards Manchuria, if the Japanese choose to follow a course of conduct to which we are adverse, we cannot stop it unless we are prepared to go to war, and a successful war about Manchuria would require a fleet as good as that of England, plus an army as good as that of Germany. The Open Door policy in China was an excellent thing, and I hope it will be a good thing for the future, so far as it can be maintained by general diplomatic agreement; but as has been proved by the whole history of Manchuria, alike under Russia and Japan, the Open Door policy, as a matter of fact, completely disappears as soon as a powerful nation determines to disregard it, and is willing to run the risk of war rather than forego its intention.⁽²⁵⁾

In its essentials, American imperialist policy regarding Asia and the Philippines during this period was tailored to fit these realities.

2. The Military Problem

Unpreparedness of the United States at this time to uphold a major position in Asia, on a par with that of Britain, Japan or Russia, was evident clearly in the difficulties encountered in shaping a military policy for the Philippines and for the Pacific area in general.

Captain Alfred T. Mahan, one of the architects of American naval policy in the Pacific, had viewed the Philippines merely as one of the "suitable naval stations, in those distant parts of the world to which the armed shipping must follow the peaceful ves-

sels of commerce." In 1899, when he was formulating the naval needs of an expanding nation, Mahan, while conceding that colonies afforded "the surest means of supporting abroad the sea-power of a country," stated that "such colonies the United States has not and is not likely to have." He was thinking in terms of "purely military naval stations."⁽²⁶⁾

The Naval War Board, which was set up as an advisory body shortly before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War (it included Mahan, Montgomery Sicard and Arent S. Crowninshield), recommended the creation of a framework of naval bases running from the U.S. Atlantic Coast through a proposed canal in the Panamanian isthmus to Hawaii, then to Guam (seized from Spain within 10 days of the battle of Manila Bay) and Manila, and further on to a point near the China coast (one of the Chusan islands was suggested).⁽²⁷⁾

When this plan was conceived, the American policy-makers were not yet aware of the problems which they were to confront in Asia. As the debate over annexation of the Philippines developed, it was concluded that complete colonial possession of all the islands was necessary to safeguard naval base and port facilities. This was the limit, however, to which the Naval War Board recommendations could be extended. Hay's abortive effort to obtain a base in Samseh Bay on the China coast in November 1900 was the last fading attempt to realize the originally conceived base link-up. Finally, the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1902, which defined the power relationships in Asia, made it plain to the United States that it could not attain dominance or even an equalized posture in Asia without a very hard struggle in which a strong navy and quite powerful Philippine fortifications would be required.

Over a decade of see-saw debate took place on imperialist military policy for the Pacific. For a time, serious thought was given to the possibility of achieving a strong naval posture based on the Philippines. Plans for a two-ocean navy were projected—a Pacific fleet and an Atlantic fleet—and, in pursuit of this, President Roosevelt obtained in 1902 congressional approval to purchase the rights and property of the French company that had been working since 1881 on a Panama canal (acquisition cost \$50 million, more than twice the exchange made for the Philippines). Work by the Americans on the canal was begun in 1904, but it was a full decade before it was completed and could serve as a unifying transfer link for the contemplated two wings of the

U.S. fleet. Significantly, the Panama Canal, as well as the Philippines, was administered by the War Department, indicating the subordination of colonial possessions to overall strategic aims.

The Panama Canal was hardly under way before major decisions were thrust upon the military planners. First among the deciding circumstances was the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905. This not only demonstrated in general the power of the Japanese fleet as a formidable threat with which to contend, but in its particulars it proved the unfeasibility of constructing a major naval base in the Philippines. Such a lesson was provided by the experience of Port Arthur, which the Russians had sought to maintain as a major naval base in Asia far from their fleet's main bases in European Russia. Not only were the Japanese, operating from nearby home bases, able to besiege it successfully and to capture it, but a Russian fleet sent to relieve it, arriving exhausted in Asian waters and without adequate supply facilities, was utterly destroyed. To American naval strategists, the Russian experience proved the fallacy of trying to maintain a divided fleet, with each wing inadequate on its own to confront a strong foe, as well as the unreliability of a naval base, such as the Philippines, that would be far distant from home bases.

Simultaneously, in the first decade of the century, another potential threat arose in the Atlantic area with the rapid build-up of Germany's fleet. American strategists shared the British view of the German naval menace. From the standpoint of American overseas investment and trade, the Atlantic basin was the critical area, for the overwhelming bulk of U.S. capital and manufacturing surplus was flowing to Europe, to Latin America and to Canada, all within the strategic scope of an Atlantic-based fleet, operating from east coast stations and from the new Guantanamo station in Cuba. Arguments were advanced for building a fleet large enough for both tasks, in the Pacific and in the Atlantic, but in cost terms this did not correspond to the predominant trade and investment pattern.*

*In 1910, the distribution of U.S. private capital invested abroad, totalling \$2 billion, was as follows: \$1.5 billion located in Canada and Central America, \$175 million in South America, \$200 million in Europe, \$10 million in the Middle East, while all else, including the Far East, amounted to only \$50 million. Export distribution was: Europe 65.1 per cent, Canada and Central America, 22.1 per cent, South America 5.3 per cent, Asia 3.5 per cent, Oceania 3 per cent, Africa 1.1 per cent.⁽²⁸⁾

Following the Russian-Japanese War, therefore, the U.S. Navy Department, with the concurrence of the Joint Army and Navy Board, decided in 1906 to maintain a single fleet, with all battle-ships in the Atlantic. In effect, this left control of the western Pacific to the Japanese fleet.

Planning for the Philippine base, in this strategic context, was based on the principle of the holding action. As part of the 1906 conclusions, it was decided to fortify a Philippine site sufficiently to enable it to hold out for a period of 90 days in case of war, the estimated time it would take to shift an American fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific to defend the Philippines from conquest. (Although the construction of the Panama Canal was to cut this time in half, it did not alter the strategy.)

Much acrimonious debate ensued as to the extent of base facilities to construct in the Philippines, and as to their location. This was a problem that had agitated military circles from the moment of the American arrival in the Philippines, indicating that the Mahan theory had a deceptive simplicity. As soon as the report of Dewey's victory over the Spanish fleet reached Washington, the Naval War Board urged the fortifying of Manila Bay. Dewey himself favored the fortification of Subic Bay, about 50 miles northwest of Manila, where Spain had previously chosen to build naval facilities. A new General Board of the Navy set up on March 30, 1900 undertook a thorough study in April as part of its task to advise on naval base building programs, but it came up with a third proposal, urging the choice of Guimaras Island, near Iloilo City in the central Visayan islands, out of belief that a U.S. fleet could easily be bottled up in both Manila Bay and Subic Bay.

The Navy's General Board decided unanimously in June 1900 on the Guimaras Island site, but sufficient doubt remained for it to appoint a commission under Rear Admiral George C. Remey, commander of the Asiatic Squadron, to re-study the question. When Remey submitted his report in January 1901 he reverted to the Subic Bay choice, with installations at Olangapo. It was this that the Navy Department recommended to Congress, with a request for a \$1 million appropriation to begin building. Extensive plans were drawn up for a major Subic base, including fortifications, dockyards and drydocks, workshops, storage facilities for 200,000 tons of coal, a railroad to Manila and a naval hospital.

Congress, however, balked, requesting further studies, despite strenuous warnings from Remey that Japan was turning its eyes southward.

This vacillation was increased by the struggle between sectional and expansionist interests in the United States that went on over the formulation of policy toward the Philippines, which culminated in the Organic Act of 1902. In the wake of this, and of the limitations on exploitation that it embodied, Congress declined to appropriate any funds for the Subic base in either 1902 or 1903. By December 1903 the Joint Army and Navy Board was warning that "The consequence of neglect or delay may be nothing less than national disaster."

With the outbreak of the Russian-Japanese War, some action was galvanized but, although the navy was calling for a five to seven year building program to cost \$10 million (considerably scaled down from initial estimates), Congress in 1904 appropriated only \$862,395 to begin work on the Subic facilities, plus \$700,000 for the army to build coastal defenses. Although the navy kept up the pressure, with Admiral Dewey appearing before congressional committees with urgent appeals, a mere \$100,000 was forthcoming in 1905, \$207,000 in 1906, \$500,000 in 1907, all crisis years in relations with Japan, and years of American maneuverings to penetrate China.

Although appropriations had been made, little of the funds were actually spent on construction of the base. The beginning was disrupted by a renewed dispute over the tenability of the Subic Bay position. General Leonard Wood, in the Philippines, protested on June 1, 1904 against the Subic Bay plan, reviving the argument that a weak defending fleet could be easily sealed up in that base and that the United States would not be in a position for many years to have an adequately strong navy to station there. Wood was supported by the commander of the Philippine squadron of the navy, Rear Admiral William M. Folger. The War Department attempted to settle the dispute by proposing to divide appropriated funds between Manila and Subic facilities. The controversy delayed effective fortification work to the point where, at the height of tension between Japan and the United States in 1907-1908, there was storage space for only 3,000 tons of coal for the navy's ships at the Philippine base, while no machine tools

or power plant had been installed to carry out repairs. Roosevelt, who on June 14, 1907 asked the War Department to furnish him with a plan of possible war with Japan, was frankly informed in August by the General Board of the Navy that nothing stood in the way of Japan seizing the Philippines.⁽²⁹⁾ It was at this time that Roosevelt wrote to Taft terming the Philippines "the Achilles heel" of the United States.

As the crisis situation with Japan mounted, orders were issued secretly for army and navy forces in the Philippines to concentrate at Subic Bay and to transfer facilities from the Manila Bay area to that point. At this juncture General Wood, together with Major General J.F. Bell, immediately returned to the attack on this plan. They insisted that it would be impossible to defend the Subic Bay position, pointing out that it could be captured by land from the rear. Wood cited the experience of Port Arthur, which had been taken by the Japanese army in that way. In Wood's opinion it would require up to 125,000 men to defend the extremely vulnerable 36-mile mountain perimeter that ringed Subic (three times longer than that at Port Arthur, and lacking that base's self-reliant strongpoints), while he felt that Manila could be defended by 20,000 men manning a 15-mile long line of defense. (At the time there were 14,000 men available.) Manila, Wood argued, was the economic and political heart of the Philippines and logically should be defended, although he was pessimistic about any prolonged stand. It could be done by mining the Manila Bay entrance, by fortifying the Bay islands of Corregidor, Carabao and El Fraile, and by situating the navy's station at Sangley Point, Cavite, on the southern rim of the Bay. (When finally carried out, this military policy was an important factor in distorting the whole economic development of the Philippine colony, contributing to the concentration of trade and industry at Manila).

"In connection with all this work," contended Wood, "it should be remembered that the nearly all-essential thing is a strong Pacific fleet, based on these islands, for unless we are superior at sea or are willing to maintain a very large force in these islands, we must eventually lose them. A naval station with an inadequate fleet is of little value."⁽³⁰⁾

In November 1907 a War Department investigation team arrived in the Philippines to examine the situation. They reported

on November 27, upholding Wood's stand. Sangley Point eventually became the main naval base in the Philippines, up to World War II, with Subic Bay as a subsidiary base.

However, the relative precariousness of the Philippine position led to a more far-reaching decision: the discarding of plans to build a major repair base in the islands. After endorsing Wood's estimates on January 31, 1908, the Joint Army and Navy Board drew up plans for constructing the main U.S. Pacific naval strong point at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Roosevelt asked Congress for appropriations for the Hawaiian base in February 1908, and in May \$900,000 was earmarked, followed in nine months by a further \$900,000. This put the seal on U.S. naval strategy in the Pacific until World War II. The success of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 proved how vulnerable even that base was.

Roosevelt, who in 1904 had written that "If we are to exert the slightest influence in eastern Asia where our people hope to have a market, then it is of the highest importance that we have a naval station at Subic Bay," in 1908 summed up the vacillations in military policy as an "humiliating experience."⁽³¹⁾

This military relegation of the Philippines to the status of an outpost on a limb in Asia paralleled the shrinking of trade and investment hopes that had propelled the U.S. venture into Asia as a colonial power. The unreadiness to make a large economic bid in Asia determined the unreadiness to construct a costly military bastion in the Philippines. In the pattern of American imperialist expansion, the Philippines became a salient, a piece of ground held in advance of the lines until the next hoped-for offensive began.

PROBLEMS OF PHILIPPINE TRADE AND INVESTMENT

1. Cotton Goods, Cordage and the Carrying Trade

By the time American colonial policy toward the Philippines had been embodied in the Organic Act of 1902, the difficulties confronted by the United States in its expansionist drive across the Pacific had begun to have their effect in the colony. Equipped now with the authority to grant franchises, to recognize mining claims, and to sell and lease land, the colonial administration under Taft and his immediate successors were in the position of a broker attempting to arouse enthusiasm in a dubious speculative scheme among reluctant clients.

In the fields of both trade and investment the Philippines proved to be a major headache. Complicating the limitations placed on exploitation was the competitive situation that American interests faced within their own colony. Other foreign firms, established under Spanish regulations, had effective control over the import and export trade, with Filipinos conditioned to buying the products of other countries. The only railroad in the islands, the Manila-Dagupan Railroad, was British owned and operated, and the greater bulk of the carrying trade was done in British shipping. Hemp, the chief Philippine product of interest to American manufacturers at the time, was handled mainly by British jobbing houses and reached cordage firms on the east coast of the United States largely by way of transshipment from Britain. Furthermore, the Treaty of Paris had bound the United States (as Andrew Carnegie complained) for a period of ten years, until 1909, to "admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States" (Article IV), a provision which, while cited as an example of "open door" policy, impeded legislation protective to American interests, and enabled all nations to take advantage of this.

The racist, discriminatory attitude displayed by American merchants toward Filipinos contributed to the difficulties of winning a market among the population when such an attempt was finally made. Foreign businessmen of other nationalities had developed relatively good relations with their Filipino customers. As Taft admitted, English, German, Spanish or Swiss businessmen did not abuse or insult Filipinos, in the manner indulged in by the Americans. Furthermore, many of these firms had paid taxes to the Philippine Republic and to representatives of the revolutionary forces while they were fighting the Americans, and this was not forgotten by Filipinos.

Perhaps the best example of the tactics adopted by American imperialist interests to solve this problem was in the cotton goods trade. Nine-tenths of cotton goods, which were the main imports in the Philippines, were handled by British merchants and came from British factories.⁽¹⁾ The tariff act drawn up by the Philippine Commission in 1901, corresponding to the Paris Peace Treaty, was compelled to provide equal duties for all merchants, regardless of nationality, and under this American cotton manufacturers were unable to displace the established British firms. "In fair competition with foreigners, Americans have failed to lay hold of Philippine trade," wrote a well-known British observer in 1904.⁽²⁾

Pressures for preferential treatment in the Philippines came from American manufacturers and exporters. Tricky wording in tariff acts, to get around treaty provisions, was the most common technique. "While no different duty in favor of American products is openly mentioned," said Colonel Clarence P. Edwards, head of the Bureau of Insular Affairs in the War Department, "the articles were so described in the tariff as to allow an advantage to American goods."⁽³⁾ Canned goods were able to benefit from this, but cotton goods still made no headway. An amendment to the Philippine tariff made by the U.S. Congress on March 3, 1905, which re-worded the act once again, also produced no result. At the end of the year, the Philippine Commission was appealing: "Next to the bare necessities of life, consisting of rice and fish, the average native requires a certain amount of cotton goods for his use and that of his family . . . if the manufacturing interests of the United States can command this trade they will gain an appreciable market for the outlet of the surplus supply of textiles annually manufactured there."⁽⁴⁾

Cotton goods, in the form of cloth, were sold mainly to Filipinos of poor incomes. These, for the most part, bought a British cloth called "splits" in the trade, a 52-inch wide textile with a weak center thread that enabled them to be easily split into two. These were cheap, and satisfactory for clothing in the tropics. Looms in American textile mills, however, were not designed for such colonial markets and were able to weave a textile only 25 inches in width, more costly than the British cloth.⁽⁵⁾ An American cotton manufacturer's representative, visiting Manila to see the effects of the revised 1905 legislation, delivered a warning to Manila merchants handling British textiles: "When I return to America we will have this altered. We are going to make it impossible for you to sell 'splits'."⁽⁶⁾

On February 26, 1906 a fresh amendment to the Philippine tariff was passed openly to favor American cotton goods. It heeded a petition from the Merchants' Association of New York that wide looms comparable to those of the British could not be introduced economically in American textile mills. "This would mean an almost complete loss of the present capital invested in textile machinery and an immense investment of new capital in wider machines for this special purpose. . . . Therefore it is found that to place American goods of this character in the Philippine market upon a fair basis of competition with the 'split' goods of European production, it is absolutely essential that appropriate provisions, favorable to the American manufacturer, should be embodied in the Philippine tariff." It was the recommendation of the Merchants' Association that the "splits" be described as "goods improved in condition" and that an extra surtax of 100 per cent be placed upon them.⁽⁷⁾ The 1906 act fully complied with this demand.

The effect of this in the Philippines was harmful to the mass of poor people. In the words of an American missionary:

These "splits" are worn by the millions of poorer people, both men and women, as a staple article of clothing. The material is poor and cheap, perhaps one dollar per piece lower than the competing product from America, but, as anyone knows who has a cognizance of the meaning of poverty in the Philippine Islands, it is as much as a native can afford, and yet, in order that there may be *an additional market for the surplus trade in American cottons*, the Filipino is prevented from buying the article he wants and is forced to purchase a textile that he cannot

afford and does not want. . . . If the inhabitants of this Archipelago had the spirit of the American colonists of 1776, they would rise in revolt and cast every shred of American cotton into Manila Bay, presumably winning by this act the applause of all honest-minded Americans.⁽⁸⁾

In spite of all these maneuverings, American cotton goods had great difficulty in winning an appreciable share of the Philippine market. Out of a total value of \$54.5 million in cotton goods imported by the colony from 1901 to 1909, the American share was only \$4.3 million.⁽⁹⁾ The situation changed only after the expiration of the ten-year period provided by the Paris Peace Treaty, in 1909, when the United States introduced tariff terms preferential to itself, putting an end to the "open door." Within a year American cotton sales showed a five-fold increase,⁽¹⁰⁾ although it wasn't until 1911 that American textiles outsold British in the Philippines, when \$4.1 million worth were sold, as much as in the previous ten-year period.⁽¹¹⁾

Nevertheless, in 1914, five years after the closing of the "open door," an American observer found that "the Philippines would be dominated by British merchants if they were not shut out by a tariff wall."⁽¹²⁾

While a problem of one type was confronted by U.S. export interests trying to bring to fruition the much-heralded colonial market, a problem of another type was *created* by the only American industry that could import a Philippine product without conflicting with sectional protectionists. The product was hemp, derived from the Philippine *abaca* plant, and it was imported by east coast cordage manufacturers.

The case of hemp was a crude and instructive example of how the Philippines was viewed in the limited American business circles seeking to exploit it. For a decade it constituted the greatest part of Philippine exports to the United States and was first on the list until 1912. But it created a problem for the colonial administration. Under the principle that the colony must be self-sufficient and not a drain on the American tax-payer, the Commission government was compelled to function out of its own taxes and revenues. Among these, out of necessity, were export taxes, imposed on Philippine products leaving the islands. Placed in the position of having to drum up investments and trade for its operation needs, if nothing else, the Philippine Commission operated like a special interest pleader before the American Con-

gress and the American business community. It found itself having to fight the special privileges given to the cordage industry.

In the U.S. tariff act of March 8, 1902 the cordage industry won major concessions. Not only were U.S. customs duties removed from Philippine hemp, because it competed with no domestic product, but the same argument was used to make it exempt from Philippine export taxes. Hemp, however, was shipped from the Philippines by British firms in British ships and reached American users by way of London; since, under the terms of the Philippine tariff, its ultimate destination was not clearly defined, it was subject to the export tax (75c per kilo). By virtue of the act of March 8, 1902 the collected export taxes had to be refunded to the American manufacturers. In effect, therefore, the American cordage manufacturers were receiving a subsidy on their imports of Philippine hemp, and the Philippine treasury was being drained of funds badly needed in the islands.

So influential were U.S. cordage interests that when General MacArthur had wanted to close the hemp ports in the Bicol (Southern Luzon) provinces as a measure to suppress Filipino resistance (proceeds from the hemp trade were then passing to the Filipino revolutionaries) Secretary of War Root was persuaded to rescind the MacArthur order.

Between 1902 and 1910 over \$4 million was refunded to American hemp importers⁽¹³⁾, the biggest buyer and beneficiary being International Harvester. This provided American users with the cheapest raw material for cordage in the world. From their dominant position in the hemp trade, American importers then proceeded to drive down the price, from \$170 per metric ton in 1902 to \$97 per metric ton in 1911, virtually cutting in half the price received by Filipino farmers.⁽¹⁴⁾

Continual and unavailing protests came from the Philippine Commission government over this serious depletion of its revenues, which occurred when the Philippine economy was suffering severely from the effects of war and from a wrenching change of rule. "We desire to call attention to the injustice effected upon the revenues of the islands. . . . These refundable duties . . . are in effect a gift of that amount to the manufacturers of the United States" (1904).⁽¹⁵⁾ "It is a direct burden upon the people of the Philippine Islands because it takes from the insular treasury export duties collected from the people and gives them

to manufacturers of hemp products in the United States" (1905).⁽¹⁶⁾ "This money has been taken out of the poverty of the insular treasury to be delivered directly into the hands of manufacturers of cordage and other users of Philippine hemp in the United States for their enrichment" (1906).⁽¹⁷⁾

The legislation which permitted this exploitation of the Philippines for the benefit largely of one industry remained on the books until 1913, when the export taxes were abolished. Taft called it a "miscalculation" that was "pardonable" because the Philippines had a monopoly on hemp.⁽¹⁸⁾ When the "free trade" policy with the Philippines was introduced in 1909, under the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act, it continued the refundable tax arrangement for hemp, causing Congressman Oscar Underwood to compare it with the experiences of the American colonies under Britain that led to the renunciation of the export tax principles in the U.S. Constitution. "If we enact this law," said Underwood, "we write into the statute book for the Philippine Islands legislation which is little short of barbarous, legislation that no government in the civilized world except Turkey, Persia and other second-class nations countenance today."⁽¹⁹⁾

It took ten years of debate in trade circles and in the U.S. Congress before the "free trade" principle for the Philippines was found acceptable. As it was, the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act into which it was inserted was, in its other features, a high tariff measure, and the Philippine exception may not have been approved if anyone other than Taft, its consistent supporter, had been in the presidency. The principle, which gave free entry for American goods into the Philippines and the free admission of a quota of Philippine products into the United States,* had been opposed not merely by domestic producers but by those who argued the unprofitability of such an arrangement, in trade terms.

A concise expression of the arguments in the debate occurred in the course of a hearing on proposed tariff reductions held in the Philippines in August 1905 by a U.S. congressional body headed by Taft. Philippine producers presented their case for free access to the American market, and their pleas were summarized by W.C. Welborn, who was chief of the bureau of agriculture in the

*The Underwood Tariff Act of 1913 removed the quota limits on sugar.

colonial regime. Welborn argued that the rising of American consumption of sugar would easily absorb Philippine production, which would take a decade to reach large proportions. He admitted that, with U.S. tariff duties removed, American consumers would be paying \$7.5 million yearly extra to Filipino producers for importing 300,000 tons of their sugar, but in return "I should not be surprised to see Americans sell \$100 million worth of goods here in 10 or 15 years from now." He was supported in this by a businessman named Lowenstein, engaged in import-export trade in the Philippines:

Mr. Lowenstein: . . . if you take off the duty on sugar and establish free trade with the Philippine Islands, all of this trade, amounting to between \$30 and \$40 million per year, would probably come to the United States, and the more you develop the material interest of these islands the more trade will go to the United States, and in that way the merchants and producers of the United States would be more than compensated.

Senator Newlands: Now that is the information that I wanted. Now, assume that the United States got all the trade of the Philippine Islands, what would it amount to?

Mr. Lowenstein: About \$40 million a year, I believe; I have not the exact figures.

Secretary Taft: It was \$36 million imports and \$33 million exports last year.

Senator Newlands: How much of that has the United States now?

Mr. Lowenstein: It has about \$6 million, I believe.

Senator Newlands: Do you think if this tariff concession is made we will get all this trade?

Mr. Lowenstein: Well, I take it that eventually free trade will be established, and that we will get nearly all of it—say, at least 80 per cent of it, which would be about \$28 million—but, do not forget the fact that immediately upon your taking down the tariff barrier against these islands the trade of this country will increase enormously. Our industries will develop; the islands will produce more, our purchasing power will increase, and the market for American goods in these islands will be very much more than it is at present. I think that the exports to these islands from the United States would double in less than no time; I should say they would double in five years. These people adapt themselves very quickly to American goods; I have been here five years and I have noticed that.

Senator Newlands: Let me ask you this: Assuming that we get \$28 million of the present imports of this country, about what would be the profit on that \$28 million to the merchants of the United States?

Mr. Lowenstein: Well, that is hard to say. Those articles exported by the trusts would yield more than the products of the farm, such as wheat, oats, etc.

Senator Newlands: Can you form any idea of what it would be—10 or 15 per cent?

Mr. Lowenstein: I would say 20 per cent.

Senator Newlands: That would make \$5.6 million. That would scarcely offset the \$7.5 million paid by the American consumer?⁽²⁰⁾

As it happened, the shrewd questioning by Senator Newlands was well-founded. American exports to the Philippines did not reach the \$28 million level until over a decade after that date (in 1917) and did not attain the optimistic \$100 million estimate until just before World War II, over 30 years later. By that time, these figures represented inflated values, and in real terms were much less. Between 1899 and 1931 the percentage of Philippine trade to and from the United States averaged less than 60 per cent. Furthermore, the balance of trade went heavily against the United States, adding up over the 32-year period to a total of about \$400 million worth of Philippine exports to the United States *above* the value of American exports to the Philippines. At the end of American direct rule Senator Newlands would have found his profits calculations not much changed, with the American consumer in effect paying a subsidy to the American manufacturer and exporter engaged in the Philippine trade.

The optimistic outlook on Philippine trade led to one of the more frustrating episodes in the colonial venture. This was the attempt to gain domination in the Philippine carrying trade. Here Britain was also the competitor, and had an overwhelming share in the shipping plying to and from the Philippines. In 1905 this amounted to 60 per cent of imports and 75 per cent of exports.⁽²¹⁾ British shipping had an equal domination in carrying Philippine products to the United States, of which only 6 per cent were carried in American bottoms in 1907.⁽²²⁾ This situation, of course, prevailed in the entire foreign carrying trade of the United States, in which American vessels bore only 5.9 per cent in the year of confident expansionism, 1898, and which rose but slowly, to 8.1 per cent in 1912.⁽²³⁾

Possession of the Philippines aroused American shipping interests to demand legislation that would give them a monopoly of at least the Philippine trade. This they sought to accomplish by having U.S. coastwise shipping laws extended to the Philippines,

making mandatory the use of ships of American registry. They argued that Britain, France, Germany and other powers "retain in their hands with a firm grip their lines of colonial communication."⁽²⁴⁾

Chief among the backers of such legislation were the shipping companies of James J. Hill, the Great Northern Steamship Co. and the Boston Steamship Co. Hill, as owner also of the Northern Pacific Railroad, had the objective of gaining control of the profitable hemp trade, rerouting it across the Pacific and by rail across the continent to east coast cordage companies. He was supported by west coast merchants, especially the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, and by two cordage manufacturers located on the west coast. Hill even presented a scheme for reducing freight charges, by using cheap seamen's labor: he would employ American crews (average wages at \$30 per month) merely as far as the three-mile limit and there shift to "Lascar" (Malayan) crews (average wages at \$3 a month).⁽²⁵⁾

An attempt was made to insert the coastwise shipping provision into the tariff bill of March 8, 1902, but implementation of it was postponed until July 1, 1904. Early in 1904 a bill was introduced in the U.S. Congress specifically to regulate shipping between the Philippines and the United States. It was hotly debated and once again deferred, to July 1, 1906. In the intervening two year period there was no appreciable increase in American vessels for the Asian trade (out of 467 ships clearing and entering the Philippines in 1906-1907, only 24 were American),⁽²⁶⁾ and a further postponement was made until April 1, 1909. On April 29, 1908 the question was shelved indefinitely, not to be seriously revived until 1920. Throughout American possession of the Philippines, in fact, no such law was ever actually applied.

Shipbuilding interests in the United States strongly favored such legislation and headed the committees lobbying for it. It was backed also by trade union representatives from the Brotherhood of Boilermakers and Shipbuilders who claimed to have "20,000 men looking for work" who could be employed in shipyards.⁽²⁷⁾ What was at issue, however, was not the inability to provide ships, once favorable government support was enacted; the issue was a conflict between the various American interests that benefited or hoped to benefit from colonial trade with the Philippines.

The main opponents of the legislation at the outset were the cordage manufacturers on the U.S. east coast (where 75 out of 105

cordage companies were located, due to the old pattern of hemp being shipped through London)⁽²⁸⁾ They fought the American shipping interests on the grounds that freight charges would rise precipitously if American vessels were handed the trade. Ship-owners, on their part, maintained that their costs were high because they were not subsidized as the merchant marine of other colonial powers was, and admitted that an initial increase of 30 percent in freight charges would result. Secretary Root, however, indicated that he was ready to agree to a 50 or even 100 per cent increase, if the bill was passed.⁽²⁹⁾ Cordage companies were especially fearful of Hill gaining his ends and shipping hemp by rail across the United States from west coast ports: ship transport for hemp cost \$11.91 per ton from Manila to New York (1903) but the Manila-San Francisco-New York route cost \$28.70 per ton. Cordage manufacturers, who were succeeding in taking the hemp trade from England, threatened to revert to buying their Philippine hemp from London once again if the shipping legislation passed.⁽³⁰⁾

Opposition also came strongly from other quarters. Suppliers of coal to the U.S. Navy in the Philippines, operating out of Newport News to Manila, argued in favor of using the cheaper foreign bottoms. Hawaiian sugar interests objected to the bill, fearing a diversion to the Philippine trade of shipping they were employing. From the standpoint of the Philippine colony itself, Taft protested that high American freight rates would force Philippine sugar, as well as hemp and other products, to seek markets other than the United States, which would destroy the colony's benefit.⁽³¹⁾

The prospect raised by the Mahan school of thought, of the United States as a great sea power with farflung naval bases protecting its merchant fleet, foundered in the realities and contradictions that surrounded the American foothold in Asia. Conflicting interests in U.S. business circles, plus the pull of American trade and capital to other continents, modified this feature of the expansionist outlook in the same way that other aspects of American colonial empire-making were altered.

2. Railroads, Bonds and Banks

Difficulties in working out a profitable trade with the Philippines that would benefit all sectors in the imperialist system were

paralleled by the problems of attracting the investment of American capital. Rosy estimates that this would rush in to take advantage of colonial opportunities proved largely unfounded. To a degree this was due to the restrictions placed on franchises, and on the lease and ownership of land and mining claims, by the Organic Act, but even if these restrictions had been set aside it is debatable if the trend would have differed radically.

The economist of imperialist expansion, Charles A. Conant (who was sent to the Philippines to devise its currency system), wrote that "the benefit of the Philippines and of nearly all colonial establishments is the degree to which they offer a field for the enterprises and capital of the nation."⁽³²⁾ For the colonial administrators, however, this presented a critical problem. Exploitation of commercial possibilities as well as the maintenance of peace and order and the very operational costs of the colony depended on some degree of development—of railroads, of public utilities, of general communications, of ports and harbors, of modern warehousing and other facilities. Taft, his successors, and their fellow Commission members spent much of their time trying to attract capital or to get around the strictures placed upon them by the U.S. Congress. The Bureau of Insular Affairs, too, kept issuing brochures to encourage investment.⁽³³⁾

Taft, addressing the New York State Chamber of Commerce in 1904, felt compelled to try to remove the effect of restrictions by stating frankly that "the limitations may be evaded if private profit requires."⁽³⁴⁾ Dean Worcester, as the colonial regime's secretary of the interior from 1901 to 1913, was a perennial pleader for the removal of restraints on landholding and on mining and timber concessions, and went to the extent of fostering illegal transactions in these fields to get around the laws. He called the land-owning limits "ruinous," and complained: "What good reason is there for imposing upon Filipinos or Americans who have the intelligence and means to enable them to purchase land and to successfully cultivate hemp, sugar, tobacco, cocoa, maguey, coffee or cacao a restriction which limits the amount of land they may purchase?" The Organic Act's limitations on mining rights he termed an "obnoxious section," arguing that "potential riches, which the people have neither the inclination, skill nor means to acquire, amount to nothing. It will therefore be no loss to the people of the Philippine Islands even if foreigners exclusively uncover the buried riches of the country."⁽³⁵⁾

Manila harbor and port improvements—dredging, building of deep-water piers and other port facilities—were provided for out of the insular treasury. The chief contractor, winning a \$2 million award in 1901, was a firm that had done much work of this kind for the War Department in the United States, the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. It was a result of being brought in as a contractor that the AG&P established a Philippine branch that became dominant in heavy construction and in iron and steel work, benefiting also from contracts for military bases. Advertising itself by 1911 as having “the largest structural steel plant, foundry and machine shops in the Orient,”⁽³⁶⁾ it could hardly be termed the consequence of investment enterprise.

The only sizeable direct private investment that came into the Philippines in the first decade of U.S. rule without strong encouragement was that made in 1902 in the Manila Electric Railway and Light Co. (MERALCO), a public utility venture awarded under contract by the Philippine Commission, to supply Manila with a tramway, light and power. This was initially a \$2.5 million investment,⁽³⁷⁾ made by Charles M. Swift, who was connected with Detroit public utilities (street railways operated by Detroit Edison Co.)⁽³⁸⁾, which were in turn linked with General Electric Co., the Morgan-backed monopoly.⁽³⁹⁾ The Manila street railway was inaugurated in April 1905.

In its franchise, the MERALCO was awarded a 50-year concession⁽⁴⁰⁾ and was authorized to fix rates that could not be altered without the company's consent for 25 years. This company put into effect the highest tram fares in Asia. Its graded fares of 6c and 5c per ride were beyond the means of the average working man, who earned no more than 50c per day. An American writer visiting the Philippines in 1914 found that because of this “most of the workmen of Manila walk.”⁽⁴¹⁾ The report of the Philippine Commission itself for 1905, the year the trams started running, admitted that “the greater part of those who live in the overcrowded districts are unable to patronize the cars.”⁽⁴²⁾

The MERALCO franchise, with its long-term provisions and its lack of restrictions on rate-fixing, was precisely the type of monopoly franchise that became the target of municipal reformers in the United States. It was granted when the reform campaigns were being mounted that put an end to such gifts to monopolies in the American cities, and it was cited by the anti-imperialists as an example of exploitation in the Philippine colony.⁽⁴³⁾

The most energetic efforts by the Philippine Commission and the War Department to promote investments in the colony were devoted to railroad construction and to bond issuance for municipal and provincial improvements (water supply, sewage systems, public building construction). A separate piece of legislation, the Cooper Bill, had to be passed in the U.S. Congress on February 6, 1905, outside of the Organic Act, extending special concessions to holders of bonds in both of these ventures. Philippine bonds were made exempt from U.S. taxes, while railroad investors were given a guarantee of payment by the colonial government of four per cent annual interest rate.

In the case of railroad investment, the Commission government had put forward two alternative proposals for attraction: the grant of lands, as with western railroad development in the United States, or the guaranteed interest payments. The former was rejected because of the land grab scandals created in the United States and because of the sensitivity on the land question already existing in the Philippines. However, in addition to guaranteed interest, the Philippine Commission eliminated tariff duties on the importation of steel rails.⁽⁴⁴⁾

These were unusual concessions, the need for which illustrated the tendency of banking circles to look upon the Philippine colony as an investment risk. Furthermore, the congressional voting on the Cooper Bill showed how strong the opposition was to giving colonial privileges to these financial groups: in the House the bill was passed by a vote of only 138 to 123, and in the Senate by 44 to 23, while an opposition motion to reduce the interest guarantee on bonds from four to three per cent was narrowly defeated in the Senate by only 37 to 35. Actually, the Cooper Bill succeeded in passing only because President Roosevelt used a threat to press for tariff reductions on Philippine products as a lever to persuade protectionist congressmen to support it.⁽⁴⁵⁾

Without special incentives, the financing of American-built Philippine railroads would have been unlikely. Six years earlier, in 1899, a group of Americans, mainly Californian interests, had sought to promote a Manila-Casiguran Bay-Cagayan Valley railroad but had received congressional advice that Congress would never concede the three per cent guaranteed interest rate they wanted.⁽⁴⁶⁾ In 1905 it took a four per cent guarantee to attract any bids.

In part the American bankers' fears were due to the fact that the only existing railroad in the Philippines, the Manila-Dagupan Railway, was owned by a well-entrenched British company and was so strategically located that it comprised the heart of any developed railroad system on the important island of Luzon. American investors balked at competing with the British and demanded a monopoly in their own colony. Taft told a congressional hearing in 1904:

You can see the complications that will arise in awarding concessions to various capitalists unless we can eliminate the English company. It would be greatly to the advantage of everybody, I think, if the person receiving the concession in the islands, as to Luzon at least, should have control of the English company, because with the property of the English company it would be much more profitable for it to branch out in other directions. It would not be subject to the squeezing competition of the English company with its line right in the middle of Luzon.⁽⁴⁷⁾

Taft acted as intermediary for negotiations between the English company and the New York banking house of Speyer and Co., a Morgan interest, for transfer of control to American banking circles. In the agreement that was consummated in 1906, Speyer and Co. became the agent for the railroad, and the franchise it obtained from the Philippine Commission was transferred to an American company incorporated in the state of New Jersey, the Manila Railroad Co., which took over the properties of the Manila-Dagupan Railway, with its stock continuing to be held by the old British company. Bonds to finance extended railroad building on Luzon were issued and sold through the American banking house.

On Luzon, the Speyer and Co. syndicate took the bids for all lines, giving it a monopoly on railroads on the richest island. Terms of the franchise handed to the Manila Railroad Co., after months of bargaining, gave it a perpetual concession, with very low taxation rates (.5 per cent for 30 years, 1.5 per cent for 50 years).⁽⁴⁵⁾ A later governor general of the Philippines termed this "a gift to a private company."⁽⁴⁸⁾

Original proposals, made in 1903, were for three lines, one running from Manila up through the Cagayan Valley to Aparri on the north coast, one running up the northwest coast of Luzon to Laoag, and one south of Manila to Batangas. These were in-

tended, according to the War Department's endorsement of the Taft recommendation, "for purposes of keeping law and order."⁽⁵⁰⁾ Further studies, from the standpoint of profitability and of encouragement to export production, brought recommendations for lines from Manila to Legaspi in southern Luzon (the hemp region), and on Cebu, Panay, Negros and Leyte islands (mainly sugar areas). After the passage of the Cooper Law, the secretary of war announced on June 12, 1905 that bids would be opened on a total of 1,233 miles of track on December 15, 1905.⁽⁵¹⁾

The southern line to Legaspi was constructed because it served the interests of the hemp industry, then the dominant American concern, linking the rich hemp provinces with the port of Manila. From the standpoint of the islands' potential riches, however, the proposed northern lines, into the Cagayan Valley and into the Ilocos regions on the northwest coast, both tobacco-growing areas, were most important. A British observer commented in 1906: "There is no doubt that the completion of the railroad through the tobacco district will make for a return of prosperity to the industry."⁽⁵²⁾ The northern lines were never constructed. The reason could only be pressure from domestic tobacco interests in the United States that feared such prosperity for Filipino growers and used their influence to prevent the extension of railroad facilities to them. These lines have not been constructed to the present day.

The railroad franchise for the Visayan islands of Panay, Cebu and Negros went to a syndicate in which the owner of the MERALCO, Charles M. Swift of Detroit, figured. Swift, with the association of the International Banking Corp. and H.R. Wilson and Heidelberg and Co. of New York, drew in Cornelius Vanderbilt, William Salomon and Co. (bankers) and J.G. White (construction engineers) of New York. This syndicate insisted on the four per cent guarantee of profit under the Cooper Law, and declined to build lines on Samar and Leyte because of "disturbed conditions."⁽⁵³⁾

Only two of the Visayan lines were ever built, on Cebu and on Panay. They proved unprofitable. In part this was due to an initial eagerness to recoup the investment quickly by charging high passenger and freight rates, which stifled the lines' use; on Cebu, the Filipino inhabitants preferred to use the cheaper if slower parallel sea and highway routes.⁽⁵⁴⁾ As a result, the Philippine

treasury was depleted by being forced to pay the syndicate the guaranteed four per cent interest (amounting to \$1,409,405.23 up to 1913).⁽⁵⁵⁾ This caused default on the building of the Negros line, with the colonial government not unpleased to release the company from its concession.

Out of the proposed 1,233 miles of track, only 866 miles were built up to 1954, and after an initial spurt of building following the Cooper Law with its special inducements, construction was very slow. In ten years' time this amounted to but 630 miles (in addition to the original 122 miles of the Manila-Dagupan line).⁽⁵⁶⁾ Within four years after the concessions were granted to the two companies, bond sales for financing construction had fallen off so greatly in the United States that the colonial government itself had to purchase the bonds to assure that the lines would be built. (To do this it had to make use of funds not intended for such a purpose.)

Railroad investment in the Philippines, despite prodding and special concessions, was thus relatively disappointing, failing by a wide margin to live up to hopes of the colonial government.

Similar difficulties were encountered in the other major investment field made attractive by the Cooper Law, that of bondholding of colonial government issues for municipal and provincial improvements. Initially the response was good, as in the case of railroads. By 1911 there were \$16 million worth of Philippine bonds, carrying a guaranteed four per cent interest, in private American hands. However, of these \$7 million, issued on February 1, 1904, were for financing the purchase of friar lands, an agreement worked out by Taft with the Vatican in 1903. This was a move made necessary by serious agrarian unrest in the Philippines and was not connected with the islands' development as such. Almost all of the remainder were purchased in the short period between March 1905 and January 1907.⁽⁵⁷⁾

Following the passage of the Payne-Aldrich Act in 1909, with its "free trade" provision, the Philippine Commission felt this would result in a renewed interest in Philippine bondholding and was encouraged to recommend that it be authorized to issue up to \$15 million in new bonds, to be spread over a six-year period at \$2.5 million per year. Washington, after sounding out the bond market, failed to endorse this. For four successive years the Philippine Commission reiterated this request,⁽⁵⁸⁾ to be ignored each time, until the idea was dropped.

It is significant that the slackening of the minimal interest in investment in the Philippines occurred at a time when American possession of the Philippines and its capacity of defense appeared unstable, in the face of rival imperialisms. The physical loss of a colony in war was equated with a loss of investment.

American banking operations in the Philippines were also conducted on a small scale, limited mainly to the financing of commercial transactions. In this field as in others American interests had to contend with the existing domination of foreign banking concerns: the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. (both British), and the Banco Espanol de Filipinas (Spanish). Steps were therefore taken to hamper the operations of foreign banks. A British colonial authority wrote in 1904: "It was of course only natural and right that America should establish her own banks and should protect the interests of her nationals in every way, but the attempt made by stretching a point of law to prevent an English bank from even bringing in a clerk is but one case out of many in which British bankers and merchants have been hampered in their business. . . . In the adjacent British colonies no discrimination is practiced against Americans."⁽⁵⁹⁾ The Banco Espanol presented a particular problem. It had a charter from the Spanish government to issue notes equal to three times its capital stock until 1928, and the Treaty of Paris had no provision disauthorizing this. The Philippine Commission proceeded to destroy its note-issuing functions by legislating a tax of one per cent per month upon all circulating notes in excess of the bank's capital.⁽⁶⁰⁾ This was undoubtedly contrary to the Treaty but it was difficult for the bank to find a way of bringing a case before the courts in the Philippines.

Two branches of banks in the United States were established in Manila in 1904 (the International Banking Corp., incorporated in Connecticut, and the Guaranty Trust Co. of New York). The Bureau of Insular Affairs announced that "The inauguration of these banks is a great step forward in connecting the trade and financial affairs of the Philippines with those of the United States."⁽⁶¹⁾ A dispute existed between these two as to which should act as fiscal agent in the Philippines; Secretary Root supported the Guaranty Trust Co. and President Roosevelt the International Banking Corp.⁽⁶²⁾ Eventually the Guaranty Trust withdrew and left the field to International.⁽⁶³⁾

National banking laws of the United States, however, were not extended to the Philippines and it was not possible to establish a national bank there. The Philippine treasury was compelled to deposit its funds in banks in the United States. First of the depositories were the International Banking Corp. and the Guaranty Trust Co. Later funds were distributed in banks across the United States, including the National City Bank of New York, the Standard Trust Co. of New York, the Central Trust Co. of Illinois in Chicago, the Seattle National Bank, the National Bank of Commerce of Boston, Speyer and Co. of New York, and others.⁽⁶⁴⁾ By 1913 a total of \$16 million of Philippine funds were at the disposal of American banks.

The lack of a national bank compounded the problems of Filipino agricultural producers. Loans to farmers were seldom if ever made by commercial banks in the Philippines, but as far as the country's overall economy was concerned at this time this was the salient need. Serious efforts were made by the Philippine Commission to encourage the establishment of an agricultural bank. On March 4, 1907 an "act to provide for the establishment of an agricultural bank in the Philippine Islands" was passed by the U.S. Congress; it provided, as in the case of other investment inducements, for a guaranteed four per cent profit to any company that would organize under Philippine Commission Laws.⁽⁶⁵⁾ Attempts made to interest American capital in such a venture were unavailing. The colonial government was finally compelled, in 1908, to set up its own Agricultural Bank of the Philippine Islands and to furnish its small capitalization of \$500,000.⁽⁶⁶⁾ Loans from this were so small as to be virtually useless for those wishing to take advantage of "free trade." As late as 1912 and 1913 Filipino agricultural producers, out of desperation, were attempting to obtain loans from French bankers, who were willing to extend them, but the American regime acted to prevent the transaction in order to bar French loan capital from entering the islands.⁽⁶⁷⁾ It was not until 1916, when a Philippine National Bank was established by the colonial government itself, that proper credit was available to Filipino sugar, tobacco and coconut planters.

AMENDING COLONIALISM

1. Expansion of the U.S. Home Market

One of the main arguments of the apologists for imperialist expansion at the turn of the century had been the contention that the home market and the home investment field within the United States were becoming saturated and that the only outlet for American products and accumulated capital lay overseas. While it is true that American exports and outflow of capital to all areas did greatly increase, more than doubling from 1900 to 1914, these did not reach the proportions predicted, nor did they tend to go far afield.

It could hardly be said that this was due to lack of possibilities in an area like the Philippines. British trade in Southeast Asia, in similar market areas, doubled at a high level from 1900 to 1910, from 17 million to 34 million pounds (i.e., in exchange rates of the times, from \$85 million to \$170 million).⁽¹⁾

In a speech delivered in Manila on December 17, 1903, William Howard Taft, who tried hard during his governorship to encourage colonial trade and investment in the Philippines, explained his relative lack of success by saying that "American capital has been so occupied with the great profits of a prosperous period in the United States that it could with great difficulty be induced to come so far."⁽²⁾ The Philippine Commission repeated this three years later, in its annual report for 1906: "The United States is so teeming with enterprises and industries which are highly profitable that it has been difficult to induce American capital to enter the islands."⁽³⁾

Taft and the Philippine Commission had touched on an important fact that had been underestimated in the latter part of the 19th century, when the horizons seemed to be closing in on American industry: the capacity for expansion in the American domestic economy. The total capitalization of industry in the United States in 1899, when it was assumed to be bursting its

seams, was almost \$9 billion, but within a decade, in 1909, this had grown to \$18.4 billion,⁽⁴⁾ and limitations were no longer discussed.

To a large extent this was caused by a rapid growth in technology and by the opening of new fields of production. The automobile industry, which was so insignificant in 1900 that it was not even reported separately in the census of that year,⁽⁵⁾ quickly became a major area of investment, with over 80 firms soon springing up,⁽⁶⁾ its capitalization increasing from a minute \$5.7 million in 1899 to \$173 million in 1909. Workers in the industry swelled from 2,509 to 85,359 in the same period.⁽⁷⁾

The first tractors began to come off production lines in 1902, and by 1910 there were 4,000 per year being produced and the capital basis was being formed that would boost this to 200,000 per year by 1920.⁽⁸⁾ International Harvester, the corporation that built them, was financed by the Morgan interests. Morgan also backed the electrical industry, particularly General Electric Co., which opened the field for electrical appliances.⁽⁹⁾ Capital for electrically-operated machine tools rose from \$83.7 million in 1899 to \$267.8 million in 1909.⁽¹⁰⁾ Such apparatus as the electric elevator was introduced in quantity as a boom in large building construction took place.

Morgan interests, hesitant to back such schemes as the financing of railroad ventures in China or the Philippines in these years, participated in the expanded building of railroads that accompanied prosperous growth in the United States; internal railroad mileage tripled in the first two decades of the century. Steel production, feeding the new industries, tripled in the first decade, from 8 million to 24 million tons annually.⁽¹¹⁾ This was facilitated by the introduction of the open-hearth furnace, which supplanted the old Bessemer process by 1908. Copper, tin and sheet iron products increased capitalization from \$49.6 million in 1899 to \$217.5 million in 1909. The automobile industry consumed considerable amounts of these metals, as well as of glass (the production of which doubled in the period) and of oil (which also doubled in refinery output, fed by the first great oil strike in Texas, the Spindletop wells, occurring on January 10, 1901).

Other innovations that drew investment capital on a large scale were the telephone and telegraph, the airplane, and the moving

picture industries. The new Solvay and electrolyting process brought a large expansion in the chemical industry, the capitalization of which grew from \$89.1 million to \$155.1 million between 1899 and 1909.⁽¹²⁾

During this decade the proportion of domestic investment to gross national product averaged 19 per cent (in comparison with an average of only 7.6 per cent for Britain, then the world's greatest colonial power and exporter).⁽¹³⁾ Although the value of manufactured products in the United States almost doubled in the same period, from a total of \$11.4 billion in 1899 to \$20.7 billion in 1909, only one-tenth of this was exported, compared with one-fourth of the value of British manufactured goods.⁽¹⁴⁾ In fact, the ratio of U.S. merchandise trade in exports to gross national product actually declined between 1899 and 1909 (from 6.3 per cent to 6.1 per cent).⁽¹⁵⁾

In the United States the greatest home market in the world had developed, and was to continue developing. The growth of mass production on a hitherto unknown scale (to be typified by the automobile assembly line) was due in part to the technological upsurge and in part to the ruthless exploitation of masses of immigrant labor. Internal expansionist trends, however, brought a rise in living standards, in consumption, and in distribution methods that was first exhibited in middle strata incomes and living standards. A vastly greater potential lay in the home market, among the working class, but only after bitter organizational and strike struggles did sectors of the workers, mainly skilled worker categories, win improved incomes. (Henry Ford's dramatic introduction of the \$5 wage for an eight-hour day on January 6, 1914 was not typical of wages of the period or of how they were won.)

Woolworth's, the inexpensive chain store, doubled its outlets during these years: 200 stores in 1900, 400 in 1910 (they were to increase to 11,413 by 1924).⁽¹⁶⁾ The mass mail-order houses of Sears, Roebuck and Montgomery, Ward experienced their expanded growth in the same period.

Only in certain fields was the pressure for protected markets abroad unceasing and even stronger. In the forefront of these was the cotton goods industry, which more than any other sector influenced a continued effort at aggressive trade policy in China and the Philippines. Senator J.C. Pritchard of North Carolina had

said in 1900 that "the Orient is the principal section whose people are by climate and habits the natural customers of the cotton planters of the South."⁽¹⁷⁾ In the last decade of the 19th century the innovation of the Northrup loom had enormously increased cotton textile manufacture, and this made for continued heavy capitalization of the cotton goods industry (from \$467.2 million in 1899 to \$822.2 million in 1909⁽¹⁸⁾); in that decade exports of cotton manufactures more than doubled to keep pace with the investment (\$23.6 million to \$50.8 million). Eventually about one-fifth of cotton goods exports were disposed of in the tropical American colonies of the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Hawaii, where rivals could be supplanted without competition. "These possessions," wrote an analyst of American imperialism, "are twice as valuable to the cotton industry as to American industry in general."⁽¹⁹⁾

At the same time, however, the new opportunities for domestic investment that reduced the impulse for overseas expansion also grew in fields that competed with products to be derived from such colonies as the Philippines. Sugar cane acreage in the United States expanded from 386,986 in 1899 to 476,849 acres in 1909, an increase of 23.2 per cent (mainly in the southern states), while production went up from 4.2 million tons to 6.2 million tons in the same period. Sugar beet interests had an immeasurably greater growth, chiefly in the middle western states: in acreage from 110,170 acres to 364,093 acres (up 230.5 per cent), and in production from 793,353 tons to 3,932,857 tons (up 395.7 per cent). This gave greater strength to domestic resistance to any further colonial acquisitions or the development of plantation investments in the Philippines. Despite the fact that the consumption of sugar in the United States increased enormously in that decade, sugar imports were kept at almost exactly the same level in 1912 as in 1900, in some years falling much below it.⁽²⁰⁾

Increased American domestic investment, of course, was bound in due time to augment the amounts of surplus profit available for overseas exports and investment. World War I and its circumstances were to carve the channels into which the bulk of this would flow, but even prior to 1914 over two-thirds of both direct and portfolio investments abroad went to three main areas: Europe, Canada and Mexico, in that order, each representing

roughly different aspects of the trend—to Europe to get around tariff barriers, to Canada as virtually an extension of the domestic economy, and to Mexico as semi-colonial interests mainly in oil, railroads and mining.

During World War I any further thought of colonial possession was definitely ended by the process in which the United States became a creditor nation. Early in the war British and French interests sold the bulk of their approximately \$4 billion in U.S. investments to American bankers to finance military purchases.⁽²¹⁾ and this included over \$2 billion in United States securities held in Europe. As the war progressed loans were advanced to European allies, totalling \$9.4 billion between 1917 and 1920.⁽²²⁾ In effect, American surplus capital was used to “colonize” Europe. At this time, too, large inroads were made by American investment interests in the Latin American fields where British, French and German imperialisms were unable to keep up the financing of their operations.

As American financial strength grew it was matched by a mounting confidence in its power as an instrument for expansion. The concept of “dollar diplomacy” was a feature of this confidence. Taft, as president from 1908 to 1912, was among the first to recognize this. It is to be noted that his efforts to penetrate China by attempting to mobilize American banks behind his ventures occurred at the time when U.S. military strategy in the Pacific had been modified and its lines drawn back to Hawaii. Taft spoke of his policies in his message to Congress on foreign relations on December 3, 1912:

The diplomacy of the present administration has sought to respond to the modern ideas of commercial intercourse. This policy has been characterized as substituting dollars for bullets. It is one that appeals alike to idealistic humanitarian sentiments, to the dictates of sound policy and strategy, and to legitimate commercial aims. It is an effort frankly directed to the increase of American trade upon the axiomatic principle that the Government of the United States shall extend all proper support to every legitimate and beneficial American enterprise abroad. How great have been the results of this diplomacy, coupled with the maximum and minimum provisions of the tariff law, will be seen by some consideration of the wonderful increase of the export trade of the United States.⁽²³⁾

The anti-imperialists, in the sense in which the term was then used, could find nothing in this with which to disagree.

2. Capitalist Reform and Anti-Colonialism

Intertwined with these forms of expansion from the turn of the century to the outbreak of World War I was the continuing process of reform in the economic and political life of the nation.

In 1902, the same year as the Philippine Organic Act, the municipal reform movement was given greater impetus by the publication in the October *McClure's Magazine* of Lincoln Steffens' first article on city corruption, "Tweed Days in St. Louis," which grew into his attention-drawing book, *The Shame of the Cities*. The looting of municipal treasuries and the bribe control of politicians by public utility monopolies were the targets of such reforms, and the campaign had much to do with the manner in which franchises were approached in the Philippines: municipal corruption was associated with long-term franchises for public utilities, of the type handed to Manila's MERALCO.

The reform drive was broadened to include the introduction of the initiative, the referendum, the recall, the direct primary, and the direct election of senators (who had previously been appointed by state legislatures), in the political field; and in anti-trust legislation and investigation, pure food and drug measures, conservation laws that restricted looting of timber, mineral and land resources in the public domain, government regulation of interstate commerce and of banking, the adjustment of tariff and credit to benefit agriculture as well as industry, child labor laws, and workmens' compensation acts, in the economic and social fields.

Sharpening class conflict, which produced the growth of Eugene Debs' Socialist Party and the revolutionary strike methods of the Industrial Workers of the World, was taken as a serious warning by the more perceptive leaders of American capitalism. Unlike the impulsive imperialists, who would escape the threatened upheaval through colonial conquests, there were others who saw the need for adjustments in the home base. Theodore Roosevelt, an imperialist who re-examined his position to become a leader of the reform elements (called "progressives"), put the view succinctly in a letter to a cabinet member, Philander C. Knox, in 1904:

More and more, the labor movement in this country will become a factor of vital importance, not merely in our social but in our political development. . . . If the attitude of the *New York Sun* toward labor, as toward the trusts, becomes the attitude of the Republican Party, we shall

some day go down before a radical and extreme democracy with a crash which will be disastrous to the Nation. . . . It would be a dreadful calamity if we saw this country divided into two parties, one containing the bulk of the property owners and conservative people, the other the bulk of the wageworkers and less prosperous people generally.⁽²⁴⁾

Roosevelt worked hard to make the Republican party respond to the demands of small business, farmer, wage-earner and middle-class elements as well to those of big business circles. His intervention in 1902 to block the formation of the giant Northwest Securities holding company, in which Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb and Co. backed the merger of the Hill and Harriman railroads, was a response to the protests of western farmers against railroad monopoly rate fixing. The Railroad Reform Bill of 1905 and the Hepburn Act of 1906 nailed this down with regulatory legislation. The establishment of a Department of Commerce and of a Department of Labor were responses to small business and labor demands.

The reputation that Roosevelt gained as a "trust-buster" was a distortion of his position, which was actually one of favoring monopolies as the most efficient form of modern industrial production. However, in his view (1905), "The great development of industrialism means that there must be an increase in the supervision by the Government over business enterprise." He thought that this must be done "by evolution and not by revolution" and by "endeavoring to do away with any evil in them." "We are not hostile to them," he said; "we are merely determined that they shall be so handled as to subserve the public good."⁽²⁵⁾

Interestingly enough, Senator Albert J. Beveridge, another ardent spokesman for colonial conquest in 1898, joined Roosevelt in the progressive wing of the Republican party. When Roosevelt's successor to the presidency, Taft, aligned himself with the most conservative industrial and financial interests and acted as a brake on further serious reforms, the progressive movement boiled up in crusade fashion. The progressive revolt led by Roosevelt in the Republican party in 1912 came up against the old-guard imperialist wing in which Taft was allied with Elihu Root (who was chairman of the 1912 Republican convention and organized it to exclude progressive delegates) and with Henry Cabot Lodge.

Root, author of colonial policy, was openly distrustful of an extension of popular democracy in the United States and opposed the major reforms of the period.⁽²⁶⁾

Woodrow Wilson, elected, as a result of the Republican split, on a "New Freedom" Democratic platform with a progressive ring, gained his nomination in the Democratic convention only when the party's progressive wing led by Bryan swung the convention to him. Although Wilson in his 1912 speech accepting nomination warned that the industries of the country "have expanded to such a point that they will burst their jackets if they cannot find a free outlet to the markets of the world,"⁽²⁷⁾ he promised two weeks after his 1913 inauguration that "the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest."⁽²⁸⁾

By 1916 the Wilson administration had completed the reform process, with monopoly groups gradually realizing that "government control" did not in any way interfere with their operations but involved the closer intertwining of the state with finance capital. It facilitated monopoly interests through publicly-financed government agencies that subsidized them, did their economic research, aided them to find markets at home and abroad, and helped to eliminate waste and inefficiency. Gradually, too, the sectional lines of division between the Democrat and Republican parties that had been particularly pronounced in the elections of 1896 and 1900 began to blur until both parties had features of being all things to all sectors. The polarization of parties along class lines that Roosevelt had feared was thus prevented.

The dimension of the problem faced by the American ruling class and its reform movements was shown in the high vote given in 1912 to the presidential candidate of the Socialist Party, Eugene Debs (he polled nearly 900,000 votes, or six per cent.). This occurred despite the taking over by Roosevelt's Progressive party in particular of many of the features of the Socialist program, which even then did not lose its momentum until the jingoism and repression of the World War I period had been used against it. Nevertheless, the reform movement did have considerable success in containing and absorbing the radical and socialist-oriented labor opposition, functioning as the domestic counterpart or reverse side of the anti-colonialism of the re-

formers. It is significant that when the political liberal *New Republic* magazine was founded in 1914, under the editorship of Herbert Croly, it was financed by Willard Straight of the Morgan interests; Croly argued the proposition that popular democracy would benefit from centralized industrial power, that the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian concepts in American life could be one.

As far as assuring American products and capital "a free outlet to the markets of the world" was concerned, a government apparatus fully geared to serve monopolies in its diplomacy and to the point of military intervention proved more flexible and less expensive than seizure of colonies.

This successful reform of the politico-economic structure of American capitalism was intimately linked with the shaping of colonial policy in the Philippines and of the form of American imperialism in general. The Anti-Imperialist League and other groups that opposed colonial possessions were largely made up of the same people who were in the vanguard of the progressive reform program at home. In most cases they were middle-class elements who felt suffocated by the naked power of the trusts and who felt that it was dangerous to permit them to crush both the form and content of popular or bourgeois democracy.

Their attitude was far from being very radical or revolutionary. In the case of the Philippines, the basic policy set out in the Organic Act of limiting monopoly practices of land-grabbing and of natural resource exploitation and of allowing for political representation for Filipinos leading toward self-government was sufficient in the main to satisfy the reformists-anti-imperialists, who continued to function within or allied with the Democratic party.

In the election of 1904, the Democratic platform plank on the Philippines read [*italics by the author*]:

Wherever there may exist a people incapable of being governed under American laws, in consonance with the American Constitution, the territory of that people ought not to be part of the American domain. We insist that we ought to do for the Filipinos *what we have already done for the Cubans*, and it is our duty to make that *promise now*, and *upon suitable guarantees of protection to citizens of our own and other countries resident there at the time of our withdrawal*, set the Filipino people upon their feet free and independent to work out their own destiny.⁽²⁹⁾

At this time Cuba had been made little more than an appendage of American monopolies, with the Platt amendment of 1901 in operation authorizing military intervention to protect them, the establishment of a major naval base at Guantanamo, and effective U.S. control of Cuban diplomatic and fiscal matters. In 1904 the conservative wing of the Democrats, led by the eastern bloc of business interests, had asserted itself against Bryanism behind the candidacy of Alton B. Parker, and this accounted to some extent for the considerable watering down of the plank on the Philippines as compared with 1900. However, the reassertion of Bryan's leadership, and candidacy, in 1908 changed the party's position very little. (In 1906, Bryan, on a visit to the Philippines, carefully spoke of "self-government" for Filipinos, and corrected his interpreter when he used the word "independence" instead of "self-government" during a Bryan speech to a Filipino assemblage.)⁽³⁰⁾

The Democratic platform plank in 1908 did "condemn the experiment of imperialism as an inexcusable blunder which has involved us in enormous expense" but it merely called for a declaration of purpose to grant independence "as soon as a stable government can be established." (By this time the Philippine Assembly was already functioning along with provincial and municipal governments.) Again, Cuba was put forward as the model, although at that very time a military intervention in Cuba, begun in 1906, was still in progress. Furthermore, the platform urged that "in recognizing the independence of the Philippines our Government should retain such land as may be necessary for coaling stations and naval bases," a statement corresponding to the original purposes of the expansionists. American strategic problems in Asia impelled a reference to Philippine possession as having "brought us weakness instead of strength" which would continue "until the neutralization of the islands can be secured by treaty with other powers."⁽³¹⁾

Essentially the same plank was reiterated in the Democratic campaign conducted by Wilson in 1912.

For their part, the Republicans in their platform of 1904 asserted that by suppressing an "insurrection" in the Philippines they had "given to life and property a security never known there before" and had "conferred upon the people of those islands the largest civil liberty they have ever enjoyed."

Taft, defending at this time the Roosevelt administration's record, insisted that "the presence of the United States in the islands is necessary . . . to secure civil rights to the people and to aliens with vested interests" and that "the more we develop the islands, the more we teach the Filipinos the methods of maintaining well-ordered government, the more tranquillity succeeds in the islands, the better the business, the greater the products, and the more profitable the association with those islands in a business way."⁽³²⁾

By 1908 the Republican party had muted the Philippine section of its election platform and had begun to stress that "education and practical experience are there advancing the capacity of the people for government." The question of independence was carefully left out, but it was asserted that "the policies of McKinley and Roosevelt are leading the inhabitants step by step to an ever-increasing measure of home-rule."⁽³³⁾

In essence, both parties and the groups around them were satisfied that an increasing degree of government by Filipinos could be counted on to protect and preserve American trade, investment and naval base advantages. Their differences lay in estimates of how long it would take to be able to rely fully on a subservient Filipino government. The Democrats felt that a point had been reached where the Philippines could already be given a promise of independence, with a policy geared toward implementing it. The Republican argument was that it was too soon to expect this to have developed, and that the people "as a whole" were not "educated" enough for the type of independence required. Taft, a believer in a slow process, after leaving the presidency in 1913, said that "if we are to be criticized at all for what has been done in the islands down to 1913, it is that we went a little too rapidly in extending the political power of the native Filipino," and he warned that if American authority left the islands there was no guarantee "that law and order will be preserved and there will be no civil commotion."⁽³⁴⁾

3. "Treat the Philippines Like Cuba"

The shifting of the Philippine question from one of whether or not the United States should have colonies to one of whether or not the Filipinos were conditioned enough to preserve American

interests in the islands was a subtle and significant development wholly acceptable to the anti-imperialists and the reformists. In the same way that reforms in the United States spread a veneer over the naked rule of monopolies without really hampering them, so the development of a "stable" Filipino government was intended to screen American colonial-type advantages.

The course of the reformist approach to the Philippine question is well seen in the case of Jacob Schurman, who had been prepared to accept some form of American domination of the islands but who objected to the methods and the form of American rule that were pursued. Although overridden in his differences with the other members of the Commission that bore his name in 1899, he returned to the issue with renewed feeling when that rule had finally been asserted. Charges of treason and of aiding the enemy levelled against the anti-imperialists during the war of suppression tended to silence him for a time, but the revelation of atrocities as the war dragged out moved him to speak out again on January 20, 1902, in a speech that was praised by the Anti-Imperialist League and that caused a comment by General Wheaton in the Philippines that "men have been sent to prison here for remarks such as those of Prof. Schurman."⁽³⁵⁾

During this period Schurman confided to friends "how hurt I feel at being regarded as a jingo or imperialist. The most that could be said of me is that I am a reluctant expansionist; but even then it must be asserted that I am in favor of giving the Filipinos complete self-government whenever they have become unified into one nationality capable of exercising the rights and duties of independent sovereignty."⁽³⁶⁾ He contended that he supported McKinley because "I expected that the American people would ultimately do what the Filipinos desired."⁽³⁷⁾

Following the passage of the Organic Act, Schurman became increasingly active in the campaign for further home rule for Filipinos and for an official pledge of granting independence. His position now coincided with that of the Anti-Imperialist League, which distributed his printed speeches and invited him to attend its conferences. His only reason for not accepting the invitations was his expressed desire not to be identified with the *past* position of the Anti-Imperialist League against taking the Philippines (evidently so as not to be charged with inconsistency).⁽³⁸⁾ Schurman instead aligned himself with "the friends of Philippine inde-

pendence" and worked for the formation of a Philippine Independence Committee, which was finally established in January 1904 and carried on considerable activity to influence the political parties to adopt independence planks in the election of that year.

An associate of Schurman's in organizing the Philippine Independence Committee was Josephine Shaw Lowell (Mrs. Charles Russell Lowell), a wealthy social worker who founded the New York Charity Organizations Society and became head of the New York State Board of Charities. Mrs. Lowell resigned from the latter post when she realized the need to deal with causes and not effects: "If the working people had all they ought to have, we should not have the paupers and the criminals."⁽³⁹⁾ Her action typified the shift by many social workers of the period from mere palliatives to the deeper currents of political action and reform. Secretary of the new Committee was another reformer, Edward W. Ordway.

Among those who agreed to membership in the Philippine Independence Committee were the following:

Charles Francis Adams (Massachusetts), Dr. Felix Adler (New York), President Edwin A. Alderman (University of Louisiana), James M. Alden (California), W.H. Baldwin (New York, president of the Long Island Railroad), Bishop Chauncey B. Brewster (Connecticut), General R. Brinkerhoff (Ohio), George Burnham, Jr. (Pennsylvania), President George W. Chase (University of Maine), R. Fulton Cutting (New York, businessman), President Charles W. Eliot (Harvard University), President W.N.P. Farmer (University of Rhode Island), Philip C. Garrett (Pennsylvania), Cardinal James Gibbons (Maryland), Judge George Gray (Delaware), President G. Stanley (University of Boston, Massachusetts), Chancellor Walter B. Hill (University of Georgia), William Dean Howells (New York, novelist and critic), President William DeWitt Hyde (Maine), Professor William James (Massachusetts, psychologist), President David Starr Jordan (Stanford University), President Henry Churchill King (University of Ohio), Professor J. Lawrence Laughlin (University of Illinois), Charles F. Lummis (California), Honorable Samuel W. McCall (Massachusetts, congressman), Wayne McVeagh (Washington, D.C.), Bishop W.N. McVickar (Rhode Island), Reverend Charles H. Parkhurst (New York), General William J. Palmer (Colorado), George Foster Peabody (New York, businessman), Bliss Perry (Massachusetts), Bishop Henry C. Potter (New York), Honorable V.M. Rose (Arkansas, congressman), Archbishop P.J. Regan (Pennsylvania), Professor Edwin R.A. Seligman (New York), Honorable George

F. Seward (New York, congressman), President Isaac Sharpless (University of Pennsylvania), Honorable Hoke Smith (Georgia, congressman), Judge Rufus B. Smith (Ohio), Bishop J.L. Spaulding (Illinois), Professor William Graham Sumner (Connecticut), Robert Ellis Thompson (Pennsylvania), Professor Henry Van Dyke (New Jersey), Horace White (New York).⁽⁴⁰⁾

A number of these people had formerly endorsed the aims of the Anti-Imperialist League, but the list indicates that a much broader reaction had set in, particularly in academic circles, against retention of the Philippines. The committee organizers were encouraged by the fact that even a man like Henry Cabot Lodge had grown disappointed by the failure of rapid commercial benefits to result from the Philippine conquest. Lodge confessed to being sick of the whole imperialist question: "The American people have lost all interest in it. It has ceased to be an issue," he wrote on May 6, 1903.⁽⁴¹⁾ Mrs. Lowell even felt emboldened to write to Elihu Root, asking him to become a committee member. He refused, on grounds that the Filipino "growth to maturity" would take so long that "it will do more hurt than good" to speak of independence, although he looked forward to a time when the U.S. association with the Philippines would be "practically that of a protectorate over a substantially independent people."⁽⁴²⁾

Schurman, who was instrumental in bringing most of the academic personages to the committee, argued to them that it was necessary to "keep hammering away at the phrases *Philippine independence* and *treat the Philippines like Cuba*."⁽⁴³⁾ To the editor of the *New York Tribune* he wrote to urge "Phillippine independence like that of Cuba under American protection,"⁽⁴⁴⁾ a position differing from that at which Root had arrived only in degree of timing.

On April 22, 1904 the Philippine Independence Committee sent a delegation to see President Roosevelt carrying a petition urging a policy of early independence, signed by 600 professors from various colleges and universities (90 from Harvard, 50 from Leland Stanford, 30 from Cornell), by 50 Bishops and over 60 judges, and by such dignitaries as Grover Cleveland, Cardinal Farley and Andrew Carnegie.⁽⁴⁵⁾ An address was also sent to the conventions of both political parties. It helped to shape the plank in the Democratic platform, but the Republicans were not persuaded.

The essential identity of the positions adopted by the Philippine Independence Committee and by the Anti-Imperialist League at this time was indicated by the League's request to distribute copies of Schurman's speeches during the campaign. Schurman agreed.⁽⁴⁶⁾ After the 1904 election, Erving Winslow of the Anti-Imperialist League wrote to Schurman outlining a plan to organize "a new and unpartisan national organization" and urging Schurman to be its vice-president.⁽⁴⁷⁾ There was agreement on the objectives "to work constantly for the early and complete independence of the Philippine Islands," but Schurman objected to the retention of the name Anti-Imperialist League, and finally declined the offer "under the influence of the belief that I can serve the cause better without such association."⁽⁴⁸⁾

Instead, Schurman, together with Mrs. Lowell and Ordway, worked to create a new and broader organization. This was the Filipino Progress League, which was set up in February 1905⁽⁴⁹⁾ and which he agreed to head. It was Schurman's opinion that the new group should be called the Philippine Independence League, but he finally accepted the alternate name, recommended by Harvard's President Charles W. Eliot, because, as Ordway pointed out, Eliot "stands for so large a body of men who really believe in independence but do not wish to antagonize the administration."⁽⁵⁰⁾

In the Filipino Progress League were most of those associated with the Independence Committee. With Schurman as president, it had Horace White as treasurer, Edward Ordway as secretary, and an executive body composed of Schurman, Charles C. Burlingham, Reverend C.N. Parkhurst, Honorable George F. Seward, Dr. Felix Adler and Mr. Charles Russell Lowell. Among the new members, many of them from leading financial circles, brought in by the broader appeal (its first petition to the government was to abolish the sale of opium in the islands) were: Andrew Carnegie, Robert W. De Forrest, Cleveland H. Dodge, Marshall Field, Honorable George F. Edmunds, Richard Watson Gilder, Bishop David H. Greer, Reverend Edward Everett Hale, Henry L. Higginson, John S. Kennedy, Chief Justice James T. Mitchell, Honorable Henry Kirke Porter, William Jay Schiefelin, Mrs. Schuyler Van Rensselaer, John Wanamaker and Honorable Francis E. Woodruff.

The program of the Filipino Progress League was "to promote the fulfillment of the hope expressed by President Roosevelt that the Philippine Islands shall stand 'in some such relation to the United States as Cuba now stands'," and it proposed to "procure and disseminate information concerning industrial, commercial and political conditions in the Philippine Islands" as well as to "promote legislation favorable to the Filipinos" (such as the opium prohibition). This was necessary so that the colony would not be "left to the exclusive charge of officials whose work becomes more and more perfunctory and of private persons whose interests are chiefly commercial and may or may not be identical with those of the colonists." It was felt that "growth of indifference and neglect must be prevented unless we are to fail in our efforts to benefit the islands politically, commercially or otherwise."⁽⁵¹⁾

With this outlook, the Filipino Progress League set itself up as a watchdog against the more overt forms of colonial exploitation and misrule and to ensure that the guidelines of "education for self-government," to which the colonial regime was pledged, would be adhered to. Essentially, this was the same role played from 1902 onwards by the Anti-Imperialist League, which was more outspoken in its advocacy of independence while the Progress League exerted quieter lobbying influence. Together they contributed to the steady pressure for the relinquishing of colonial-type imperialism and for the evolution of more indirect means to further American interests abroad.

4. The Colonial Issue Is Settled

Two episodes need to be related in the gradual adjustment of imperialist policy to the forces at work in American life. One of these was the last serious bid by colonialist elements, during the Taft administration, to achieve their ends in the Philippines. The other was the conceding of further autonomy to Filipino leaders and the pledge of independence for the colony made during the administration of Woodrow Wilson.

The passage of the Payne-Aldrich tariff act of 1909, with its "free trade" provision allowing 300,000 tons of Philippine raw sugar to enter the United States duty free, inspired a move by

investors connected with the American Sugar Refining Co. (the Sugar Trust) to acquire large tracts of Philippine lands for sugar production. Occurring at a time when Filipino producers were not yet in a position to take full advantage of the tariff concession, the American investment aimed at capturing the lion's share of the quota.

To carry out the scheme, an evasion was made of the limitations on land ownership in the Organic Act. This was done by a carefully arranged set of legal opinions and steps by the Philippine Commission and the War Department that sought to exclude the old friar lands, that had been purchased by the colonial government in negotiations with the Vatican in 1903 and put up for public sale, from the definition of public lands. The former friar-held San Jose Estate of 22,484 hectares on the island of Mindoro, south of Manila, was decided upon and was purchased.

As soon as the sale was consummated on January 4, 1910 it was challenged as an illegal transaction by domestic sugar-beet interests in the United States. Representative Martin, of the sugar-beet growing state of Colorado, introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives demanding a formal inquiry into the circumstances of the sale.⁽⁵²⁾ The dispute that followed was essentially between sugar-beet interests and the American Sugar Refining Co. which was involved in sugar-cane growing in Cuba, Puerto Rico and Hawaii.*

*Beet sugar and cane sugar interests were not always at odds. Up to 1902 and the Organic Act, beet-sugar growers and refiners fought an independent fight for tariff protection and restrictions on colonial exploitation. In October 1901 the Sugar Trust flooded the market with cheap refined cane sugar and forced beet-sugar factories to the wall, buying them up one by one in 1902 through stock purchases. This was done in order to obtain in 1903 Cuban sugar legislation beneficial to the Sugar Trust. This provided for the importation only of Cuban raw sugar to be refined by Sugar Trust factories, and for a 20 per cent reduction in tariffs on Cuban sugar, which was less than the 25 per cent reduction granted the Philippines. This gave the Sugar Trust its raw sugar while enabling it to charge high protectionist prices for its refined product.⁽⁵³⁾ In the case of the friar land deal in the Philippines, the beet-sugar growers in the United States protested.

In the resulting congressional investigation, the Anti-Imperialist League was a participant, opposing the friar land sale through its own representative, Moorfield Storey, and its own legal counsel, Jackson H. Ralston.

Before the Payne-Aldrich Act had been approved, and in anticipation of its passage, the Sugar Trust sent its representative to the Philippines in March 1909 to look into land acquisition. He was J. Montgomery Strong, a member of a legal firm in which Henry W. Taft, the brother of President Taft, was also a member.⁽⁵⁴⁾ Although this firm retired from the scene and was replaced by another when the purchase was actually consummated, the Taft connection could not have been unknown to the Philippine Commission. Arrangements for the deal were handled by Dean Worcester and his Department of the Interior. The Philippine Commission paved the way by passing legislation amending the Public Land Act (originally passed in accordance with the Organic Act) in such a way that the friar lands were placed under a separate administrative agency. Governor General Forbes wired to the Bureau of Insular Affairs on October 22, 1909: "Acts 1847 and 1933 were passed amending friar land act to give government right to sell vacant friar lands without restrictions as to area."⁽⁵⁵⁾

Those involved in the San Jose Estate sale were Horace Havemeyer, a director of the American Sugar Refining Co.; C.H. Senff, who had once been vice-president of the same company; and Charles J. Welch, a vice-president of Welch and Co., a California corporation doing a commission in sugar. All were engaged in cane-sugar growing, Havemeyer in Cuba, Senff in Puerto Rico, Welch in Hawaii.⁽⁵⁶⁾ The manner in which the sale was conducted was undoubtedly governed by the fact that the American Sugar Refining Co. was then undergoing investigation and prosecution for defrauding the government of \$2,134,116 through false weight declarations on imported raw sugar,⁽⁵⁷⁾ and by the legal uncertainties of friar land purchase. Sales certificates, signed by Dean Worcester, were executed in the name of E.H. Poole "or his nominees," with Havemeyer, Senff and Welch, the "nominees," remaining unmentioned in the background. Two hundred hectares were assigned to a Mindoro Development Co. for the erection of a sugar *central* or refinery. In addition, three large tracts of land, totalling 2,688 hectares, were purchased adjacent to the

San Jose Estate, for growing sugar cane to be supplied to the Mindoro Development Co.; the stockholders in the California corporations making the purchases were all relatives or close friends of Charles J. Welch.⁽⁵⁸⁾

Congressman Martin, in calling for an investigation of this effort to get around the Philippine land laws, accused President Taft and Secretary Root of a conspiracy to turn the islands over to the Sugar Trust.⁽⁵⁹⁾ There had been consultations by Dean Worcester and Governor General Forbes with the Taft administration over the sale, and both the Secretary of War and the U.S. Attorney General had approved it. Taft's own desire to permit large landholdings by Americans in the Philippines was well known. In addition, after he assumed the presidency, the Philippine Commission had felt emboldened to engage in other dubious land transactions: 49,727 acres of friar lands, the Isabela Estate, had been leased on January 21, 1910 to a group of Americans in Manila for both sugar and tobacco growing; a nephew of Dean Worcester had leased on April 1, 1909 a 977-hectare estate in Nueva Ecija; the 13,000-hectare Tala Estate had been leased on April 20, 1908 to Frank Carpenter, the executive secretary of the Philippine Commission.⁽⁶⁰⁾ These, too, were attacked by Martin as maladministration by colonial officials having a financial interest in land deals.

Worcester, defending his own role in these transactions, called the San Jose sale "a consummation greatly to be desired both on account of the value to Philippine sugar growers of such a practical demonstration of the superiority of modern methods of sugar growing and extraction, and because of the opportunity offered for profitable employment of Filipino laborers."⁽⁶¹⁾ The Philippine Assembly, however, adopted a resolution expressing an utterly different view, "Declaring the sale in large and unlimited tracts of land belonging to the so-called 'friar estates' to be contrary to the will, sentiments and the interests of the Philippine people" since such a policy "might disturb that peace and destroy that happiness desired with such fervor, because, it [the Assembly] believes that such corporations would establish a ruinous competition with the Philippine capitalists and producers, as thanks to their powerful resources they would acquire predominance in the field of exploitation of the native energies, and that,

once established in the country, said corporation would constitute a great obstacle to the political emancipation desired by the Philippine people in general."⁽⁶²⁾

The conclusions of the congressional investigating body brought about by Martin's protest reflected the antagonisms and the strong opposition aroused by the issue. The majority opinion whitewashed the colonial officials involved and absolved them of charges of misconduct (although it was found expedient to "advise against speculation in public lands by public officials"), but it showed doubt about the way Philippine land laws had been interpreted in its recommendation that Congress enact legislation regarding friar land sale limitations. The minority opinion, while agreeing to absolve colonial officials from guilt, asserted that, "We believe the Philippine Commission has made some mistakes in matters of policy, and have, in our judgment, without wrongful purpose, misconstrued some portions of the organic act that affect public and friar lands." It opposed long-term land leases in general, recommending a maximum 10-year lease period, and declared, "The sale of the friar lands or the public lands in large tracts, as in the case of the San Jose Estate, should in future be absolutely prohibited," since "the whole matter has worked out in such manner as to clearly indicate what will happen if the Philippines are thrown open to exploitation by American capitalists."

Anti-Imperialist League representatives who attended the hearings and submitted opinions were stronger. Moorfield Storey insisted that the provisions of the Organic Act were "to prevent the exploiting of the Philippine Islands by American or other capitalists" and that "no reason can be suggested why the very choice agricultural lands, which were held by the religious orders, should be thrown open to exploitation, or why the general policy contemplated by the act should have been abandoned."⁽⁶³⁾ The League's legal counsel, Jackson H. Ralston, asserted: "It should be a criminal offense for Philippine officials directly or indirectly to purchase or lease lands. Such further legislation should be had as will absolutely prevent American exploitation of the Philippines so long as we exercise jurisdiction over them."⁽⁶⁴⁾

The difficulty of obtaining any legislation by the U.S. Congress at this stage for altering Philippine land laws for the benefit of the Sugar Trust or any other corporation competing with do-

mestic American interests was self-evident. No further action on this matter was ever undertaken by Congress. On February 28, 1914 the Philippine legislature (Assembly and Commission) passed a law limiting all public land sales to 16 hectares for an individual and 1,024 hectares for a corporation, thus formally placing friar lands under the provisions of the Organic Act. The San Jose Estate transaction was allowed to stand, mainly, no doubt, because to have reversed it would have exposed its illegality and would have discredited the American colonial regime, but it was the last land-grab attempt by American monopolies in the Philippines during the colonial period.

Anti-colonialists had argued, among other things, that the entrenchment of American monopolies in the Philippine colony would make difficult any grant of independence when the occasion arose. Up to this time, the U.S. government, still in the hands of those linked with expansionist policies, had refused to commit itself to any projection of independence, howsoever remote. Before the termination of the Taft administration, however, anti-colonialist Democrats had returned to the question with the introduction of bills and resolutions for Philippine independence.

Representative John Sharp Williams of Mississippi had introduced such a bill in 1910, and in 1911 a House Joint Resolution had been proposed by Representative Ferris. In 1911, however, the Democrats won control of the House in the congressional election of that year, and the chairmanship of the House Committee on Insular Affairs went to an anti-colonialist, William A. Jones, of Virginia. He re-introduced, under his name, a refurbished version of the Williams bill. It was approved by the House in 1912 but was stifled in the Senate, where the Republicans still held a majority.

The Jones Bill proposed in 1912 was "to establish a qualified independent government for the Philippines and to fix the date when such qualified independence shall become absolute and complete." Although this bill was defeated, the subsequent election of Woodrow Wilson later in the same year, and the capture of both House and Senate by the Democrats, brought the question of imperialist policy in Asia again into the arena. The lines were drawn when President Wilson declared in a post-election speech: "The Philippines are at present our frontier but I hope we presently are to deprive ourselves of that frontier."

Following the inauguration of the Philippine Assembly in 1907, which the anti-colonialists regarded as a basic step toward Filipino autonomy, the retentionist forces had dug in their heels and retarded any further development in that direction. In the American colonial regime, all the key administrative posts were kept firmly in American hands, from the Philippine Commission down to bureau heads, assistant bureau heads, the heads of other offices and provincial and judicial posts. The number of Americans in the colonial service had actually increased, from 2,479 in 1908 to 2,680 in 1912.⁽⁶⁵⁾

President Taft, in his final message to Congress on insular affairs on December 6, 1912 denounced the Jones Bill as "a disguised policy of scuttle, " and attacked the proposal to extend further autonomy to Filipinos who required "constant support and supervision at every step by Americans," predicting "dissension and disorder" as a result. He said that "an enormous increase in the commercial development of the islands has been made since they were virtually granted free access to our markets three years ago, with every prospect of increasing development and diversified industries. Freed from American control such development is bound to decline."⁽⁶⁶⁾ The National City Bank concurred in this view with a long circular opposing steps toward independence.⁽⁶⁷⁾ Taft took to stumping the country, opposing the idea of independence: "The expense of maintaining troops in the islands is practically nil, and I always will be opposed to any measure looking to their freedom."⁽⁶⁸⁾ "If we are to be criticized at all for what has been done in the islands down to 1913, it is that we went a little too rapidly in extending the political power of the native Filipino."⁽⁶⁹⁾ Almost all those who had held leading posts in colonial administration took a similar public view.

In the Philippines itself, the Democratic party organization, made up of businessmen and officials, virtually endorsed the Taft position. Although it was split into two factions, both opposed independence. One faction called for liberalized land and mining laws in the islands and urged legislation that would "invite and induce the investment of capital in the Philippine Islands and ensure it proper protection after it shall have been so invested." The other faction urged that the Philippines be made "an integral part and territory of the United States of America" with a territorial government similar to that of Canada or Australia. Gov-

ernor General Forbes, for his part, continued to echo the already exploded main theory of the expansionists, that the proponents of independence in the United States "did not realize . . . the advantages of a depot at the gateway of China."

As the issue was debated within the Democratic party and in the congressional committees, it became apparent that the question of independence as such was not primary in the minds of the anti-colonialists. The basic question was whether or not American interests in the Philippines could be guaranteed with full autonomy in the hands of Filipinos. In the Democratic platforms in both 1908 and 1912 this was what had been emphasized in the formulation favoring "an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose to recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands *as soon as a stable government can be established.*" As Governor General Forbes pointed out, "The real question between the parties may very well simmer down to a definition of the word 'stable'."⁽⁷⁰⁾

The first Jones Bill that failed of adoption in 1912 had contained a provision for a grant of independence eight years after the passage of the act. Much of the opposition from the old guard expansionists had stemmed from this feature. When the second Jones Bill was introduced following the election of Wilson, the specific dating of independence was removed. Entitled, "An Act to declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the future political status of the people of the Philippine Islands, and to provide a more autonomous government for those Islands," it confined its reference to independence to the preamble:

Whereas it was never the intention of the people of the United States in the incipency of the war with Spain to make it a war of conquest or for territorial aggrandizement; and

Whereas it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein; and

Whereas for the speedy accomplishment of such purpose it is desirable to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them without, in the meantime, impairing the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the people of the United States, in order that, by the use and exercise of

popular franchise and governmental powers, they may be better prepared to fully assume the responsibilities and enjoy all the privileges of complete independence. . . .

In its details, the Bill provided for a second branch of legislature to be created, the Philippine Senate, which replaced the Philippine Commission. In other words, within the confines of the Organic Act and subsidiary colonial legislation, domestic affairs were put in the hands of Filipinos. Veto power, however, was retained by the American governor general over all matters relating to American sovereignty and to rights of American citizens in the Philippines. In the implications clearly readable in the Jones Bill, independence was promised whenever Filipinos could prove that they effectively would safeguard American trade, investment and strategic interests in the islands.

It took nearly three years of hearings, debate and electoral changes in Congress before the Jones Bill was finally approved, on August 29, 1916. In that period a number of critical events and trends occurred that had a major effect on policy-makers and on congressional groupings, making the passage of the bill possible.

Most important of these was the tremendous shift of American imperialist attention to Europe as a consequence of the outbreak of World War I. The financial resources of the nation were poured into war loans, primarily, and into the related acquisition of European holdings in the United States and the expansion of industrial capacity for war purposes. In addition, increased attention went to the Latin American region, to enter the gaps made by the inability of European powers to sustain their stake in that area. Coupled with these financial orientations was the focusing of U.S. naval and army forces in the Atlantic and European sectors, proving the soundness of the military strategy devised in the first decade of the century.

A diminished interest in the Philippines came also from conditions in the colony itself. Difficulties faced one of the major investments in the islands, in railroads. The Philippine Railway Co.'s lines in Cebu and Panay had never proved profitable, and by 1915 the colonial government had paid out about \$2 million to make up the four per cent bonded interest. Now the sounder

Manila Railroad Co. on Luzon ran into similar trouble. In 1914 the colonial government had to make up \$25,818 in guaranteed interest, which rose to \$41,500 in 1915. Furthermore, it had to extend track-construction loans to the railroad amounting to \$2.8 million by 1915. In that year, therefore, the colonial government felt compelled to take steps to purchase the Manila Railroad Co.⁽⁷¹⁾

Due to lack of private investment in the colony's development, the colonial regime had to resort to creating government corporations, including a National Development Co., a National Coal Co., and a National Cement Co. More important, although the demand for raw materials was rising in U.S. war industry, Filipino agricultural producers had no real credit sources to expand production to take advantage of it. Consequently a Philippine National Bank was created in 1916 to provide financing mainly for the sugar and copra industries. This involved, in part, the transfer of Philippine funds from their depositories in U.S. banks to the new Philippine bank.

United States trade with the Philippines, which had risen considerably after the passage of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, had levelled off and even suffered a decline. Exports to the Philippines, at \$25.4 million in 1913, fell off to \$22.9 million in 1916.⁽⁷²⁾

Together with these trends was another, ominous product of the war. This was the advantage taken by Japan to improve its position in China at the expense of the other, preoccupied powers. Japan declared war on Germany and immediately attacked and seized the German base of penetration in Tsingtao and the Shantung peninsula. On January 18, 1915 the Japanese presented China with their notorious Twenty-One Demands that virtually meant the Japanese domination of China, particularly in the Manchuria-North China region once coveted by American interests. Although the Demands were considerably modified as a result of protests from the other powers, including the United States, Japan remained during the war the principal source of loan capital for China and gained most of its aims.

As usual, the display of power by Japan had its effect on American attitudes toward the Philippines. It undoubtedly hastened the moves to make a promise of independence to the Filipinos, on grounds that it showed unaggressive intent by the United States in Asia, thus removing an excuse for Japan to adopt any hostile posture toward U.S. presence in the Philippines.

The Japanese moves contributed to the most remarkable development in regard to the Jones Bill when it came up for a vote in the U.S. Congress in 1916. When it reached the Senate, after passing the House without difficulty, Senator James P. Clarke of Arkansas added an amendment that independence would be granted not less than two years and not more than four years after passage of the act. (His initial proposal was for not less than one year or more than two years, altered only at the personal intervention of President Wilson.⁽⁷³⁾) This would give the Philippines independence before August 1920.

Clarke said frankly that he would be willing to let Japan have the Philippines.⁽⁷⁴⁾ His own state of Arkansas grew sugar, and the most active of his supporters in the Senate (LaFollete of Wisconsin, Williams of Mississippi, Shafroth of Colorado, Hitchcock of Nebraska and Ashurst of Arizona) came from sugar-beet growing or refining regions. The Senate vote on the Clarke Amendment was 41 to 41, and the Vice-President, Thomas R. Marshall, cast the deciding vote in favor.

This astonishing development, which went beyond administration policy, overrode not only Philippine trade and investment interests but also the opposition of military quarters. The Secretary of War, Lindley M. Garrison, unable to block it, submitted his resignation to Wilson.

The bill, in its amended form, showed a possibility of being accepted by the House. Its opponents could only defeat the Clarke Amendment by the rather desperate move of calling upon the Catholic Church to put pressure on Catholic congressmen. It was Taft who took the lead in organizing Catholic opposition. In the Philippines, the Catholic Church was alarmed over the fate of its properties in the event of independence, still having memory of the confiscation of friar lands by the First Philippine Republic. In Manila alone, in 1914, Church property was valued at \$50 million.⁽⁷⁵⁾ The American Cardinal Gibbons declared that "I am convinced that, for the present, at least, the welfare of the islands will be better safeguarded under the care and direction of the United States." Led by the Catholic Congressman Fitzgerald of New York, 30 Democrats shifted to the Republican opposition to defeat the amendment. The Jones Bill itself was passed in its original form, without an independence date.

As policy, the Jones Act set the seal on a process that had been speeded up from the time Woodrow Wilson had assumed office.

Within a few months steps were taken by his administration to overturn the colonial regime in the Philippines, to oust the old guard hangovers from the "Empire days," and to hasten Filipinization. The number of Americans serving in the colonial government plummeted from 2,623 in 1913 to 582 by 1920.⁽⁷⁶⁾ Preliminary to the creation of a Philippine Senate, a majority of Filipinos was placed on a completely refurbished Commission.

Maneuvering took place over the choice of a man to carry out this planned policy. The Anti-Imperialist League recommended the noted incorruptible reformer, Thomas Mott Osborne.⁽⁷⁷⁾ However, the Filipino leaders, through their resident commissioner, Manuel L. Quezon, wanted Francis Burton Harrison, a Tammany Hall congressman from New York, who was the ranking member of the House Ways and Means Committee.⁽⁷⁸⁾ Wilson appointed Harrison as governor general, a significant choice of a politician to handle what became essentially the shaping of colonial politics to fit the new imperialist design.

In the Philippines itself, the Filipinos who had been taken into the structure of the colonial regime sought to give evidence that they were ready to conduct a "stable government" as the anti-colonialists conceived of it. A resolution by the Philippine Assembly, adopted after the arrival of Harrison in the islands, asserted that it would "fully demonstrate the present capacity of the Filipino people to establish a government of its own and guarantee in a permanent manner the safety under such government of the life, property and liberty of the residents of the Islands, national as well as foreign."⁽⁷⁹⁾ The attitude was summed up by Sergio Osmena, who had been Speaker of the Philippine Assembly from its inception, in commenting on the implications of the Jones Act: "The Filipinos know that theirs is now an autonomous regime; that they, and not the Governor-general, are being subjected to a test; that they, and not the Governor-general, are in duty bound to establish a stable government here."⁽⁸⁰⁾

Perhaps the greater reassurance, however, came from reactions in certain Filipino quarters to the Clarke Amendment. It was reported that numerous signed petitions were sent to Governor General Harrison or to Washington vigorously opposing any American withdrawal from the islands and calling for dropping any further consideration of independence for at least 20 years. These came mainly from "the great sugar planters of the southern

provinces, who realize that the prosperity and indeed the very existence of their trade depends upon continued connection with the United States."⁽⁸¹⁾ The sugar planters had become the dominant economic group in the Philippines and their power was growing in the islands' politics and finances. In the virtually one-party rule in the Philippines of the Nacionalista party the influence of the "sugar bloc" was strong and undoubtedly lay behind the report by *The New York Times* correspondent in Manila on February 12, 1916 (following the Senate approval of the Clarke Amendment) that Filipino political leaders privately opposed the measure.

Among anti-colonialists in the United States there were varying reactions to the Jones Act as finally adopted and to the attitudes of Filipino leaders. Schurman agreed with setting a time limit for granting independence because "sovereignty is no longer regarded by the American people as an advantage" but he favored the provisions of the Jones Act because it "leaves the United States with all the advantages it holds at present."⁽⁸²⁾ The Anti-Imperialist League, which had backed the original Jones Bill and had repeatedly petitioned Congress for its passage from 1912 onwards (Moorfield Storey had participated in formulating the bill), was not satisfied with the approved Act because of the indefinite promise of independence, which might be reversed or permanently postponed by future administrations.

Within the Anti-Imperialist League, however, a major point of dissension arose over the attitude of the Filipino political leaders. Although the League disliked the final Jones Act it "had to be satisfied because the representatives of the Filipinos were." It was the opinion of League leaders that the next step should be to fight for immediate independence, and that this should be pushed in Congress before the election of 1920. When leaders of a Philippine Independence Mission, sent to the United States in 1919, failed to press hard for this, with the excuse that it "was not opportune," League leaders became impatient with them. It was all too plain that in the pursuit of "stable government" in the Philippines the views of the "sugar bloc" were prevailing.

One League leader, Fiske Warren, wrote that he "doubted the sincerity of some of the Filipino leaders in their demand for immediate independence." In his opinion, "they were asking for it only because it would mean political death in the Philippine Is-

lands to waver in its advocacy." Erving Winslow, the League's secretary, went to the point of openly criticizing Manuel Quezon, the Independence Mission's head. Winslow feared that cooperation in "stable government" would be carried so far by the small but powerful Filipino groups benefitting from the colonial "free trade" relationship that the relinquishment of the colony would be frustrated. With this Moorfield Storey disagreed, and the resulting dispute over the outcome of the Jones Act brought many resignations from the League.⁽⁸³⁾

The dispute, however, was over the timing of independence, which the Jones Act had made inevitable, and not over the essential content of the Act. "Stable government," in the view of all sectors in the American government, was one that would protect and perpetuate American "rights" in the Philippines. In the opinion of many, the 20 years between the passage of the Jones Act and the final grant of independence in 1946 was an unnecessary period of delay. The issue of an American colonial system was settled, and the continuation of the Philippine colony during that time was an anachronism in American imperialist policy.

BALANCE SHEET

1. Questions of Cost and Profit

The controversy over a Philippine policy, and over the whole question of colonial possession to which it was related, has been called one of the "great debates" in American history. It has also been one of the least understood debates, and one not easily nor finally resolved. Aspects and features of it, in fact, in other forms, have persistently reappeared in American life, and continue to do so until the present time.

From 1898 onwards, this great debate was over whether the expansion of American trade and investment outside the borders of the United States should occur with or without the customary imperialist possession of colonies. Involved essentially in the outcome was the development of what has come to be known as "neo-colonialism," a system in which all the advantages and pertinent features of colonial domination are maintained in an exploited country without its outright possession as a colony.

From its evolvment in the 19th century, modern imperialism did not always find it necessary, or possible, to resort to colonial possession of an area that it exploited. The "sphere of influence" that operated often in regions where rival imperialist countries were more or less evenly matched (as for some time in China or in Latin America) had many of the aspects associated with neo-colonialism. In the main, however, the term gained its application in countries that were once colonies but where political "independence" has been converted into more or less of a facade behind which the domination of foreign monopolies and strategic interests continues.

Although often argued in moral terms, the great debate, as conducted by the anti-colonialists in the United States, had this as its ultimate, if not clearly stated, aim. The granting of Philippine independence was not a matter of the moral principle of freedom for Filipinos winning out over an immoral principle of colonial subjugation for Filipinos, any more than the emancipation of

Negro slaves in the United States in 1863 could be equated with freedom for black Americans. Filipinos in 1970 have still not overcome the limitations on their freedom that the concept of "stable government" laid down in the Jones Act of 1916 embodied. It was a neo-colonial "stable government," committed to protection of American interests, that was handed independence in the Philippines in 1946.

It is not always realized that the Spanish-American War, which precipitated the great debate and which has always been associated with the outright seizure of colonies by the United States, produced a model of neo-colonialism at the same time that it brought traditional-type colonies under the American flag. The neo-colonial model was Cuba, where American monopolies (especially the sugar monopoly) gained a protected sphere of operations masked by a form of independence subject to U.S. intervention and control. Significantly, anti-colonialists, from members of the Anti-Imperialist League to domestic sugar and tobacco growers, worked long and hard, not for complete Filipino freedom but for the Philippines to come into the same relationship to the United States as Cuba.

This was the essence of the position adopted by the anti-imperialist movement. Although it had humanitarian voices within it, the hard, practical colonial legislation that it supported, from the Organic Act of 1902 to the Jones Act of 1916 to the Tydings-McDuffie Philippine Independence Act of 1934, satisfied, through compromise, the economic needs of domestic sectional interests, the market and investment needs of overseas expansion, and the military-strategic needs connected with the latter.

The "anti-imperialists," by and large, were not opposed to the expansion of overseas markets and investments. Some of them, like Edward Atkinson, believed that the allegedly critical need for this was greatly exaggerated, and favored a much more intensive development of the potentialities of the home market. This did indeed occur; it modified the imperialist urge but it did not expunge it. In the main, however, it was felt by "anti-imperialists" that overseas expansion could be achieved without the burden of owning colonies, through superior American production and competitiveness, through manipulation of tariffs, or at most through protectorates in which direct colonial responsibility would not have to be assumed nor concessions made in the American market for a colonial people.

In the case of the Philippines, anti-imperialist views on the expense and the overall unprofitability of colonies were clearly substantiated in the long term. A complete balance sheet on the Philippines up to the date of independence has never been drawn up, but it is possible to construct its broad outline.

William Howard Taft, who claimed that military costs in the Philippines were part of general American defense needs and should not be counted as colonial expenses as such, insisted that the only actual costs of occupation were a sum of \$3.5 million appropriated by the U.S. Congress on March 3, 1903 for relief needs in the colony and for conducting a Philippine census.⁽¹⁾ However, it was officially estimated by Elihu Root that "equipment, supplies and military operations" between May 1, 1898 and April 1902 in the Philippines (i.e., during the conquest of the colony) came to \$170.3 million.⁽²⁾ Annual garrison and naval costs from 1902 onwards averaged between \$6 million and \$50 million,⁽³⁾ and to this must be added the costs of fortifications, the initial stage of these, from 1906-1912, amounting to \$10 million;⁽⁴⁾ in 1923 accumulated costs of this type were put at \$140 million.⁽⁵⁾ It would no doubt be safe to say that military costs of conquest, suppression, fortification and garrison maintenance totalled at least \$500 million by the time an Independence Act was voted by the U.S. Congress (a figure existing prior to the incalculable expenditure of reconquering the islands from Japan and rehabilitating them as a result of World War II).*

In terms of trade, in the 30 years of colonial possession prior to the beginning of the Great Depression of the 1930s, Philippine exports to the United States exceeded imports of American goods by nearly \$400 million (up to 1927, \$1.2 billion vs \$900.1 million).⁽⁶⁾ If a 20 per cent rate of profit is conceded to American goods, as forecast optimistically by merchants in advance of the Payne-Aldrich Act, American manufacturers and merchants

*A variety of estimates were made as to the costs of the Philippine conquest and retention. Senator George Hoar claimed in 1901 that the cost was \$600 million, and was not refuted. The *New York Evening Post* estimated it at \$308.4 million on March 6, 1907. Cong. James L. Slayden of Texas inserted an estimate of \$284.4 million in the *Congressional Record* of February 25, 1909. Carl Crow, in his book *America and the Philippines*, 1914, stated that suppressing the "insurrection" cost \$300 million.

earned approximately \$160 million from this trade; in a generous estimate, invisibles in the way of insurance and freight charges, etc., may have boosted this to around \$200 million. However, in the overall sense, this was more than over-balanced by far by the amount of duties waived on Philippine products entering the United States. In the year 1926 alone, for that year's \$100 million of Philippine exports to the American market, \$42 million in duties were waived.⁽⁷⁾ To some extent, earnings from Philippine exports went to American investment interests in the islands, in the refining of raw sugar, in manufacture of coconut products and in commercial handling, but the greater amount represented a payment by American tax-payers to Filipino producers well in excess of American trade profits.

Returns from the field of investment did not go far to redress the imbalance of military expenditure and trade. To begin with, investment occurred at a relatively low level, totalling at the time of the Independence Act little more than \$200 million. This was only about 30 per cent of U.S. investments in Asia, the bulk of which found profitability there in non-colonial areas, mainly Japan. Of this amount, about one-fourth was in the form of bonds, and about one-third represented resident capital that did not remit profits to the United States.⁽⁸⁾ A considerable part of the amount was accounted for by savings and reinvestment of profits. A case in point was the Manila Electric Co., or MERALCO, which was started with an investment of \$2 million in 1901; 60 years later, when it was sold to a Filipino combine, its value was \$50 million.⁽⁹⁾ This sum, while figuring in the totality of American investments, did not represent any further investments from the United States. It indicated a mounting return on the original investment to the parent company in the United States, but the total amount of profits remitted from all investments over the period of American occupation could hardly have made up the trade gap, let alone repaid the military costs. It is the general consensus of American historians and analysts that in the large view the Philippine colony was not a paying venture.

In effect, the American tax-payer was subsidizing the small sector of American business enterprise that benefitted from the Philippine colony. This was not a matter over which much direct concern has ever been raised, particularly after the introduction

of the income tax in 1914 had begun to spread the burden over the American people, but from the broad standpoint it was not an economically sound system.

It is illuminating that (although new factors of American power have to be taken into consideration in the contemporary period) American imperialism did not attain a vastly favorable trade balance with the Philippines nor realize large returns from investment until after Philippine independence had become a fact and a neo-colonial relationship had been established. Military expenses in maintaining bases in the islands and in underwriting a subservient Philippine army were considerable, amounting to approximately \$1 billion in the first post-independence decade, but much of this must be credited to the larger pattern of American policy in Asia as a whole. From 1945 to 1956, however, in the same span of time, the United States had a favorable trade balance of \$1.7 billion with the Philippines, almost double the total of American trade itself with its colony for the first 30 years of possession.⁽¹⁰⁾ American direct investment almost tripled in the first two decades after Philippine independence, and in the decade between 1956 and 1965 these investments remitted \$386.2 million in profits back to the United States, exclusive of reinvestment or of resident savings.⁽¹¹⁾ Furthermore, the comparatively new factor of loan capital to the independent Philippines (always charily given when the United States held colonial responsibility) has come into operation: at the end of 1965 the Philippine external debt, mainly to American banks, totalled \$487 million (of which \$345.8 million carried interest rates ranging from 5 per cent to 6.5 per cent, with the largest amount, \$98.5 million, carrying 5.75 per cent interest).⁽¹²⁾

Beyond any doubt, the profits of the neo-colonial period have far exceeded those of the American colonial period in the Philippines.

2. Neo-Colonialism: A Continuing Debate

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the evolvement of a neo-colonialist policy by the United States has been its relation to reform movements within the American capitalist system. Among the most vocal of the "anti-imperialists" were the bour-

geois reformists who campaigned for the modification and harnessing of the more ruthless operations of the monopolies (or "trusts"), for minimizing of the more naked forms of corruption and exploitation in the society, and for a closer and more efficient regulative relationship between government and private business enterprise.

Certain significant parallels can be seen in the development of colonial policy and the peak periods of reform in the United States. In the first of these, the "New Freedom" administration of Woodrow Wilson, the passage of the Jones Act coincided with heightened government regulation of and assistance to monopoly practices and government policies of social welfare. In the second major reform period, the "New Deal" administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the passage of the Philippine Independence Act (and the abrogation of the Platt Amendment on Cuba) coincided with the "welfare state" measures and centralized economic controls that preserved American capitalism in crisis. The welfare state at home and neo-colonialism abroad become twin supports of the contemporary imperialist framework.

In the development of this process the "anti-imperialist" forces in the United States were of considerable diversity. They included the urban liberal reformer and the conservative farmer, the humanitarian and the racist, supporters of overseas expansion and defenders of domestic protection—all with varying reasons for opposing colonial possessions. The policy that led to neo-colonialism was a synthesis of many viewpoints and not a single clearly elaborated concept to be held up and examined. Thus, in the shaping and writing of legislation that gave independence to the Philippines, those who molded the "stable government" idea were mainly expansionist in outlook, while those who gave the final *coup de grace* to the Philippine colony were mainly domestic agricultural producers who resisted competition from Philippine products in the severe depression days of the 1930s.

In the experience of formulating colonial policy, however, even the more aggressive imperialist commercial and investment groups that had favored seizure of colonies had reason to doubt the practicality of colonial possessions. They had to contend with the fact of Congress having authority over affairs and laws in colonies. Corporations and individuals desiring to exploit such areas found their activities subject to the pressure and investiga-

tion of a variety of domestic influences, reformist and protectionist. However, Congressional prerogatives were less when it came to non-colonial areas of investment and trade: operations of a neo-colonialism were far less apt to come under scrutiny.

The post-independence events in the Philippines following 1946—the brutal suppression with American assistance of the Huk national liberation movement and its popular support, the wholesale corruption of Filipino politics, the unbridled looting of the “independent” economy, the evasion of the one-time strictly watched land laws, the crimes committed by American military base personnel, the moral decay of Philippine society arising from frustrated development—would have all produced major scandals and investigations if occurring under direct American rule.

Nevertheless, although the system that emerged can be defined as neo-colonialism, it did not represent a clear-cut victory for the anti-colonialists. It is incorrect to conclude, for instance, as some have done, that the imperialist impulse for colonial conquest and possession that manifested itself in 1898 was a “temporary aberration.” The reason why the Philippines was retained for nearly 50 years despite the relatively early rejection of traditional colonialism in theory was the fact of continuing strength and pressure of the colonialist forces.

These have exhibited upsurges after each period of rapid accumulation of capital and of productive capacity in the United States, occurring at the turn of the century, at the close of World War I, and at the end of World War II. Expansionist ambitions, whetted by the profits of World War I, led to the virtual reversal in the 1920s of the promises of Philippine independence contained in the Jones Act; it was not until the Great Depression of the 1930s had brought a severe shrinkage of investment and trade, and had revived protectionist demands from domestic producers, that the U.S. Congress was influenced to pass the Philippine Independence Act of 1934. Then, at the end of World War II, on the very eve of Philippine independence in 1946, the enormously enriched monopolies with overseas interests made last-ditch attempts for a “re-examination” of the independence question, and indeed forced on the Filipino people an onerous revision of the original terms of independence, compelling the “stable government” of Filipino leaders, who were handpicked by the ag-

gressive imperialists, to agree to a greatly increased American economic and military presence, which continues to the present time.

This strength and influence of the most aggressive elements among the American imperialists is linked with the creation, mainly at their insistence, of a large navy and a streamlined modern standing army and air force as the means of backing up the role of the United States as a world power. It is more than incidental that Elihu Root, who devised the colonial system for the "insular possessions," and who helped as a leading corporation lawyer to create the structure of the American monopoly, was the same man who simultaneously worked out the modern staff structure and permanent footing of the American army. At an early stage, the U.S. military establishment was intimately associated with that sector of American capitalism with a large stake in overseas expansion.

All the wars fought by the United States in this century have been waged outside the boundaries of the nation, in the interests of overseas investments and markets. In World War I it was to protect the loan capital made available to the Allied side. In World War II it was to protect and to expand the entire international stake, at the expense of rival fascist imperialisms in Europe and Asia alike.

The moves made by American imperialism in Asia and the western Pacific in the period after World War II, including the Korean War and the Vietnam War, have had a great similarity to the aggressive expansionism of 1898. In both periods a key target was the illimitable Chinese market. Whereas in the earlier period this goal was frustrated by Japanese and other rival imperialists, with U.S. capability proving to be over-extended, in the latter period American imperialism had won overwhelming supremacy over its rivals and had tremendous power to exploit the victory. In 1946 the United States seemed poised to realize its dreams of half a century.*

*Curiously enough, the inheritors of the "Empire Days" have some of the same names: a new General MacArthur, son of the former military governor of the Philippines, came to act as a proconsul in Asia; a new Henry Cabot Lodge, son of the imperialistic senator, came to act as a spokesman for the new expansionists.

Militarily, the concept of the holding action (which did not stand up to the Japanese conquest of the Philippines early in 1942) had been converted after World War II into the policy of building a powerful ring of bases on the island rim of Asia and on its shores. This went infinitely far beyond the original Mahan idea of naval facilities and coaling stations. New military base-colonies were created out of Okinawa, Guam and other central Pacific islands, out of Korea and South Vietnam, while Japan, Formosa and the Philippines were dotted with huge base complexes of an aggressive character.

In this situation, the impulse for conquest and for scarcely-disguised colonial-type aggression, in an even more virulent form, has once again come to the fore. It has been augmented by an aspect of American surplus production not present in the era of 1898: military production, on which a large part of the U.S. economy has been made dependent, and for which war is the market. The colonial wars in Korea and Vietnam, in an important respect, were an outlet for surplus arms production and have been used to support a semblance of prosperity in the United States. The result, however, has been an overextension of American capability, and diminishing returns from an extremely costly policy.

Both the Korean War of 1950-1954 and the Vietnam War beginning in 1961 produced serious debates within American ruling circles over the profitability of these imperialist ventures, debates with an echo of those occurring early in the century. The enormous overseas expenditures connected with the Vietnam War in particular undermined the whole American international trade and balance of payments position, seriously affecting other areas of imperialist operations. A new and more profound anti-imperialist movement in the United States came into being as part of the new debate, with mass features as well as dissent in capitalist and middle-class sectors. It is paralleled by a trend in ruling circles for a reemphasis on indirect neo-colonial methods. When an analysis of the contemporary period is made, it will bear a marked resemblance to the period of debate over imperialist policy following the Spanish-American War. (Clashes between military and civil concepts of policy, authority and administration have also occurred in a repeated pattern, the MacArthur-Truman dispute in the Korean War, the "hawk" and "dove" antagonism in

the Vietnam War, and the frequent Pentagon-State Department rifts being much like echoes of the Otis-Schurman and Mac-Arthur-Taft differences during the Philippine conquest.)

As the staggering cost of the Vietnam War mounted, one of the main issues that arose was the inability of American resources to take care of the needs both of the home market and of militaristic imperialist adventures abroad. A "poverty program" and a "re-construct the cities program" clashed with the spending of enormous sums for overseas expansion. The old struggle between domestic and foreign interests reappeared in a new form.

The controversy in the 1960s, curiously enough, has been associated with a frustration almost identical to that which blunted the imperialist drive across the Pacific in 1898: the withering of hopes to exploit the China market and other parts of Asia. Unfortunately for American imperialism, a new rival did emerge to supplant Japan in challenging its drive for domination: the national liberation movements of China, Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines and elsewhere. In a much more thorough fashion, by popular revolution, the China market was again taken from the American grasp. In the new situation, coupled with the failure of present-day colonial wars, American imperialism attempts to fashion new methods of retaining its positions, including even more subtle techniques of neo-colonialism.

American neo-colonialism, often attributed to the sheer power of American production and of the American dollar, has been shaped by contradictions encountered by American imperialism both abroad and at home. As the contradictions continue, and as they are more fully understood by the American people and others, the great debate over the course of American imperialist policy will continue to echo both within and beyond the borders of the United States.

REFERENCE NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, 418-20, 272, 285.
2. Pratt, "The Large Policy of 1898," 230, 224.
3. Edwardes, *Asia in the European Age*, 93.
4. Regidor and Mason, *Commercial Progress in the Philippine Islands*.
5. Conant, *The United States in the Orient*, 79, 171.
6. Conant, "The Economic Basis of Imperialism," 327.
7. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study*, 76-77.
8. *New Cambridge Modern History*, XI, 50.
9. Faulkner, *American Economic History*, 556.
10. *New Cambridge Modern History*, 46.
11. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898*, 287.
12. Rollins, "The Anti-Imperialists and 20th Century American Foreign Policy," 17.
13. Radosh and Dahies, "American Labor and the Anti-Imperialist Movement: A Discussion," 100, 94, 96.
14. Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*, 180.
15. Birley, *Speeches and Documents in American History*, III, 173.
16. Rollins, *op. cit.*, 17.
17. Pratt, *op. cit.*, 209.
18. *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, XIII, 6150.
19. Pratt, *op. cit.*, 287.
20. Foner, *History of the Labor Movement in the U.S.*, II, 405.
21. Dulles, *America in the Pacific*, 222.
22. Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy."
23. Latane, *America as a World Power*, 100.
24. Pratt, *op. cit.*, 262-3, 264.
25. Van Alstyne, *The Rising American Empire*, 181.
26. Sen. Doc. 62, I (55th Cong., 3 Sess.) 320, 324.
27. Barrett, "The Problem of the Philippines," 264.
28. Van Alstyne, *op. cit.*, 185-6.
29. Kirk, *Philippine Independence: Motives, Problems and Prospects*, 5.
30. Van Alstyne, *op. cit.*, 185.
31. Dewey, *Autobiography*, 170.
32. Josephson, *The President Makers*, 82.
33. Wolff, *Little Brown Brother*, 61.
34. Sen. Doc. 169 (55 Cong., 3 Sess.)
35. Pratt, *op. cit.*, 268, 277, 231.
36. Bowers, *Beveridge and the Progressive Era*, 69-70.

CHAPTER II

1. Braisted, "The Philippine Naval Base Problem, 1898-1909," 22.
2. Pratt, "The Large Policy of 1898," 221-2f.
3. *Sen. Doc. 62*, I (55 Cong., 3 Sess.), 383.
4. *Letters of Henry Adams*, II, 183.
5. Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, 197-8.
6. *Census of the Philippine Islands (1903)*, IV, 171; Liang, *The Development of Philippine Political Parties*, 43.
7. *Sen. Doc. 62*, *op. cit.*, 333.
8. *Sen. Doc. 331* (57 Cong., 1 Sess.), 2927.
9. Aguinaldo and Pacis, *A Second Look at America*, 31.
10. *Sen. Doc. 62*, *op. cit.*, 341, 354.
11. Root, *Military and Colonial Policy of the U.S.*, 40.
12. Agoncillo, *Malolos: Crisis of the Republic*, 129.
13. Majul, *Mabini and the Philippine Revolution*, 147-8.
14. Guerrero, "The Kaiser and the Philippines," 590.
15. Aguinaldo and Pacis, *op. cit.*, 38.
16. *Sen. Doc. 331*, *op. cit.*, 2928.
17. Blount, *American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912*, 19.
18. *Sen. Doc. 331*, *op. cit.*, 2933.
19. Miles, *Serving the Republic*, 271.
20. *Sen. Doc. 221*, II (56 Cong., 1 Sess.), 1195.
21. Aguinaldo and Pacis, *op. cit.*, 41.
22. *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain*, II, 77.
23. Agoncillo and Alfonso, *A Short History of the Filipino People*, 257.
24. Mabini, *The Philippine Revolution*, Chap. IX.
25. Foreman, *The Philippine Islands*, 433, 457.
26. *Sen. Doc. 331*, *op. cit.*, 1386.
27. *Sen. Doc. 148*, (56 Cong. 2 Sess), 6.
28. Storey and Lichauco, *The Conquest of the Philippines*, 41.
29. *Report of the Navy Department (1898)*, 122-3.
30. *Sen. Doc. 169*, (55 Cong. 3 Sess.), 1.
31. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898*, 297.
32. Stuntz, *The Philippines and the Far East*, 414.
33. Parker, "Church and State in the Philippines, 1896-1906," 360.
34. Stuntz, *op. cit.*, 411.
35. Pratt, *op. cit.*, 308.
36. *North American Review*, April 1905, 518.
37. Olcott, *Life of William McKinley*, II, 110-11.
38. Allen, *Great Britain and the U.S.*, 573, 584.
39. Guerrero, *op. cit.*, 588 (*The Standard*, London, May 4, 1898).
40. Pratt, *op. cit.*, 292.
41. *Letters of Henry Adams*, II, 356.
42. Dulles, *America in the Pacific*, 242-3.
43. Hoar, *Autobiography of 70 years*, II, 312-13.
44. *Sen. Doc. 148*, *op. cit.*, 7.
45. *Sen. Doc. 62*, *op. cit.*, 387, 377.
46. Elliott, *The Philippines to the End of the Military Regime*, 349.

47. Africa, "Did the U.S. Acquire the Philippines from Spain by Purchase?" 151-52; Crow, *America and the Philippines*, 25-6.
48. Agoncillo, *op. cit.*, 356.
49. Majul, *op. cit.*, 101.
50. Cabellero, *Quezon: The Story of a Nation and Its Foremost Statesman*, 39.
51. Agoncillo, *op. cit.*, 362, 363.
52. *Sen. Doc.*, 331, *op. cit.*, 776-77.
53. Thayer, *Life and Letters of John Hay*, 198-99.
54. Curti, *Bryan and World Peace*, 119.
55. Miller, *Great Debates in American History*, III, 248, 271-72, 292.
56. *Congressional Record*, (56 Cong. 1 Sess.) 1309-10.
57. Dunn, *From Harrison to Harding*, I, 282; Coletta, "Bryan, McKinley and the Treaty of Paris," 139.
58. Miller, *Great Debates*, 321-22.
59. Grunder and Livezey, *The Philippines and the U.S.*, 46.
60. Hoar, *op. cit.*, 320-22.

CHAPTER III

1. Edwards, "The Work of the Bureau of Insular Affairs," 240.
2. Palma, *My Autobiography*, 32.
3. Fonacier, "The Chinese Exclusion Policy in the Philippines," 8.
4. Willis, *Our Philippine Problem*, 327.
5. *The Fukien Times Yearbook*, Manila, 1963.
6. *Sen. Doc.* 62, I (55 Cong. 3 Sess.), 387.
7. Agoncillo, *Malolos*, 241.
8. *Sen. Doc.* 331 (57 Cong. 1 Sess.), 772, 777, 773.
9. Agoncillo, *op. cit.*, 434.
10. *Sen. Doc.* 331, *op. cit.*, 820, 2709-45, 2728-29, 820-25.
11. Ireland, "The United States in the Philippines," 581.
12. Dewey, *Autobiography*, 285.
13. Schurman speech, Cornell University, Sept. 22, 1898. *Schurman Papers*.
14. Schurman, *Philippine Affairs*, 2.
15. Interview, *Utica Press*, Utica, N.Y., January 18, 1899. *Schurman Papers*.
16. *Commercial Advertiser*, New York, Jan. 16, 1899.
17. Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present*, 87, 266.
18. *Ibid.*, 87, 88.
19. *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain*, II, 1127.
20. Van Alstyne, *The Rising American Empire*, 181.
21. *New York Evening Sun*, Jan. 16, 1899.
22. *Washington Times*, Washington, D.C., Aug. 25, 1899.
23. *New York Evening Journal*, Jan. 23, 1899.
24. Schurman, *Philippine Affairs*, 7.
25. *Sen. Doc.* 221 (56 Cong. 1 Sess.), 1233-34.
26. *Sen. Doc.* 331, *op. cit.*, 776.
27. Worcester, *op. cit.*, 787.
28. Letter to David J. Hill, Asst. Sec. of State, March 8, 1899. *Schurman Papers*.
29. *Sen. Doc.* 331, *op. cit.*, 804, 806-08.

30. *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, op. cit.*, 896.
31. *Schurman Papers*.
32. Worcester, *op. cit.*, 790-791.
33. Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, I, 120n.
34. Majul, *Mabini and the Philippine Revolution*, 260-61.
35. Worcester, *op. cit.*, 12, 13, 263.
36. *Ibid.*, 13, 263.
37. Letter to David J. Hill, April 16, 1899. *Schurman Papers*.
38. Worcester, *op. cit.*, 264.
39. *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain*, II, 996, 998.
40. Worcester, *op. cit.*, 14-17, 264.
41. Interview with Admiral Dewey, London *Daily News* (quoted in New Haven, Conn. *Leader*, Aug. 26, 1899). *Schurman Papers*.
42. *Milwaukee Sentinel*, Sept. 30, 1899. *Ibid.*
43. *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President*, I, 121.
44. Interview, Hamilton, Ohio *Republican News*, Aug. 28, 1899. *Schurman Papers*.
45. Interview, Chicago *Inter-Ocean*, Aug. 21, 1899. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER IV

1. *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain*, II, 1051.
2. Dawes, *A Journal of the McKinley Years*, 203.
3. *Sen. Doc. 331, op. cit.*, 126-27.
4. Alejandrino, *The Price of Freedom*, 200-01.
5. Carter, *Life of Lt. Gen. Chaffee*, 240.
6. *Correspondence, op. cit.*, 1159.
7. *Report of the War Department*, I, (5), 61-2.
8. *Sen. Doc. 331, op. cit.*, 1944-46, 1420-84, 894, 559, 1767-68.
9. *Ibid.*, 901-06.
10. *Sen. Doc. 205* (57 Cong. 1 Sess), 19-20, 21.
11. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, 337.
12. *Sen. Doc. 331, op. cit.*, 1571-73.
13. *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, III, 298.
14. *Sen. Doc. 331, op. cit.*, 1548, 1607, 1619, 1614, 1622, 1628.
15. Moses, *Unofficial Letters of an Official's Wife*, 330. (Bernard Moses, the official in question, was a member of the Second or Taft Philippine Commission.)
16. Willis, *Our Philippine Problem*, 23.
17. *Reports of the Philippine Commission, 1900-1903*, 492-3.
18. Blount, *The American Occupation of the Philippines*, 418.
19. *Reports of the Philippine Commission*, 562; *Seventh Annual Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1906, II, 7.
20. Blount, *op. cit.*, 424.
21. Abad, *Gen. Macario Sakay*.
22. *Sen. Doc. 331, op. cit.*, 2123.
23. *Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1903*, III, 489-90.
24. Storey, *The Democratic Party and Philippine Independence*, 36.
25. Forbes, II, 36.

CHAPTER V

1. Foner, *History of the Labor Movement in the U.S.*, III, 421.
2. *The American Federationist*, March 1899, 39-40.
3. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, 269-70.
4. Foner, *op. cit.*, 431.
5. Lanzar, "The Anti-Imperialist League," Aug. 1930, 8, 16, 29.
6. Harrington, "Anti-Imperialist Movement in the U.S." 223.
7. *Ibid.*, Lanzar, *op. cit.*, 37.
8. Hofstadter, *Great Issues in American History*, II, 202-04.
9. Lanzar, *op. cit.*, 19-21; Harrington, *op. cit.*, 215-20; Harrington, "Literary Aspects of American Anti-Imperialism," 655-57.
10. Hoar, *Autobiography of 70 Years*, II, 305. (See also Lasch, "The Anti-Imperialists, The Philippines and the Inequality of Man," 319.)
11. Schurz, "Thoughts on American Imperialism", 784.
12. Blount, *The American Occupation of the Philippines*, 297.
13. Conant, "The Economic Future of the Philippines," 366.
14. Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the U.S.," 223-24.
15. Vest, "Objections to Annexing the Philippines," 112.
16. Williams, *Odyssey of the Philippine Commission*, 72.
17. Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, II, 566.
18. Josephson, *The President Makers*, 54.
19. Hoar, *op. cit.*, 324, 326.
20. Lanzar, *op. cit.*, Oct. 1933, 267.
21. *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain*, II, 973.
22. Oberholtzer, *A History of the U.S. Since the Civil War*, V, 592.
23. Chamberlin, *The Blow from Behind*, 108, 110.
24. Foner, *op. cit.*, 434.
25. Oberholtzer, *op. cit.*, 673-74.
26. Lanzar, *op. cit.*, Aug. 1930, 37.
27. Harrington, *op. cit.*, 227n., 214.
28. Forbes, *op. cit.*, 566-67.
29. Reyes, *Legislative History of America's Economic Policy Toward the Philippines*, 41-42.
30. Schurman letter to McKinley, June 1, 1900. *Schurman Papers*.
31. Forbes, *op. cit.*, 566.
32. Bailey, "Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on Imperialism?" 44, 46; Harrington, *op. cit.*, 227.
33. Oberholtzer, *op. cit.*, 649.
34. Lanzar, *op. cit.*, 41.

CHAPTER VI

1. *Reports of the Philippine Commission, 1900-1903*, 34-5, 50-1, 25-7.
2. Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, 206-07.
3. Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, II, 448.
4. Reports, *op. cit.*, 273.
5. Magoon, *Reports on the Law of Civil Government, etc.*, 55. (Magoon, incidentally, was later to be prosecuted for corruption while serving in an appointed post in the military government in Cuba.)

6. *House Doc. 509* (56 Cong., 2 Sess.), 270, 239.
7. Fonacier, "The Chinese Exclusion Policy in the Philippines," 24*n*.
8. Reports, *op. cit.*, 439.
9. *Sen. Rpt. 915* (57 Cong., 1 Sess.), 2.
10. Reports, *op. cit.*, 272, 273.
11. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, 361-2.
12. Willis, *Our Philippine Problem*, 151.
13. *Sen. Rpt. 915*, *op. cit.*, 1-3.
14. *Sen. Doc. 331* (57 Cong., 1 Sess.)
15. Reports, *op. cit.*, 272, 440, 357, 443, 456, 460.
16. *Ibid.*, 460.
17. *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President*, 1, 106: Exhibit VIII.
18. Jessup, *op. cit.*, 300, 345, 350.
19. Reports, *op. cit.*, 5-11.
20. Pringle, *Life and Times of William Howard Taft*, 1, 182.
21. *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain*, II, 1154-5.
22. *Sen. Doc. 331*, *op. cit.*, 866-7, 876, 869.
23. Pringle, *op. cit.*, 170.
24. *The Philippine Review*, 183; LeRoy, "Chinese Exclusion in the Philippines," 142.
25. Moses, *Unofficial Letters of an Official's Wife*, 73-4.
26. Clark, *Labor Conditions in the Philippines*, 880.
27. Dos Passos, *Mr. Wilson's War*, 81.
28. *Committee Reports and Hearings, House of Rep., Committee on Insular Affairs* (56 Cong., 1 & 2 Sess.), 139, 157.
29. Crow, *America and the Philippines*, 162.
30. Minger, "Taft, MacArthur and the Establishment of Civil Government in the Philippines," 326, 318, 321-22.
31. Sullivan, *Our Times: The United States, 1900-1925*, 1, 44.
32. Chamberlin, *The Blow from Behind*, 132.
33. Josephson, *The President Makers*, 286.
34. Pringle, *op. cit.*, 128 (Letters of Taft to Helen H. Taft, July 7 and 8, 1894.)
35. Forbes, *op. cit.*, 1, 125*n*.
36. Minger, *op. cit.*, 314, 321.
37. *Public Laws and Resolutions Passed by the United States Philippine Commission*, 13.
38. *Sen. Doc. 331*, *op. cit.*, 878.
39. Reports, *op. cit.*, 123.
40. *Census of the Philippine Islands, 1903*, III, 640.
41. Pringle, *op. cit.*, 185.
42. Minger, *op. cit.*, 316. (Letter from Taft to John M. Harlan, June 30, 1900.)
43. *Ibid.*, 316. (Letter from Taft to Elihu Root, July 14, 1900.)
44. Taft, *Recollections of Full Years*, 112.
45. *Sen. Doc. 191* (58 Cong., 2 Sess.)
46. Reports, *op. cit.*, 507-08.
47. Taft, "Address Delivered Before the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York," 15-16.
48. Willis, *op. cit.*, 328.

49. *Sen. Doc. 331, op. cit.*, 884-5.
50. *Reports, op. cit.*, 728-9.
51. Abad, *General Macario Sakay, Was He a Bandit or a Traitor?* 131-2.
52. *Public Laws, etc., op. cit.*, 148.

CHAPTER VII

1. Faulkner, *American Economic History*, 570.
2. Van Alstyne, *op. cit.*, 186.
3. Barrett, "American Interests in the Far East," 12-13.
4. Williams, *Contours of American History*, 417.
5. Carnegie, "Americanism vs. Imperialism," 3.
6. Birley (ed.) *Speeches and Documents in American History*, III, 244.
7. LeRoy, *Philippine Life in Town and Country*, 287. (See also Willis, *Our Philippine Problem*, 335; and Crow, *America and the Philippines*, 175: "Manila offers no more advantage as a distributing point for American goods than Jamaica does as a distributing point for British goods destined for the United States.")
8. Dennett, *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War*, 160.
9. Faulkner, *op. cit.*, 570.
10. Dennett, *op. cit.*, 112-114.
11. Hagedorn, *Leonard Wood*, II, 73.
12. *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, V, 763.
13. Morton, "Military and Naval Preparations for the Defense of the Philippines During the War Scare of 1907," 95.
14. *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, op. cit.*, 761-62.
15. Blount, *American Occupation of the Philippines*, 1898-1912, 647.
16. *Committee on Insular Affairs, House of Rep.: Committee Reports, Hearings and Acts of Congress* (59 Cong.), 191-216.
17. Winslow, "Neutralization," 88.
18. Blount, *op. cit.*, 647. (Resolutions filed by Reps. McCall of Mass., Cline of Indiana, Sabbath of Ill., Garner of Texas, Peters of Mass., Martin of Colo., Burgess of Texas, Oldfield of Ark., Ferris of Okla.; in 1912 by Rep. Jones of Va.)
19. Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the U.S.*, 500.
20. Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, II, 217.
21. Hou, *Foreign Investment and Development in China*, 17.
22. Eckel, *The Far East Since 1500*, 346.
23. Beard, *The Idea of National Interest*, 332.
24. Croly, *The Promise of American Life*, 312.
25. Dulles, *America in the Pacific*, x-xi.
26. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, 82, 83.
27. Braisted, "The Philippine Naval Base Problem, 1898-1909," 22.
28. Osborne, "Protection of American Commerce and Capital Abroad," 688.
29. Braisted, *op. cit.*, 29, 23-4, 24-5, 27, 30, 32-3.
30. Morton, *op. cit.*, 101-04.
31. *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, IV, 737; VI, 939.

CHAPTER VIII

1. *Sen. Doc. 191* (58 Cong., 2 Sess.), 15.
2. Foreman, "The Americans in the Philippines," 402.
3. Hoxie, "The American Colonial Policy and the Tariff," 214.
4. *Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1905*, IV, 94.
5. *Sen. Report 1178* (59 Cong., 1 Sess.), 2.
6. Brent, "Tyranny or Democracy—Which?" 600.
7. *Sen. Rpt. 1178, op. cit.*, 2, 7.
8. Brent, *op. cit.*, 600.
9. Galang (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Philippines*, V, 200.
10. *Report of Philippine Commission to Sec. of War, 1910*, 158.
11. *Report of Philippine Commission to Sec. of War, 1911*, 148.
12. Crow, *op. cit.*, 177.
13. Blount, *op. cit.*, 401, 617.
14. Forbes, *op. cit.*, II, 452.
15. *Fifth Annual Report of Philippine Commission, 1904*, I, 26-7.
16. *Sixth Annual Report, op. cit.*, I, 72-3.
17. *Seventh Annual Report of Philippine Commission, 1906*, I, 68.
18. Taft, "The Philippine Islands," 5.
19. *Congressional Record*, May 13, 1910, 2009.
20. *Public Hearings in the Philippine Islands, August 1905*, 67-8.
21. *Sixth Annual Report, op. cit.*, I, 20.
22. *Committee on Insular Affairs, House of Rep.: Committee Reports, Hearings and Acts of Congress* (60 Cong.), 237.
23. *Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1912*, 363.
24. *Sen. Doc. 182* (58 Cong., 2 Sess.), 5.
25. *Sen. Doc. 124* (58 Cong., 2 Sess.), 28.
26. *Committee on Insular Affairs . . . Reports, op. cit.*, 238.
27. *Sen. Doc. 182, op. cit.*, 28-9.
28. *Sen. Doc. 124, op. cit.*, 24.
29. *Sen. Doc. 182, op. cit.*, 8-9.
30. *Sen. Doc. 124, op. cit.*, 2-3, 28.
31. *Sen. Doc. 182, op. cit.*, 15-16.
32. Conant, "The Economic Future of the Philippines," 371.
33. E.g., *What Has Been Done in the Philippines*; Clark, *Labor Conditions in the Philippines*.
34. Taft, *op. cit.*, 20.
35. *Sixth Annual Report, op. cit.*, II, 39, 25; I, 74.
36. *The Cablenews American Yearly Review, 1911*.
37. Taft, *op. cit.*, 18.
38. *House Insular Affairs Committee Hearing. Taft Statement.* (58 Cong. 2 Sess.), 59.
39. Swados (ed.), *The Muckrakers*, 212-13.
40. Willis, *op. cit.*, 386.
41. Crow, *op. cit.*, 245.
42. *Sixth Annual Report, op. cit.*, II, 83.
43. Willis, *op. cit.* (Willis was sent to the Philippines by the Anti-Imperialist League, and his book represents the League's viewpoints on conditions in the colony.)

44. *Fifth Annual Report*, *op. cit.*, III, 978, 1034.
45. *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, *op. cit.*, V, 136.
46. "Philippine Railroad Progress" (*Overland Monthly*), 442.
47. *Hearing*, Taft Statement, *op. cit.*, 55.
48. *Seventh Annual Report*, *op. cit.*, I, 51-4.
49. Elliott, *The Philippines to the End of the Commission Government*, 307.
(The governor-general referred to was Francis Burton Harrison, in a message written Jan. 10, 1916.)
50. Root, *Military and Colonial Policy of the U.S.*, 389.
51. *Sixth Annual Report*, *op. cit.*, I, 4.
52. Forbes-Lindsay, *The Philippines: Under Spanish and American Rules*, 309.
53. *Seventh Annual Report*, *op. cit.*, I, 51-4.
54. Forbes, *op. cit.*, I, 393.
55. *Report of Philippine Commission to Sec. of War, 1913*, 13.
56. Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present*, 624.
57. Forbes, *op. cit.*, I, 393, 271.
58. *Report of the Philippine Commission, 1910*, 17; *1911*, 9; *1912*, 11; *1913*, 9.
59. Colquhoun, *Greater America*, 105-06.
60. Conant, "William H. Taft: Peacemaker of the Philippines," 18.
61. *What Has Been Done in the Philippines*, 21.
62. *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, III, 265.
63. Ide, "Banking, Currency and Finance in the Philippine Islands," 30.
64. *Report of the Philippine Commission, 1908*, I, 14; *1909*, 12.
65. *Eighth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1907*, I, 3-4.
66. *Report, 1908*, *op. cit.*, I, 12.
67. Forbes, *op. cit.*, I, 287; II, 91-2.

CHAPTER IX

1. Rose, *Britain and Southeast Asia*, 64.
2. *Sen. Doc. 191* (58 Cong., 2 Sess.), 10.
3. *Seventh Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1906*, I, 65.
4. *Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1912*, 227.
5. Morris (ed.), *Encyclopedia of American History*, 498.
6. Lord, *The Good Years*, 5.
7. *Statistical Abstract*, *op. cit.*, 204.
8. Allen, *The Big Change*, 117.
9. Williamson (ed.), *The Growth of the American Economy*, 581.
10. *Statistical Abstract*, *op. cit.*, 211.
11. Morris, *op. cit.*, 498.
12. *Statistical Abstract*, *op. cit.*, 217, 220.
13. Maddison, *Economic Growth of the West*, 239.
14. Faulkner, *op. cit.*, 392; *Statistical Abstract, 1921*, 868.
15. Maddison, *op. cit.*, 67.
16. Allen, *op. cit.*, 115.
17. Reyes, *Legislative History*, 39.
18. *Statistical Abstract, 1912*, *op. cit.*, 218.
19. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics*, 533.
20. *Statistical Abstract, 1912*, *op. cit.*, 106, 204, 566.

21. Thomson, *World History from 1914 to 1961*, 86.
22. Faulkner, *op. cit.*, 685, 597.
23. *House Doc. 927* (62 Cong., 3 Sess.), 6.
24. Busch, T.R., *The Story of Theodore Roosevelt and His Influence on Our Times*, 157.
25. Morison and Commager, *The Growth of the American Republic*, 485, 482.
26. Mowry, *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, 1900-1912*, 41-2.
27. Hugh-Jones, *Woodrow Wilson and American Liberalism*, 204.
28. Morison and Commager, *op. cit.*, 552.
29. Forbes, *op. cit.*, II, Appendix.
30. Shuster, "Shall the Philippines Have a 4th of July?" 425.
31. Forbes, *op. cit.*
32. Taft, "The Philippine Islands," 31, 36.
33. Forbes, *op. cit.*
34. Taft, "Holding the Philippine Islands," 26.
35. Newspaper Interview, Jan. 24, 1902. (*Schurman Papers*)
36. Letter to Rev. Francis E. Clark, Nov. 20, 1900. (*Ibid.*)
37. Letter to Mr. John Frankenhimer, Feb. 3, 1903. (*Ibid.*)
38. Letter to Erving Winslow, Sept. 5, 1903. (*Ibid.*)
39. Morison and Commager, *op. cit.*, 465.
40. List in *Schurman Papers*.
41. Garraty, *op. cit.*, 210. (Letter to George Meyers, May 6, 1903.)
42. Jessup, *op. cit.*, 370.
43. Letter to Josephine Shaw Lowell, Dec. 10, 1903. (*Schurman Papers.*)
44. Letter to editor, *New York Tribune*, Jan. 19, 1904. (*Ibid.*)
45. Letter of Edward W. Ordway to Schurman, April 27, 1904. (*Ibid.*)
46. Letter to Erving Winslow, June 1904. (*Ibid.*)
47. Letter of Erving Winslow to Schurman, Nov. 17, 1904. (*Ibid.*)
48. Letters to Erving Winslow, Nov. 26 and Dec. 22, 1904. (*Ibid.*)
49. Correspondence of Schurman and Ordway, Feb. 1905. (*Ibid.*)
50. Letter of Mrs. Lowell to Schurman, Jan. 29, 1905. (*Ibid.*)
51. List and Program in *Schurman Papers*.
52. *House Doc. 894* (61 Cong., 2 Sess.), I, 1.
53. Welliver, "The Mormon Church and the Sugar Trust," 82-93.
54. *House Rpt. 2289* (61 Cong., 2 Sess.), iv, liii.
55. *House Doc. 894, op. cit.*, III, 5.
56. *House Rpt. 2289, op. cit.*, xii.
57. *House Doc. 911* (61 Cong. 2 Sess.), 2.
58. *House Rpt. 2289, op. cit.*, xi, xxx-xxxii.
59. Elliott, *op. cit.*, 60.
60. *House Rpt. 2289, op. cit.*, xxiv-xxvii.
61. *Report of the Philippine Commission to Sec. of War, 1910*, 116-7.
62. *House Doc. 1326* (61 Cong., 3 Sess.), 1.
63. *House Rpt. 2289, op. cit.*, xxxiii, xxxv-xxxix, lii.
64. Lanzar, *op. cit.*, July 1933, 229.
65. Forbes, *op. cit.*, 199, 231.
66. *House Doc. 1067* (62 Cong., 3 Sess.), 12.
67. Storey, *The Democratic Party and Philippine Independence*, 18.

68. Jones, "Misgovernment in the Philippines," quoting interview with Taft in *Washington Herald*.
69. Taft, *op. cit.*, 26.
70. Forbes, *op. cit.*, 201-02, 188, 371.
71. *Report of the Philippine Commission, 1915*, 31-2.
72. Forbes, *op. cit.*, 461.
73. Quezon, *The Good Fight*, 130.
74. Forbes, *op. cit.*, 252.
75. Crow, *op. cit.*, 43.
76. Forbes, *op. cit.*, 373, 231.
77. Lanzar, *op. cit.*, October 1933, 250.
78. Quezon, *op. cit.*, 127.
79. Bernstein, *The Philippine Story*, 94.
80. Worcester, *op. cit.*, 737.
81. Forbes, *op. cit.*, 253.
82. *The Filipino People*, Oct. 1912. (*The Filipino People* was the information propaganda magazine issued by the Philippine Resident Commissioner, Manuel Quezon, in Washington.)
83. Lanzar, *op. cit.*, 259, 258.

CHAPTER X

1. *Congressional Record*, July 19, 1912, 9348-9.
2. *Sen. Doc. 416* (57 Cong., 1 Sess.), 3.
3. Taft, "Holding the Philippine Islands," 23: *House Rpt. 606* (62 Cong., 2 Sess.), 12. (Statement, Cong. Jones.)
4. *House Rpt. 1115* (63 Cong., 2 Sess.), 9.
5. Lanzar, *op. cit.*, November 1930, 128 (quoting War Dept. statement).
6. Forbes, *op. cit.*, II, 461; Worcester, *op. cit.*, 653.
7. President Calvin Coolidge, "Letter to Governor-general Leonard Wood," April 6, 1927 (Forbes, *op. cit.*, 561).
8. Hartendorp, *History of Industry and Trade of the Philippines*, 54, 730.
9. McPhelin, "The Purchase of Meralco," 526.
10. Hartendorp, *op. cit.*, 721, 734.
11. Report, Office of Statistical Coordination and Standards of the Philippine National Economic Council, 1968 (*Graphic*, January 8, 1969, 64.).
12. *Statistical Bulletin*, Central Bank of the Philippines, December 1965, 240. (The external debt of the Philippines had risen by the end of 1968 to over \$734 million.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

- Report of the Philippine Commission to the President* (The Schurman Report). 4 vols. Washington, 1900.
- Annual Reports of the Philippine Commission, 1900-1916*. Washington.
- Report of the Navy Department*. Washington, 1898.
- Report of the War Department*. Washington, 1900.
- Census of the Philippine Islands (1903)*. 4 vols. Washington, 1905.
- Public Laws and Resolutions Passed by the U.S. Philippine Commission*. Washington, 1901.
- Reports on the Law of Civil Government in Territories Subject to Military Occupation by the Military Forces of the U.S.* (Reports by Charles E. Magoon to the Secretary of War). Washington, 1902.
- Correspondence Relating to the War With Spain*. 3 vols. Washington, 1902.
- Congressional Record*, 56th Congress, 1st Session.
- Congressional Record*, May 13, 1909.
- Congressional Record*, July 12, 1912.
- What Has Been Done in the Philippines*. Bureau of Insular Affairs. Washington, 1904.
- Labor Conditions in the Philippines*. Report of Victor S. Clark. Washington, 1905.
- Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1912 and 1921*. Washington.

House and Senate Documents

- House Document No. 509*, 56th Congress, 2nd Session. The Insular Cases: Records, Briefs and Arguments of Counsel, October 1900, in Supreme Court of the U.S.
- House Document No. 894*, 61st Congress, 2nd Session. Sale of Friar Lands in the Philippine Islands.
- House Document No. 911*, 61st Congress, 2nd Session. Friar Lands in the Philippines.
- House Document No. 1326*, 61st Congress, 3rd Session. Sale of Lands Belonging to the So-called Friar Estates.
- House Document No. 927*, 62nd Congress, 3rd Session. Message of the President of the United States on Foreign Relations.
- House Document No. 1067*, 62nd Congress, 3rd Session. Message of the President of the United States on Fiscal, Judicial, Military and Insular Affairs.
- Senate Document No. 62*, 55th Congress, 3rd Session. A Treaty of Peace between the U.S. and Spain. Consular Reports from the Orient.
- Senate Document No. 169*, 55th Congress, 3rd Session. Report on Financial and Industrial Conditions in the Philippine Islands (The Harden Report).
- Senate Document No. 148*, 56th Congress, 2nd Session. Correspondence Between State Department and Peace Commissioners in Paris.
- Senate Document No. 205*, 57th Congress, 1st Session. Charges of Cruelty, etc. to the Natives of the Philippines.

- Senate Document No. 331*, 57th Congress, 1st Session. Comprehensive Hearings Before Committee on the Philippines in Relation to Affairs in the Philippine Islands.
- Senate Document No. 446*, 57th Congress, 1st Session. Expenditures in the Philippine Islands.
- Senate Document No. 124*, 58th Congress, 2nd Session. Shipping Between the U.S. and the Philippines.
- Senate Document No. 191*, 58th Congress, 2nd Session. Address by W.H. Taft on the Duty of Americans in the Philippines, Manila, December 17, 1903.
- Senate Document No. 95*, 59th Congress, 1st Session. Address by Senator W.P. Frye to Tobacco Growers Association on Possible Competition from Philippine Tobacco.

House and Senate Hearings and Reports

- House Committee on Insular Affairs: *Committee Reports, Hearings and Acts of Congress Corresponding Thereto*, 59th Congress. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.
- House Committee on Insular Affairs: *Committee Reports, Hearings and Acts of Congress Corresponding Thereto*, 60th Congress. Regulation of Philippine Shipping.
- House Committee on Insular Affairs: *Hearing. Statement of Honorable W.H. Taft*. 58th Congress, 2nd Session.
- House Report No. 1540*, 57th Congress, 1st Session. The Cooper Civil Government Bill.
- House Report No. 2227*, 58th Congress, 2nd Session. Guarantee of Interest on Philippine Railroad Bonds.
- House Reports No. 7559 and 8115*, 59th Congress, 1st Session. Majority and Minority Views on Establishing Agricultural Bank in the Philippines.
- House Report No. 1*, 61st Congress, 1st Session. The Payne-Aldrich Tariff Bill.
- House Report No. 606*, 62nd Congress, 2nd Session. First Jones Bill.
- House Report No. 1115*, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session. Second Jones Bill.
- Senate Report No. 915*, 57th Congress, 1st Session. Administration of Civil Government in the Philippines.
- Senate Report No. 1178*, 59th Congress, 1st Session. Philippine Tariff Laws.
- House Report No. 2298*, 61st Congress, 3rd Session. Investigation of the Administration of Philippine Lands.
- A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents*. 10 vols. Washington, 1896-1899.
- Public Hearings in the Philippines Upon Proposed Reduction of the Tariff Act*, August 1905. Bureau of Printing, Manila, 1905.

BOOKS

- Abad, Antonio K. *General Macario Sakay: Was He a Bandit or a Patriot?* Feliciano, Manila, 1955.
- Adams, Henry, *Letters Of*, Vol. II, 1892-1918. Houghton, Mifflin, N.Y., 1938.
- Agoncillo, Teodoro. *Malolos: Crisis of the Republic*. University of the Philippines, 1960.

- Agoncillo, Teodoro and Alfonso, Oscar. *A Short History of the Filipino People*. University of the Philippines, 1960.
- Aguinaldo, Gen. Emilio and Pacis, Vicente Albano. *A Second Look At America*. Robert Speller, N.Y., 1957.
- Alejandrino, Gen. Jose. *The Price of Freedom*. Colcol, Manila, 1949.
- Allen, Frederick Lewis. *The Big Change*. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1952.
- Allen, H.C. *Great Britain and the United States*. Odhams Press, London, 1954.
- Beard, Charles A. *The Idea of National Interest*. MacMillan, N.Y., 1934.
- Bemis, Samuel Flagg. *A Diplomatic History of the United States*. Henry Holt, N.Y., 1942.
- Bernstein, David. *The Philippine Story*. Farrar, Strause, N.Y., 1947.
- Birley, Robert (ed.). *Speeches and Documents in American History*, Vol. III, 1865-1913. Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1951.
- Blount, James H. *The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912*. Putnams, N.Y., 1912.
- Bowers, Claude. *Beveridge and the Progressive Era*. Houghton, Mifflin, N.Y., 1932.
- Busch, Noel F. *TR: The Story of Theodore Roosevelt and His Influence on Our Times*, Reynal & Co., N.Y., 1963.
- Cabellero, Isabello P. *Quezon: The Story of a Nation and Its Foremost Statesman*. International Publishers, Manila, 1935.
- Carter, William H. *The Life of Lieutenant-General Chaffee*. University of Chicago Press, 1917.
- Chamberlin, Fred C. *The Blow From Behind*. Lee & Shepard, Boston, 1903.
- Conant, Charles A. *The United States in the Orient*. Houghton, Mifflin, N.Y., 1900.
- Croly, Herbert. *The Promise of American Life*. N.Y., 1912.
- Crow, Carl. *America and the Philippines*. Doubleday, Page, N.Y., 1914.
- Curti, Merle. *Bryan and World Peace*. Smith College, 1931.
- Dawes, Charles G. *A Journal of the McKinley Years*.
- Dennet, Tyler. *Americans in Eastern Asia*. MacMillan, N.Y., 1922.
- Dennet, Tyler. *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War*. Doubleday, Page, N.Y., 1925.
- Dewey, George A. *Autobiography*. Scribners, N.Y., 1913.
- Dos Passos, John. *Mr. Wilson's War*. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1963.
- Dulles, Foster Rhea. *America in the Pacific*. Houghton, Mifflin, N.Y., 1938.
- Dunn, Arthur Wallace. *From Harrison to Harding*. 2 vols. Putnams, N.Y., 1922.
- Edwardes, Michael. *Asia in the European Age*. Thames & Hudson, London, 1961.
- Elliott, Charles B. *The Philippines to the End of the Military Regime*, Bobbs, Merrill, Indianapolis, 1917.
- Elliott, Charles B. *The Philippines to the End of the Commission Government*, Bobbs, Merrill, Indianapolis, 1917.
- Faulkner, Harold U. *American Economic History*. Harpers, N.Y., 1960.
- Foner, Philip S. *History of the Labor Movement in the United States*, Vols. II and III. International Publishers, N.Y., 1955.

- Forbes, W. Cameron. *The Philippine Islands*. 2 vols. Houghton, Mifflin, N.Y., 1928.
- Forbes-Lindsay, C.H. *The Philippines: Under Spanish and American Rule*. Winston, Philadelphia, 1906.
- Foreman, John. *The Philippine Islands*. Scribners, N.Y., 1905.
- Galang, Zoilo (ed.). *Encyclopedia of the Philippines*. Vol. V. Floro, Manila, 1950.
- Garraty, John A. *Henry Cabot Lodge*. Knopf, N.Y., 1953.
- Grunder, Garel A. and Livezey, William E. *The Philippines and the United States*. University of Oklahoma, 1957.
- Hagedorn, Hermann. *Leonard Wood*. 2 vols. Harpers, N.Y., 1931.
- Hartendorp, A.V.H. *History of Industry and Trade of the Philippines*. American Chamber of Commerce, Manila, 1958.
- Hugh-Jones, E.M. *Woodrow Wilson and American Liberalism*. Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1958.
- Hoar, George F. *Autobiography of 70 years*. Scribners, N.Y., 1905.
- Hobson, J.A. *Imperialism: A Study*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1902, 1938.
- Hofstadter, Richard *The Age of Reform*. Jonathan Cape, London, 1962.
- Hofstadter, Richard, (ed.). *Great Issues in American History*. Vol. II.
- Hou, Chi-ming. *Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1965.
- Jessup, Philip C. *Elihu Root*. Dodd, Mead, N.Y., 1938.
- Josephson, Matthew. *The President Makers*. Harcourt, Brace, N.Y., 1940.
- Kirk, Grayson. *Philippine Independence: Motives, Problems and Prospects*. Farrar & Rinehart, N.Y., 1936.
- Latane, J.H. *America as a World Power*. Harper & Bros., N.Y., 1907.
- LeRoy, James A. *Philippine Life in Town and Country*. Putnams, N.Y., 1905.
- Liang, Dapan. *The Development of Philippine Political Parties*. South China Morning Post, Hongkong, 1939.
- Lord, Walter. *The Good Years*. Longmans, London, 1960.
- Mabini, Apolinario. *The Philippine Revolution*.
- Maddison, Angus. *Economic Growth of the West*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1964.
- Mahan, Alfred T. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*. Sampson, Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, London, 1887.
- Majul, Cesar Adib. *Mabini and the Philippine Revolution*. University of the Philippines, 1960.
- Miles, Gen. Nelson A. *Serving the Republic*.
- Miller, Marion Mills (ed.). *Great Debates in American History*. Vol. III. Current Literature, N.Y., 1913.
- Moon, Parker Thomas. *Imperialism and World Politics*. MacMillan, N.Y., 1939.
- Morris, Richard B. (ed.). *Encyclopedia of American History*. Harpers, N.Y., 1953.
- Morrison, Samuel Eliot and Commager, Henry Steele. *The Growth of the American Republic*. Vol. II. Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1962.
- Moses, Edith. *Unofficial Letters of an Official's Wife*. Appleton, N.Y., 1908.
- Mowry, George E. *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, 1900-1912*. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1964.

- New Cambridge Modern History*. Vol. XI. Cambridge University Press, 1962.
- Oberholtzer, Ellis Paxton. *A History of the United States Since The Civil War*. Vol. V. MacMillan, N.Y., 1937.
- Olcott, Charles S. *The Life of William McKinley*. 2 vols. Houghton, Mifflin, N.Y., 1916.
- Palma, Rafael. *My Autobiography*. Capitol Publishers, Manila, 1953.
- Pratt, Julius W. *Expansionists of 1898*. Peter Smith, Gloucester, 1959.
- Pringle, Henry F. *The Life and Times of William Howard Taft*. 2 vols. Farrar & Rinehart, N.Y., 1939.
- Quezon, Manuel Luis. *The Good Fight*. Appleton-Century, N.Y., 1946.
- Regidor, Antonio M. and Mason, Warren J. *Commercial Progress in the Philippine Islands*. Dunn & Chidzey, London, 1905.
- Reyes, Jose S. *Legislative History of America's Economic Policy Toward the Philippines*. Columbia University, N.Y., 1923.
- Roosevelt, Theodore, *Letters Of*. 8 vols. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1951.
- Root, Elihu. *The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1916.
- Rose, Saul. *Britain and Southeast Asia*. Chatto & Windus, London, 1962.
- Schurman, Jacob Gould. *Philippine Affairs: A Retrospect and Outlook*. Scribners, N.Y., 1902.
- Schurman Papers*. Collection in Cornell University Library.
- Storey, Moorfield and Lichauco, Marcial. *The Conquest of the Philippines*. Putnams, N.Y., 1926.
- Storey, Moorfield. *The Democratic Party and Philippine Independence*. Ellis, Boston, 1913.
- Stuntz, Homer C. *The Philippines and the Far East*. Jennings & Dye, Cincinnati, 1904.
- Sullivan, Mark. *Our Times: The United States, 1900-1925*. Vol. I. Scribners, N.Y., 1926.
- Swados, Harvey. *The Muckrakers*. World Publishing Co., N.Y., 1962.
- Taft, Mrs. William H. *Recollections of Full Years*. Dodd-Mead, N.Y., 1914.
- Thayer, William Roscoe. *Life and Letters of John Hay*. Houghton, Mifflin, N.Y., 1915.
- Thompson, David. *World History From 1914 to 1961*. Oxford University Press, 1963.
- Van Alstyne, R.W. *The Rising American Empire*. Blackwell, Oxford, 1960.
- Williams, Daniel R. *The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission*. McClurg, Chicago, 1913.
- Williams, William Appleman. *The Contours of American History*. Jonathan Cape, London, 1961.
- Williamson, Harold E. (ed). *The Growth of the American Economy*. Prentice-Hall, N.J., 1951.
- Willis, Henry Parker. *Our Philippine Problem*. Henry Holt, N.Y., 1905.
- Wolff, Leon. *Little Brown Brother*. Doubleday, N.Y., 1960.
- Worcester, Dean C. *The Philippines: Past and Present*. MacMillan, N.Y., 1930.

ARTICLES IN PERIODICALS AND PAMPHLETS

- Africa, Bernabe. "Did the United States Acquire the Philippines from Spain by Purchase?" *Philippine Social Science Review*, Nov.-Dec., 1939, Manila.
- American Federationist*, March, 1899.
- Bailey, Thomas A. "Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate for Imperialism?" *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, June 1937.
- Barrett, John. "The Problem of the Philippines." *North American Review*, September 1898.
- Barrett, John. "American Interests in the Far East." Address before Chamber of Commerce of New York, June 1, 1899. (Pamphlet)
- Beveridge, Sen. Albert J. "Development of a Colonial Policy for the United States." *Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July 1907.
- Braisted, William R. "The Philippine Naval Base Problem, 1898-1909." *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, September 1932.
- Brent, Bishop Charles H. "American Democracy in the Orient." *North American Review*, September 1905.
- Brent, Bishop Charles H. "Tyranny or Democracy—Which?" *The Outlook*, July 14, 1906.
- Brent, Bishop Charles H. "On U.S. Responsibility in the Philippines." *The Outlook*, June 1913.
- Bryan, W.J. and Beveridge, A.J. "Debate: On Imperialism." *The Reader*, July 1907.
- Cablenews American*. Yearly Review. Manila, 1911.
- Carnegie, Andrew. "Americanism vs. Imperialism." *North American Review*, June 1899.
- Central Bank of the Philippines. *Statistical Bulletin*, Vol. XVII-4, December 1965, Manila.
- Coletta, Paulo. "Bryan, McKinley and the Treaty of Paris." *Pacific Historical Review*, May 1937.
- Conant, Charles A. "The Economic Future of the Philippines." *Atlantic Monthly*, March 1902.
- Conant, Charles A. "William H. Taft: Peacemaker of the Philippines" *Putnams Monthly*, October 1908.
- Dolliver, Senator. "Significance of the Anglo-American Alliance," *North American Review*, April 1902.
- Dunnell, M.B. "Our Policy in China." *North American Review*, October 1898.
- Edwards, Col. Clarence R. "The Work of the Bureau of Insular Affairs." *National Geographic Magazine*, June 1904.
- Fonacier, Tomas A. "The Chinese Exclusion Policy in the Philippines." *Philippine Social Science and Humanities Review*, March 1949.
- Filipino People, The*, October 1912, Washington.
- Forbes, W. Cameron. "A Decade of American Rule in the Philippines." *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1909.
- Foreman, John. "The Americans in the Philippines." *Contemporary Review*, September 1904, London.

- Foreman, John. "American Democracy in the Orient." *North American Review*, January 1906.
- Fukien Times Yearbook*, 1963, Manila.
- Guerrero, Leon Ma. "The Kaiser and the Philippines." *Philippine Studies*, October 1961, Manila.
- Hammond, J.H. "American Commercial Interests in the Far East." *Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July 1905.
- Harrington, Fred A. "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898-1900." *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, September 1935.
- Harrington, Fred A. "Literary Aspects of American Anti-Imperialism, 1898-1902." *New England Quarterly*, December 1937.
- Hoxie, R.F. "The American Colonial Policy and the Tariff." *Journal of Political Economy*, March 1903.
- Ide, Henry C. "Banking, Currency and Finance in the Philippine Islands." *Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July 1907.
- Jones, William A. "Misgovernment in the Philippines." Speech of January 28, 1913. (Pamphlet).
- Lanzar, Maria C. "The Anti-Imperialist League." *Philippine Social Science Review*, August 1930, November 1930, July 1933, October 1933.
- LeRoy, James A. "Race Prejudice in the Philippines." *Atlantic Monthly*, July 1902.
- Le Roy, James A. "Japan and the Philippines." *Atlantic Monthly*, January 1907.
- Lodge, Henry Cabot. "Our Blundering Foreign Policy." *Forum*, March 1895.
- McPhelin, Michael. "The Purchase of Meralco." *Philippine Studies*, July 1961, Manila.
- Minger, Ralph Eldin. "Taft, MacArthur and the Establishment of Civil Government in the Philippines." *Ohio Historical Quarterly*, October 1961.
- Morton, Louis. "Military and Naval Preparations for the Defense of the Philippines During the War Scare of 1907." *Military Affairs*, Summer 1949.
- Nation, The*, January 18, 1906. (Editorial, "One Way Out of the Philippines.")
- Newlands, Senator F. "A Democrat in the Philippines." *North American Review*, December 1905.
- Osborne, John Hall. "Protection of American Commerce and Capital Abroad." *North American Review*, May 1912.
- Overland Monthly*, May 1908. "Philippine Railroad Progress."
- Parker, Donald B. "Church and State in the Philippines, 1896-1906." *Philippine Social Science Review*, November 1938.
- Parsons, E.C. "American Snobbishness in the Philippines." *The Independent*, February 1906.
- Peffer, Senator. "A Republic in the Philippines." *North American Review*, March 1899.
- Philippine Review, The*, March 1902.
- Pratt, Julius W. "The Large Policy of 1898." *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, September 1932.
- Radosh, Ronald and Davies, Horace B. "American Labor and the Anti-Imperialist Movement." *Science and Society*, Winter 1964.

- Rollins, John W. "The Anti-Imperialists and Twentieth Century American Foreign Policy." *Studies on the Left*, Vol. III, 2, 1962.
- Schurz, Carl. "Thoughts on American Imperialism." *Century Magazine*, September 1898.
- Shuster, Morgan W. "Shall the Philippines Have a 4th of July?" *Century Magazine*, January 1914.
- Taft, William Howard. "Address Delivered Before the Chamber of Commerce of the States of New York," April 21, 1904. (Pamphlet.)
- Taft, William Howard. "The Philippine Islands." Address delivered before the Chautauqua Society, August 11, 1904. (Pamphlet.)
- Taft, William Howard. "Holding the Philippine Islands." Address delivered before the Academy of Music, Brooklyn, November 13, 1913. (Pamphlet.)
- Vanderlip, Frank A. "Facts About the Philippines." *Century Magazine*, August 1898.
- Vest, Senator G.G. "Objections to Annexing the Philippines." *North American Review*, January 1899.
- Welliver, Judson C. "The Mormon Church and the Sugar Trust." *Hampton's Magazine*, January 1910.
- Winslow, Erving, "Neutralization." *North American Review*, September 1907.
- Worcester, Dean C. "Knotty Problems of the Philippines." *Century Magazine*, October 1898.

INDEX

- abaca (hemp) trade, 175-77
 Adams, Brooks, 28
 Adams, Charles Francis, 103, 117, 202
 Adams, Henry, 28, 36
 Addams, Jane, 103
 Adler, Felix, 104, 202, 204
 Agoncillo, Felipe, 38-39, 52, 54
 agricultural bank (Philippine), 89
 Aguinaldo, Emilio, 38-43, 45, 54, 64-65, 68, 70, 72, 80, 93, 107, 110
 Alderman, Edwin A., 202
 Aldrich, Thomas Bailey, 104
 Alger, Secretary of War, 76, 80
 American Asiatic Association, 29, 49, 152
 American Beet Sugar Co., 105
 American China Development Co., 29, 49
 American Federation of Labor, 99
 American Sugar Refining Co., 206-07
 Anderson, Col. George S., 92
 Anderson, Gen. T.H., 42
 Andre, Consul, 52, 66
 Angell, James Burrill, 104
 Anglo-American Committee, 49
 Anglo-American League, 49
 Anglo-Japanese Treaty, 156, 166
 Anti-Imperialist League, 101-09, 111-14, 116-17, 129, 162, 198, 201-05, 207, 209, 217-18, 220
 Araneta, Gregorio, 66
 Arellano, Cayetano, 66
 Arguelles, Col., 76-77
 Astor, John Jacob, 31
 Atkinson, Edward, 21, 103, 105, 109, 220
 Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 183
 Austria-Hungary, 53
 Bacon, Sen. Augustus O., 59, 61, 62, 104
 Baguio, 130
 Baldwin, W.H., 202
 Balfour, Prime Minister, 48
 Bandolerismo Statute, 96
Baptist Standard, 47
 Barrett, John, 30, 110, 152
 Barrows, David, 126
 Becker, George F., 33, 47, 51_N
 Bell, Gen. J. Franklin, 95, 96, 160, 170
 Beresford, Lord Charles, 153
 Betts, A.J., 97
 Beveridge, Sen. Albert J., 33, 90, 137, 196
 Bishop, Capt. William, 88
 Blount, J.H., 26
 Bonifacio, Andres, 37
 Bournes, Frank S., 52, 72, 81
 Boutwell, George S., 103
 Bowles, Samuel, 103
 Boxer Revolt, 155
 Bradford, Gamaliel, 100, 103, 111
 Brewster, Bishop Chauncey B., 202
 Brinkerhoff, George R., 202
 Britain, 18, 27-28, 48-49, 126, 130, 153-55, 163-64, 172-74, 188
 Bryan, William Jennings, 57-58, 60-62, 104, 108, 112-13, 116-17, 197, 199
 Bud Dajo, 98
 Buencamino, Felipe, 66
 Burgess, Cong., 162
 Burlingame, Anson, 16
 Burlingham, Charles C., 204

- Burnham, George, Jr., 202
 Burrows, Sen., 90

 Caffrey, Donelson, 104
 Carmack, Sen., 127
 Carnegie, Andrew, 24, 56-57, 105,
 111, 117, 203-04
 Carpenter, Frank, 28
 Carlisle, John G., 103
 Carter, James Coolidge, 103
 Catholic Church, 47-48
 Cavite, 43
 Chadwick, John White, 103
 Chaffee, Gen., Adnan, 94
 Chappelle, Archbishop Placido
 Louis, 53, 85
 Chase, George W., 202
 China, 16-17, 27-30, 48, 52, 73,
 82, 151-56, 159
 China Consortium, 163-64
 Chun, Prince, 164
 Civil Service Act (Philippine), 138
 Clark, Champ, 104
 Clarke Amendment, 215, 217
 Clarke, Sen. James P., 215
 Cleveland, Pres. Grover, 25, 103,
 108, 117
 Colonial Advisory Board (War
 Dept.), 73-74
 Colonial Department, 131-32
 Committee of Correspondence,
 101
 Committee on American Interests
 in China, 29
 Conant, Charles A., 107, 182
 Cooper Bill, 184, 187
 Cooper, Cong. Henry W., 127
 Conger, E.H., 152
 Constabulary, Philippine, 84, 130
 Cortes, Spanish, 37
 cotton trade, 174-75, 192-93
 Couer d'Alene strike, 100
 Crane, Richard T., 105
 Crane, Sen., 162

 Croly, Herbert, 165
 Crosby, Ernest, 103, 105
 Crow, Carl, 221
 Crowninshield, Arent S., 166
 Cuba, 26-27, 31-32, 48, 53, 61,
 100, 116, 120, 198-99, 205-6,
 220
 Cutting, Robert Fulton, 105, 202
 Cuyler, Theodore, 103

 Davis, Sen. Cushman K., 50
 Day, Sec. William R., 35-36, 40,
 50-51
 Declaration of War on Spain, 32-
 33
 De Forrest, Robert W., 204
 Democratic Party, 106-08, 112-
 113, 163, 197-200, 203, 211-12
 Denby, Charles, 29, 72-73, 76-77,
 80-82, 152
 Dewey, Adm. George A., 13, 31,
 33, 38-43, 49, 71, 81-82, 100,
 126
 Diederichs, Adm., 49
 Dingley Tariff, 122-23
 Dodge, Cleveland H., 204
 Dole, S. B., 25
 Draper, Cong. William H., 15
 Dubois, Sen., 127
 Dunne, Peter Finley, 104

 Edmunds, George F., 204
 Edwards, Col. Clarence P., 173
 Eliot, Charles W., 202
 Estes, Dana, 105

 Farley, Cardinal, 203
 Farmer, W.N.P., 202
 Federalista Party, 148-49
 Ferris, Cong., 210
 Field, Marshall, 204
 Filipino Progress League, 204-05
 Fish, Stuyvesant, 31
 Flint, Lt. Grover, 90-91

- Forbes, W. Cameron, 98, 151, 202, 211-10
Folger, Rear-Admiral William M., 169
Formosa, 14, 27, 73
Foraker, Sen. Joseph B., 139
France, 16, 47-48, 52-53, 126, 154, 156
Fry, Sen. William D., 50
Fuller, Henry B., 104-05
Funston, Gen., 110

Gardner, Cornelius, 146
Garret, Philip C., 202
Garrison, Lindley M., 215
George, Henry, 103
Germany, 15, 48, 52-53, 126, 153-55, 167, 214
Gibbons, Cardinal James, 50, 202, 215
Giddings, Franklin Henry, 104, 111
Gilder, Richard Watson, 204
Godkin, E. L., 103
Gompers, Samuel, 22, 24, 100, 105, 107
Grand Army of the Republic, 110
Gray, Sen. George, 50, 60, 72, 202
Greer, Bishop David H., 202, 204
Guam, 35
Guaranty Trust Co., 188

Hagashi, Count, 160
Hagedorn, Lt. Ernst, 92
Hale, Edward Everett, 204
Hale, Sen., 116
Harden, Edward W., 47, 51, 52_N
Harlan, John M., 142
Harriman, E. H., 152, 160, 196
Harrison, Francis Burton, 216
Harrison, Pres., 25, 103
Harvey, George, 163
Hatfold, Sen., 124
Havemeyer, Horace, 207

Hawaii, 15, 25, 33, 132, 158, 71
Hay, John, 28, 49, 56, 78, 80, 116, 131, 154, 157, 166
hemp trade, 18
Higginson, Henry L., 204
Higginson, Thomas Wentworth, 104
Hill, David J., 78-79
Hill, J. J., 151, 180-81, 196
Hill, Walter B., 202
Hippisley, Alfred E., 154
Hoar, Sen. George F., 62, 104, 108-09, 116, 120-21, 125, 221_N
Hobart, Vice-Pres. Garrett, 61
Hobson, J. A., 19-20
Hongkong, 35, 40, 41, 48-49
Hood, Charles S., 92
Howells, William Dean, 104, 202
Hughes, Gen. Robert P., 89-90, 126
Hyde, William DeWitt, 202

Ide, Henry C., 134, 140, 151
Insular Cases, 121-24
Insular Affairs, Bureau of, 129, 132
International Banking Corp., 186, 188-189
Investment, U.S. domestic, 190-95
Investment, U.S. in Philippines, 222-23
Investment, U.S. overseas, 150, 164, 167-68
Ireland, Archbishop John, 50

James, William, 104, 202
Japan, 13-14, 27, 48, 132, 153-63, 165-66, 169, 214-15
Joint Army and Navy Board, 168-69, 171
Jones Bill, 210-13, 215-18, 220, 224-25
Jones, Cong. William A., 210

- Jordan, David Starr, 104, 107-08, 202
- Katipunan, 37-38, 66
- Katsura, Count, 159
- Kennedy, John S., 204
- Kiel, 48
- King, Henry Churchill, 202
- Kipling, Rudyard, 105
- Knox, Philander, 164
- Korea, 13-14, 153, 156, 158-59, 161-62
- Laughlin, J. Lawrence, 202
- Lawton, Gen., 69, 110
- Legarda, Benito, 66
- Liberty Meeting, 101
- Lieber, Francis, 87
- Littlefield, Cong., 116
- Lodge, Henry Cabot, 28, 30, 33, 36, 40, 108, 114-15, 119-20, 125-26, 137, 151, 196-97, 203
- Long, Secretary, 31, 43
- Lowell, Charles Russel, 204
- Lowell, Josephine, 103, 202-04
- Lowenstein, Mr., 178-79
- Ludlow, Gen. William S., 100
- Lukban, Vicente, 94
- Luna, Antonio, 54, 66
- Mabini, Apolinario, 41, 54, 66, 77, 143
- MacArthur, Gen. Arthur, 86-89, 93, 126, 134-36, 138-43, 176
- Magoon, Charles E., 122
- Mahan, Capt. Alfred T., 15, 30, 35, 165-66, 227
- Malvar, Gen. Miguel, 96
- Manchuria, 53
- Manila-Dagupan Railroad, 172, 185-87
- Manila Electric Railway and Light Co (Meralco), 183, 222
- Martin, Cong., 206, 208-09
- Mason, Sen. William E., 59
- McCall, Cong. S. W., 22, 116, 162, 202
- McCook, James J., 153
- Massachusetts Reform Club, 101
- McEnery, Sen. Samuel D., 61-62
- McGinity, T. J., 104
- McKinley, Mrs., 48
- McKinley, Pres. William, 26, 29, 32-33, 35, 43-44, 46-48, 50-51, 54-56, 58-59, 60, 66-67, 70, 72-74, 82-84, 93, 109, 111-12, 115-17, 121, 125, 133, 139, 143, 150, 153-54, 201
- McKinley Tariff, 25
- McVeagh, Wayne, 202
- McVickar, Bishop W.N., 202
- Meade, Commodore, 14-15
- Merritt, Gen. Wesley, 43-45, 52, 64, 75
- Metcalfe, Maj. Wilder, 88
- Methodist Episcopal Church, 47
- Miles, Gen. Nelson, 43
- Military Order of the Carabao, 136
- Miller, Gen., 68
- Mitchell, James T., 204
- Moody, William Vaughn, 104
- Morgan, J. P., 139, 151, 153, 163, 185, 191, 196
- Morrill, Justin, 104
- Moses, Bernard, 140
- Naval War Board, 35, 166-68
- Neutralization of the Philippines, 162-63
- "New Freedom," The, 224
- Newlands, Sen., 178-79
- North American Bible Society, 47
- Northwest Securities Case, 196
- Norton, Charles Eliot, 104
- Nozaleda, Archbishop, 85
- "Open Door," The, 154-55, 159
- Ordway, Edward, 202, 204

- Organic Act, Philippine, 124, 127-29, 132, 140, 148, 150-51, 169, 182, 201, 206, 220
- Osborne, Thomas Mott, 216
- Otis, Gen. Elwell, 64-77, 81, 84-85, 109-10, 126
- Pact of Biak-na-Bato, 38
- Page, Walter Hines, 28
- Palmer, Gen. William J., 202
- Panama Canal, 166-68
- Parker, Alton B., 199
- Parker, Dr. Peter, 14
- Parkhurst, Charles H., 103, 202-03
- Patterson, Sen., 90, 127, 128
- Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act, 177, 187, 205-07, 214, 221-22
- Peabody, George Foster, 105, 202
- Peace Commission, U.S., 50-54, 56
- Peace protocol, Spanish-American, 47
- Pearl Harbor, 26, 35
- Peele, Hubbell and Co., 17-18
- Perkins, Lt. Alvin S., 91
- Perry, Bliss, 202
- Perry, Commodore Matthew, 13-14
- Pettigrew, R. F., 104
- Pingree, Hazen, 103
- Philippine Assembly, 208, 211, 216
- Philippine Independence Committee, 202-03
- Philippine Independence Mission, 217
- Philippine National Bank, 189
- Philippine Republic, 38
- Philippines, 17-18, 24, 35, 41-44, 46, 50-54, 56-60, 62, 64-83, 84-98, 100, 114
- Platt Amendment, 69, 116, 199
- Poole, E. H., 207
- Populist Movement, 23-24, 57
- Port Arthur, siege of, 167, 170
- Porter, Henry Kirk, 204
- Portsmouth, Treaty of, 159-60
- Potter, Bishop Henry Codman, 103, 202
- Pratt, Spencer, 40
- Presbyterian Mission Society, 47
- Puerto Rico, 100, 132
- Pullman strike, 1894, 19
- Quezon, Manuel Luis, 216, 218
- Railroad investment, U.S., in Philippines, 184-187
- Ralston, Jackson H., 207-08
- Rawlins, Sen., 89-90
- Reed, Speaker Thomas B., 104, 107, 117
- reform movement, 195-96
- Regan, Archbishop P. J., 202
- Reid, Whitelaw, 28, 50, 56
- religious groups, attitude of, 20-21, 27
- Remey, Rear-Admiral George C., 168-69
- Republican Party, 199-200, 203
- Rizal, Jose, 15
- Rockefeller, William, 31
- Rockhill, W. W., 154
- Roosevelt, Pres. Franklin D., 224
- Roosevelt, Pres. Theodore, 30-31, 40, 93, 96, 107, 117, 124-25, 131, 155, 157-58, 160-62, 165-66, 170-71, 184, 188, 195-96, 203-5
- Root, Elihu, 92-93, 100, 119-20, 122, 125, 127, 130-35, 141-43, 147, 176, 181, 188, 196-97, 203, 208, 221, 226
- Root-Takahira Agreement, 162
- Rose, V. M., 202
- Russell, Sturgis and Co., 16-17
- Russia, 27, 47-48, 52, 153-58, 163
- Russo-Japanese War, 132, 157-60,

- 167-68
 Ryan, Thomas Fortune, 31
- Sakay, Macario, 96, 148
 Salomon and Co., William, 186
 Samoa, 14-15, 35
 Samseh Bay, 155, 166
 San Jose sugar estate case, 206-10
 Schieffelin, William Jay, 204
 Schurman, Jacob, 71-74, 76-77, 79-84, 98, 101, 104, 111, 115, 117, 126, 129, 131, 140, 162, 201-04, 217
 Schurz, Carl, 22, 103, 107, 111, 117
 Seligman, Edwin R. A., 202
 Senff, C. H., 207-08
 Seward, George F., 202-04
 Seward, Secretary, 14
 Sharpless, Isaac, 203
 Shaw, Albert, 28
 Shepard, Edward M., 103
 Sherman, John, 103
 shipping interests, U.S., 180-81
 Sicard, Montgomery, 166
 Singapore, 35
 Slayden, Cong. James L., 221_N
 Smith, Edward Burritt, 103, 111
 Smith, Gen. Jacob H., 94-95
 Smith, Hoke, 203
 Smith, Rufus B., 203
 Spaulding, Bishop J. L., 203
 Speyer and Co., 185, 189
 Spooner Bill, 118-121, 124, 143
 Spooner, Sen. John C., 118
 Spreckles sugar interests, 26
 Stanley, G., 202
 Steffens, Lincoln, 195
 Storey, Moorfield, 100, 103, 105, 108, 109, 126, 162, 207, 209, 217-18
 Straight, Willard, 152, 163
 Strong, J. Montgomery, 207
 Stuntz, Rev. Homer, 91
 Sumner, William Graham, 104,
- 203
 Swift, Charles M., 183, 186
- Taft, Charles, 140-41
 Taft, Henry W., 207
 Taft Philippine Commission, 111, 118-119, 121, 123, 125, 130, 133, 136, 138, 141-42, 145, 157
 Taft, William Howard, 93, 96, 118-21, 124-28, 133-36, 138-47, 151-52, 158-59, 161-63, 165, 172, 178, 181-82, 185, 187, 190, 194, 200, 205, 207-08, 211, 215, 221
 Tavera, T.H. Pardo de, 66, 72
 Teller Amendment, 36, 61
 Teller, Sen. Henry, 32-33
 Thoburn, Bishop James Mill, 47
 Thompson, Robert Ellis, 203
 Tillman, Sen. Benjamin ("Pitchfork Ben"), 104, 106
 tobacco interests, U.S.; (attitude to Philippines), 189
 Torres, Florentino, 66, 69, 76
 Treaty of Paris, 52-54, 172
 Treaty of Whanghia, 16
 Tshushima Straits, Battle of, 158-59
 Twain, Mark, 104-105
- U.S. Steel Corporation, 112, 151
- Valentine, John J., 105
 Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 186
 Vanderlip, Frank A., 47
 Van Dyke, Henry, 103, 203
 Von Holst, Herman E., 104
 Van Rensselaer, Mrs. Schuyler, 204
 Vatican, 49-50, 53, 206
 Vest, Sen. George G., 57-58, 107
 Veterans Army of the Philippines, 136
 Von Bulow, Bernhard, 41-42

- Walker, Brisbane, 111
Waller, Maj. L. W. T., 95
Wanamaker, John, 204
Warren, Fiske, 217
Welborn, W. C., 177-78
Welch, Charles J., 207-08
Welsh, Herbert, 109
White, Horace, 203-04
Wildman, Rounseville, 38
Wilhelm, Kaiser, 41
Williams, Cong. John Sharp, 210
Williams, Consul Oscar, 29-30, 39
Willis, Henry Parker, 109
Wilson, James, 30
Wilson, Pres. Woodrow, 22, 136-37, 164, 197, 199, 205, 210, 215-16, 224
Winslow, Erving, 103, 162-63, 204, 218
Wise, John, 103
Wood, Capt., 39
Wood, Gen. Leonard, 97, 160, 169, 170, 171
Woodruff, Francis F., 204
Worcester, Dean, 72-73, 76-77, 79-82, 140, 151, 182, 207-09
Wright, Luke E., 140, 146, 147, 151